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Abstract: 
 
Laboratory experimentation was once considered impossible or irrelevant in 
economics. Recently, however, economic science has gone through a real 
‘laboratory revolution’, and experimental economics is now a most lively subfield 
of the discipline. The methodological advantages and disadvantages of controlled 
experimentation constitute the main subject of this thesis. After a survey of the 
literature on experiments in philosophy and economics (chapter one), the problem 
of testing normative theories of rationality is tackled (chapter two). This 
philosophical issue was at the centre of a famous controversy in decision theory 
(the ‘Allais controversy’), during which a methodology of normative falsification 
was first articulated and used to assess experimental results. In the third chapter, 
the methodological advantages of controlled experimentation are illustrated and 
discussed with examples taken from the experiments on the so-called ‘preference 
reversal’ phenomenon. Laboratory testing allows to establish with a high degree 
of certainty that certain phenomena lie behind the experimental data, by means of 
independent testing, elimination of alternative hypotheses, and the use of different 
instruments of observation. The fourth chapter is devoted to a conceptual analysis 
of the problem of ‘parallelism’. This is the problem of inferring from the 
occurrence of a phenomenon in the laboratory, to its (possible) instantiation also 
in non-laboratory environments. Experimental economists have discussed 
parallelism at length, and their views are presented and criticised. Eventually, it is 
argued that parallelism is a factual matter and as such can only be established on 
empirical grounds. The fifth chapter provides an example of how one can argue 
for parallelism, focusing on the case of experimentation on the ‘winner’s curse’ 
phenomenon. The role of experiments as ‘mediators’ between theoretical models 
and their target domain of application is illustrated, and the structure of parallelism 
arguments analysed in detail. Finally, in the last chapter, economic experiments 
are compared to simulations, in order to highlight their specific characteristics. 
 
 3 
 
 
Acknowledgments: 
 
The greatest debt goes to my supervisors, John Worrall and Philippe Mongin. 
Not only they have read all the preliminary drafts of this thesis, criticised them, 
and advised me how to improve them; they have taught me how to think 
philosophically in the first place. I should also thank all my other teachers at the 
London School of Economics, and in particular Dan Hausman and Nancy 
Cartwright, who have read extended parts of the manuscript and have strongly 
influenced my views on economic science. Various chapters have been improved 
thanks to Paul Anand, Roger Backhouse, Marco Del Seta, Donald Gillies, 
Brendan Larvor, Peter Lipton, Mary Morgan, Matteo Motterlini, Andrea Salanti, 
Bob Sugden, Sang Wook Yi, and a few anonymous referees. Members of the 
research students’ seminar, the ‘Modelling’ and the ‘Measurement in Physics and 
Economics’ group at the LSE, and the Experimental Economics seminar at the 
University of East Anglia have also provided me with comments, suggestions, and 
a number of challenging critiques. I also thank audiences at the ‘Economie et 
philosophie’ seminar in Paris 1997, the University of Trento workshop on 
Economic Experiments 1998, the Model-Based Reasoning conference held in 
Pavia 1998, and the Italian Society for Logic and Philosophy of Science 1999, 
where some of the arguments have been tested. Thanks to all the researchers and 
staff at THEMA, University of Cergy-Pontoise, for their hospitality in the Spring 
terms of 1997 and 1998. While writing this thesis, I have been supported 
financially by a Marie Curie grant (TMR) from the European Community, a 
British Academy scholarship, and logistically by the Centre for Philosophy of 
Natural and Social Science at the LSE. The CPNSS has been a fantastic 
environment, for the invaluable intellectual stimuli it has provided, and for the 
people I met there. In particular, thanks Cynthia, Dorotha, George, Julian, 
Klementina, Kate, Makiko, and Sang. A special mention goes to Marco, Matteo 
and Sebastiano for their friendship, and for having diverted my thoughts from 
philosophy to football and other important matters during lunch breaks. Finally, I 
must thank Francesca and Francesca, who have made me happier. 
 4 
 
Contents: 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction: philosophy, experiments, and economics 
1. The laboratory turn in philosophy and economics                     7  
2. Experimental economics in a nutshell                                       9 
3. Philosophies of experiment                                                      14 
4. The background: traditional philosophy of science                 15 
5. The sociology of science                                                          17 
6. The sociology of the laboratory                                                18 
7. Tacit knowledge and underdetermination                                20 
8. The epistemology of experiment                                              23 
9. Experimenters’ philosophy                                                       31 
10. Methodological monism and pluralism                                  33 
11. The unbearable lightness of economic methodology             35 
12. How to (dis-)solve the dilemma                                             37 
13. The strategy of this dissertation                                              41 
14. The content of this dissertation                                              43 
 
Chapter 2. Testing Normative Theories: the debate on expected utility 
theory 
1. Introduction                                                                               46 
2. The rise of expected utility theory                                            50 
3. Is every ‘counterexample’ a counterexample? Normativism 
and its problems                                                                            58 
4. Generalisations                                                                         69 
5. Intransitive behaviour                                                               79 
6. Conclusions                                                                              85 
 
Chapter 3. Phenomena and Artefacts: preference reversals and the 
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism. 
1. Introduction                                                                               88 
2. Experiments                                                                              90 
3. Preference reversals                                                                  92 
4. Data and phenomena                                                                 95 
5. Artefacts                                                                                    97 
6. Explaining preference reversals away                                      98 
7. Theories and instruments                                                        107 
8. Theory ladenness                                                                    108 
 5 
 
9. Fallibility and reliability                                                         116 
10. Independent tests                                                                  120 
11. Phenomena without (a unique) theory                                  127 
12. The reality of reversals                                                         133 
13. Replication and reproduction                                               134 
14 Conclusions                                                                           136 
 
Chapter 4. The Problem of ‘Parallelism’: some conceptual analysis and an 
application. 
1. Introduction                                                                            138 
2. The relation of parallelism: a preliminary discussion            143 
3. Metaphysical versions of parallelism                                     145 
4. Methodological versions of parallelism                                 148 
5. A methodological detour                                                        153 
6. Empirical versions of parallelism (I)                                      165 
7. Testing the robustness of preference reversals                       169 
8. Empirical versions of parallelism (II)                                     173 
9. Conclusion                                                                              177 
 
Chapter 5. Experiments as Mediators: testing the ‘winner’s curse’ 
hypothesis 
1. Introduction                                                                             181 
2. (Re)producing the winner’s curse phenomenon                     184 
3. Parallelism and underdetermination                                       188 
4. Models                                                                                    190 
5. Mediators                                                                                195 
6. Tightening the bridge                                                              205 
7. Parallelism as analogy                                                            210 
 
Chapter 6. Conclusion: simulating experiments, experimental simulations 
1. Summary                                                                                 218 
2. Experiments and simulations                                                  219 
3. Experimental simulations                                                       225 
4. Mediating entities, mimetic devices                                       230 
 
Bibliography                                                                                              231 
 6 
 
List of tables and figures: 
 
Chapter 2 
Table: The Allais paradox                                                                            56 
Table: The ‘two cardinalities’ issue                                                              57 
Figures 1a-1b: The ‘hard core’ of EU theory                                                72 
Figure 2: Indifference lines compatible with Allais’ results                         76                           
Figure 3: The ‘fanning out’ effect                                                                 77 
 
Chapter 3 
Figure 1: A compound lottery A and its reduced counterpart R(A)           100 
Figure 2: The lottery A                                                                               103 
Figure 3: The lottery A’                                                                              104 
Figure 4: The lottery R(A)                                                                          105 
Figure 5: The duck-rabbitt                                                                          113 
Figure 6: Wilson’s cloud-chamber event                                                    115 
 
Chapter 4 
Table: Different kinds of ‘artefacts’                                                           141 
 
Chapter 5 
Figure 1: Hughes’ DDI account                                                                  199 
Figure 2: The path from theoretical models to the real world                    201 
Figure 3: Experiments as mediators                                                           203 
Figure 4: Three demonstrations in parallel                                                 211 
Figure 5: Parallelism as analogy                                                                 214
 7 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction 
Philosophy, experiments, and economics 
 
 
‘We must next deal with its style of 
presentation, and so cover both what is to 
be said and how it is to be said.’ 
(Plato, The Republic, Part 3, 392c) 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1. The laboratory turn in philosophy and in economics 
 
To quote famous economists on the irrelevance or even the impossibility of 
controlled testing is one economic experimenters’ favourite games. One may start 
with John Stuart Mill: “there is a property common to almost all the moral 
sciences, and by which they are distinguished from many of the physical; that is, 
that it is seldom in our power to make experiments in them”. “Our belief [in 
economic generalisations]” writes Lionel Robbins “does not rest upon the results 
of controlled experiments”. According to Milton Friedman, “we can seldom test 
particular predictions in the social sciences by experiments explicitly designed to 
eliminate what are judged to be the most important disturbing influences”; and 
Richard Lipsey claims that “economics must be a non-laboratory science”, given 
that “it is rarely, if ever, possible to conduct controlled experiments with the 
economy”. Samuelson and Nordhaus say that “economists [...] cannot perform 
the controlled experiments of chemists or biologists because they cannot easily 
 
 
 8 
 
control other important factors”, and even in the Encyclopedia Britannica one 
reads that “there is no laboratory in which economists can test their hypotheses”.1  
 
Nowadays, claims such as these have become rather obsolete. Economists do 
perform controlled experiments and do test their theories in the laboratory. Since 
the early sixties economics has been going through a ‘laboratory revolution’ like 
those that have irreversibly shaped other sciences in the past. Experimental 
economics is today an established sub-field of economics, experimental papers 
are published constantly in the best journals,2 experimentalists hold chairs in the 
most prestigious departments, and some of them are even forecasted as possible 
Nobel laureates. 
 
The laboratory revolution, however, is still ‘in progress’. It is hard to say how 
deeply it has affected economic science, or whether it is just a temporary fashion 
that will leave no permanent mark on the discipline. Even sciences which have 
endorsed experimental practice as a basic methodology of enquiry, have done so 
to different degrees and use experimentation in different ways. In medicine, for 
example, laboratory experiments play an ancillary role in reaching conclusions that 
go beyond what happens in the laboratory. Tests on guinea-pigs and mice 
constitute an important aid while developing a new drug; but only the drug’s 
capacity to defeat an epidemic in a population of human beings constitutes a valid 
test of its success.3 Non-laboratory techniques of data-gathering survive in these 
sciences and are likely to live on forever. In contrast, a science like physics has 
been shaped by the laboratory revolution so deeply that it now has little in 
common with the Aristotelian science that it used to be (i.e. a science mainly 
concerned with understanding naturally occurring phenomena by means of 
unaided observation). Today - as students of science have noticed – most physics 
is devoted to the study of phenomena, such as cold fusion or lasing, that rarely if 
ever occur spontaneously in nature but are produced at will in the lab. 
 
The laboratory has become a pervasive and characteristic feature of 
contemporary science, and philosophers and historians devote more and more 
time and effort to its study. A veritable ‘laboratory revolution’ in science studies 
                                                 
1Cf. Mill (1836, p. 124) and Robbins (1932, p. 74). The Friedman and Lipsey quotes are taken 
from Starmer (1999), Samuelson and Nordhaus’ from Friedman and Sunder (1994, p. 1), the 
last one from Davis and Holt (1993, p. 4 n. 2).. 
2According to Plott (1991), about a hundred experimental articles were published each year 
in the early nineties. 
3On the ‘laboratory revolution’ in medicine, see the studies in Cunningham and Williams 
(eds. 1992). 
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has indeed occurred more or less simultaneously with the ‘laboratory revolution’ 
in economics. Philosophers like Ian Hacking and Nancy Cartwright, historians 
such as Peter Galison and David Gooding, sociologists like Bruno Latour and 
Harry Collins, have tried to save experimental practice from an earlier general 
‘neglect’ (Franklin, 1986). 
 
Both these revolutions, in economics and in philosophy, will loom large in this 
dissertation. The dissertation is about the laboratory turn in economics, and will 
make use of a number of conceptual tools developed during the laboratory turn in 
philosophy of science in order to understand it. My main interest being 
epistemological in character, I shall focus especially on the methodological and 
philosophical issues arising from the use of experimental methods to gain 
economic knowledge. Questions such as ‘What kind of knowledge can 
experiments provide?’, ‘What does it mean to perform a good experiment?’, 
‘What are the limits and advantages of experimentation?’, will be the primary 
subject of interest throughout the following chapters. This of course will require 
some patience in order to understand the problems economic experimentalists 
address and the techniques they devise to solve them.  
 
1.2. Experimental economics in a nutshell 
 
The origins of experimental economics are difficult to trace back in time. Alvin 
Roth (1995, p. 4) points to Bernoulli’s Saint Petersburg’s experiments (1738)4 as 
the earliest ancestors of today’s experiments, but the question has little more than 
anecdotal interest. The truth is that experimental economics is almost entirely a 
post- Second World War product, and thus a fairly young discipline. For this 
reason, perhaps, we still lack a serious historiography of the subject.5 What we 
do have is a set of personal recollections by the main protagonists of the 
‘laboratory turn’, which have now become part of a ‘standard narrative’ 
encapsulated in many textbooks, handbooks and survey papers.6 Customarily, 
three main lines of research are distinguished at the origins of experimental 
economics (cf. e.g. Davis and Holt, 1993, ch. 1; Roth, 1995). The distinction 
                                                 
4 More about this ‘experiment’ in Ch. 2. 
5To the best of my knowledge, the only historian who has written on experimental 
economics so far is Robert Leonard - see his (1994) article on the study of bargaining 
behaviour in economics and psychology. 
6See Smith (1991; 1992), Davis and Holt (1993), Friedman and Sunder (1994), Kagel and Roth 
(eds. 1995), Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis (1995). Smith (1992) and Friedman and Sunder 
(1994, ch. 9) provide to my view the best narratives in terms of attention to the institutional 
background and individual histories. Roth’s introduction to Kagel and Roth (eds. 1995) is 
better in terms of number of references. 
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provides a very useful taxonomy of the kind of work done today (and this should 
perhaps make us a little sceptical regarding its historical accuracy). 
 
The first line is that of market experiments (or industrial organisation). 
E.H. Chamberlin in the late forties began to experiment with his students at 
Harvard mainly for didactic purposes, in order to show them that even simple 
‘classroom markets’ do not equilibrate as required by orthodox equilibrium 
theory (Chamberlin, 1948). Vernon Smith, a Harvard graduate student, was 
puzzled by some features of Chamberlin’s experiments, and started to devise 
other, methodologically more sophisticated ones, when he moved to Purdue in the 
early sixties. His 1962 paper - “An Experimental Study of Competitive Market 
Behavior”, which  is now considered a classic - pointed to an innovative way of 
studying markets, and started a whole new literature on the subject. Smith is the 
main experimentalist working on markets and market institutions and one of the 
‘gurus’ of experimental economics in general.7 
 
At the same time, a number of economists, psychologists and mathematicians 
were beginning to devise experimental tests of game theory. The list is very long: 
John Nash, Lloyd Shapley, John Milnor, Jacob Marschak, Sidney Siegel, 
Lawrence Fouraker, Martin Shubik and many others belong to it. They worked 
mainly in Princeton, Stanford, and the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica; 
others gathered around Reinhard Selten in West Germany. An interdisciplinary 
conference held in Santa Monica in 1952 was the first occasion for the American 
group to meet and stimulated further activity. Since then, game theory and 
experimental economics have become deeply intertwined and ‘experimental 
games’ constitute a substantial portion of contemporary game theory research.8 
 
The third line of research concerns individual behaviour and decision 
making. Economists had been interested in the experimental determination of 
indifference curves since the early thirties. The real boost to experimental decision 
theory came however in the fifties, following von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 
(1944) formalisation of an empirically testable model of rational decision under 
risk. At a conference held in Paris in 1952, Maurice Allais presented his 
experiments which - he claimed - refuted the von Neumann-Morgenstern model 
                                                 
7Smith’s own historical account can be found in the introduction to Smith (1991), and in 
Smith (1981; 1992). 
8For some history, see in particular Smith (1992) and Friedman and Sunder (1994). Mirowski 
(forthcoming, ch. 6) describes the context in which game theory (and experimental game 
theory) was born and flourished during and immediately after the war, with particular 
attention to the connections with military research. 
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at the descriptive as well as at the normative level. The history of this ‘refutation’ 
and of the subsequent debate will be told in more detail in chapter two (see also 
the references therein).  After the Paris showdown, research in this area somehow 
stagnated until the late seventies, to finally become a most active branch of 
economics in the last twenty years. 
 
The work done in each of the above areas of experimental economics has one 
feature in common: the attempt to gain economic knowledge by observing rather 
simple, repeatable processes in closed, ‘controlled’ circumstances. Friedman and 
Sunder (1994) distinguish experimental economics from other kinds of empirical 
testing precisely on the basis of the kind of data it uses. Experimental economics 
uses experimental data deliberately created for scientific purposes in 
controlled conditions (the laboratory). ‘Happenstance’ (as opposed to 
experimental) data are products of uncontrolled processes. ‘Field’ (as opposed 
to laboratory) data are gathered in ‘natural’ environments. 
 
The notion of ‘control’ is central in the experimental sciences. At a very 
abstract level, experimental methods of enquiry consist in the variation of some 
(allegedly causally efficient) factor keeping all the other circumstances constant, so 
as to observe the effect of that factor acting alone on the system under study. By 
iterating such a procedure, the influence of all the causal factors and their 
contribution to the system’s behaviour can in principle be studied, and different 
hypotheses tested. The laboratory allows one to carry on such an investigation in 
privileged conditions, in which ‘background circumstances’ can be kept constant, 
‘disturbing’ factors ‘shielded’, and the ‘main causes’ triggered at will.9 More 
concretely, to achieve control of some experimental system is a matter of skill and 
a heavily context-dependent question. Different techniques are applied from case 
to case, and it is difficult if not impossible to discuss them without some specific 
examples in mind. Some textbooks (see Friedman and Sunder, 1994, in 
particular) include guidelines about how to prepare, run, interpret an economic 
experiment, and even how to get the results published - at a level of detail that 
cannot be pursued in this introduction. In the course of this dissertation, however, 
I shall try to address concrete problems of experimental control and how they 
may be solved in practice. 
 
                                                 
9 John Stuart Mill’s (1843) four methods of ‘agreement’, ‘difference’, ‘residues’ and 
‘concomitant variation’ constitute the first philosophical attempt to articulate the logic of 
experimental and quasi-experimental science. 
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What do experimental economists try to achieve? Most methodological papers 
include a taxonomy of the goals that may be pursued in the laboratory. Alvin Roth 
(1986; 1988; 1995) proposes three categories to classify economic experiments: 
‘Speaking to theorists’, ‘Searching for facts’, and ‘Whispering in the ears of 
princes’. 
 
i. Speaking to theorists 
A great deal of experimental economics has to do with testing and modifying 
theories which are already formalised and specified to a good degree. Most of the 
work on individual decision-making, for example, is of this sort. An axiomatised 
theory (the Bayesian model) was tested and some anomalies discovered; other 
models encompassing the old theory and the anomalous evidence were 
developed and tested on their own, and so on. Similarly, a lot of game-theoretic 
research follows this approach, ever since the early tests of behaviour in ‘prisoner 
dilemma’ situations. Experimentalists often argue that the laboratory enables to 
test theories in circumstances in which all their (explicit) assumptions are satisfied. 
The theories are, so to speak, given ‘the best possible shot’. This methodology is 
supposed to have many advantages, compared to traditional tests ‘in the field’. I 
shall come back to this issue in chapter four, where claims of this sort will be 
discussed and criticised. 
 
ii. Searching for facts 
Some economic theories are admittedly incomplete. This may be due to technical 
difficulties in solving very complicated models in an analytical way, or to the 
necessity of idealising from some aspects of the real world which cannot be easily 
represented. Many game theoretic models, for example, fall in the former 
category: some games have no equilibrium, others have many and we do not 
know which one is the correct prediction. An obvious solution to problems of this 
kind is to get some real human beings, let them play the game, and see what will 
happen. Experimental work on institutions, in contrast, falls in the second 
category. Neoclassical economic theory does not tell a very realistic story about 
the way equilibria are attained. Normally, a story of ‘Walrasian tatonnement’ is 
told, but no Walrasian auctioneer is at work in real markets. One of Vernon 
Smith’s earliest achievements when he turned to the laboratory was to show that 
institutions matter and influence the outcome allocation more than previously 
assumed. In this case, experimental economics has filled a gap in economic theory 
providing data upon which, some day perhaps, a more complete account of the 
functioning of markets will be based. 
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iii. Whispering in the ears of princes 
Other experiments are devised explicitly to support policy decisions. These 
experiments typically regard the effect of some institutional change, and are 
performed when no existing theory can illuminate the problem. Often some 
informal hypotheses - put forward by lobbies, industries, experts, etc. - are tested 
(as in type-i experiments). For example, whether a certain market institution leads 
to more efficient allocation than another. Alternatively, the experiments are used in 
order to solve problems that cannot be understood theoretically (as in type-ii 
experiments): can, for instance, a given auction system achieve certain policy 
goals, like promoting firms owned by minorities and women, and at the same time 
maximise the amount of revenue raised by the auctioneer?10 
 
Smith (1982) uses also the ‘Boundary Experiments’ category. In this case the 
goal is to test the boundary condition under which the theory fails, and thus 
establish its degree of generality (robustness), or the possibility of a domain 
extension. Friedman and Sunder (1994, pp. 7-8), to conclude, isolate five major 
purposes of experiments in economics: 
 
1. Influence a specific (policy) decision 
2. Discover regularities where theory does not help 
3. Test robustness (boundary experiments) 
4. Choose among competing theories 
5. Study the functioning of an institution before implementing it in the field. 
 
The list mostly overlaps with the taxonomies found in other articles and 
textbooks. There is quite a general consensus among practitioners about the 
scope of experimental economics, but how are these goals achieved in practice? 
This is the central subject of this dissertation, which is mainly concerned with 
questions of method. I shall try to focus not only on general philosophical topics - 
such as the nature of economic knowledge, and the role of experiments in its 
production -, but also on the details of experimentation.  
 
1.3. Philosophies of experiment 
 
                                                 
10An example of the use of experiments to solve problems of this kind can be found in Plott 
(1997). I have discussed the methodological sugnificance of Plott’s work and its 
contribution to the design and implementation of the Federal Communication Commission 
auction of Personal Communication Systems in a separate paper (Guala, unpublished). 
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Philosophical rationalisations of experimental practice and of the role it plays in 
science are as old as experimental science itself. Galileo, Newton, Descartes, all 
had their own views about the proper use of experiments, views that were partly 
endorsed and partly revised by later scientists, historians and philosophers of 
science. Rather surprisingly, however, detailed accounts of experimental practice 
were until very recently almost non existent in science studies.11 
 
This is not so any more: the so-called ‘Philosophy of Experiment’ (Hacking, 
1989a) or ‘New Experimentalism’ (Ackermann, 1989) is one of the liveliest 
trends of research in recent philosophy of science. Fairly general presentations 
and more or less complete surveys of this growing literature can be found in 
Ackermann (1989), Hacking (1989), Pickering (1992), Knorr-Cetina (1992), 
Mayo (1996, ch. 2), Franklin (1998), and Morrison (1998a).12 In the present 
and the following sections I shall sketch the main features of these new 
philosophical studies of experiments. The approach adopted varies from author to 
author, and it would be impossible to provide an exhaustive picture of this field of 
research in a few pages. There are however some fundamental tenets and general 
trends that characterise most philosophy of experiment, and I shall be content to 
focus on these. I shall start by illustrating the background - i.e. the ‘traditional’ 
philosophy of science that was dominant until approximately fifteen years ago - 
against which the philosophy of experiment represents an innovative turn. Then, I 
shall proceed to discuss the new literature. A very rough distinction can be drawn 
between those  ‘students of experiment’ who endorse some form of scepticism or 
epistemic agnosticism about science and those who pay a tribute to its 
achievements.13 The former correspond more or less to the ‘sociologists of 
science’, and - not the least for chronological reasons - it will be convenient to 
start with them (sections 1.5-1.7), before moving to other approaches (section 
1.8). 
 
1.4. The background: traditional philosophy of science 
 
 As noticed by Ian Hacking, in order to have an argument, and a fruitful one, two 
philosophers must share some common ground. Philosophy of science in the 
                                                 
11With a few notable exceptions: cf. e.g. Bernard (1865), Fleck (1935/1979). 
12 There are also a few volumes of collective papers, the most relevant being Achinstein 
and Hannaway (eds. 1985), Gooding, Pinch and Schaffer (eds. 1989), Le Grand (ed. 1990), 
Pickering (ed. 1992) and Buchwald (ed. 1995). Several journals have devoted special issues 
to this topic: see Science in Context (1988), Isis (1988), as well as the symposia in PSA 1988, 
PSA 1990, PSA 1996, and Journal of Philosophy (1989). 
13 Cf. Hacking (1989) for such a distinction. 
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English speaking world was dominated until quite recently by a tradition founded 
on a rather limited set of general claims. Hacking has pointed to a number of 
assumptions shared on the one hand by Carnap, Hempel, Nagel, Braithwaite and 
the other proponents of the ‘received view’; and on the other by Karl Popper, 
one of their most vigorous critics. The ‘ideal typical’ traditional philosopher of 
science subscribed to some or all of the following principles: (a) scientific theories 
are mainly assessed in the light of empirical evidence; (b) science (physics at least) 
is in general progressing; (c) scientific language is precise; (d) science is in some 
sense unified; (e) the context of discovery and the context of justification are 
distinct; (f) the aim of philosophers is to isolate the rules for the rational 
justification of theories.14 
 
These claims can be reformulated in a normative way:  theories should be 
assessed mainly in the light of empirial evidence, scientific language should be 
precise, ... etc. At the core of the traditional approach lies the programme of 
isolating the features that characterise ‘Science’ and differentiate it from other 
activities such as, say, poetry or fishing. Once these features have been identified 
and formalised, a set of rules can be put forward that will tell us how ‘good 
science’ ought to be done.15 
 
Attention to the history and practice of science is therefore entrenched in the 
traditional view. Real ‘good’ science provides in principle the ‘empirical basis’ 
against which theories of science should be tested.16 In the late sixties, in 
particular, a sharp ‘historicist turn’ took place in philosophy of science, thanks 
mainly to Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962/1970), and 
Lakatos’ (1970) methodology of scientific research programmes. Philosophers 
turned to the study of the diachronic, dynamic aspects of science, and the new 
literature on experiments can be seen partly as an epiphenomenon of that 
renewed interest in the history of science. 
 
 The studies of experiment constituted, however, in the first place a new kind 
of historiography of science, aimed at illuminating aspects of the scientific 
enterprise that had been previously neglected. To begin with, a tendency to focus 
on bigger and bigger units of historical analysis - from theories to paradigms, 
                                                 
14 I have slightly modified Hacking’s (1983, pp. 5-6) list. 
15For Carnap (1950) and the positivists this is the problem of explication, for Popper 
(1934/1959) it is the problem of demarcation; the two have slightly different characteristics 
which is not worth pursuing here. 
16For a sophisticated presentation of the relationship between philosophy and history of 
science, see Lakatos (1971). Cf. also what is said below in sections 1.10-1.12. 
 16 
 
research programmes or entire disciplines - was characteristic of the late 
traditional view, whereas the new studies of experiment opposed to it a 
programmatic attention to the small and local details of scientific activity. 
 
Secondly, philosophers of science since at least the logical empiricists tended 
to focus on the theoretical and linguistic aspects of science. A crucial role, for 
instance, was assigned to ‘observation statements’, that were supposed to 
provide the low level empirical ground upon which the (theoretical) structure of 
scientific knowledge could be built. Rather than engaging in a study of how 
phenomena are produced in the laboratory, traditional philosophers were mainly 
concerned with how they are described by scientists, and with the logical relation 
between such descriptions and high level theoretical statements. The standard 
‘mechanisms’ of science, according to the traditional view, are the deductive-
nomological (D-N) and the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) models: 
 
Theory 
Initial Conditions 
____________________ 
∴ Observation statement 
 
Where is the experiment in such a scheme? It is behind the observation 
statement (O), it is so to speak what ‘produces’ O. Pierre Duhem (1905), and 
many others after him, had pointed out that in order to obtain the ‘right’ O we 
have to make sure that the apparatus works well; since we implicitly formulate a 
hypothesis about the functioning of the instruments, traditionalist philosophers 
introduced among the premisses of the D-N and the H-D models a concern for 
experiments in the form of auxiliary hypotheses: that the theories of the instruments 
are correct, that everything works well, etc. It may sound a little exaggerated, but 
this is more or less all you can find in traditionalist philosophy of science about 
experiments, and this reduces to talking about theories of instrumentation, 
hypotheses about the correct performance of an experiment, etc. 
 
Even philosophers and historians who challenged the standard view seemed to 
share the ‘linguistic’ prejudice of the traditional approach. Norwood Russell 
Hanson (1958), Thomas Kuhn (1962/1970) and Paul K. Feyerabend (1975), for 
example, stressed the importance of the ‘background’ assumptions that influence 
scientific observation, but in so doing highlighted once more the theoretical 
aspects of science and ignored the material, practical ones. The first detailed 
study of laboratory work, to be sure, shared this ‘literary bias’ with the authors 
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cited above. Yet, Latour and Woolgar’s Laboratory Life (1979/1986) marked a 
turning point in recent studies of science. 
 
1.5. The sociology of science 
 
The earliest studies of experimental practice were done by sociologists, and it 
would be impossible to understand those studies without introducing the basic 
ideas informing the new ‘sociology of scientific knowledge’ (SSK) of the 
seventies. The so-called ‘Strong Programme’ in the sociology of science, 
developed in Edinburgh by David Bloor (1976) and Barry Barnes (1974), can be 
taken as the ‘manifesto’ of the SSK. Their main claim was that a principle of 
symmetry should be applied to historical explanations of scientific development: 
sociological explanation does not apply only to by-products, external 
interferences on science, cases of fraud, pseudo-scientific disciplines, etc., but 
also to scientists’ greatest achievements.17 
 
The Strong Programme aimed at showing that - instead of methods of rational 
justification - sociological factors, in the last instance, are what fix scientific 
beliefs. In order to do so, it exploited three weaknesses of traditionalist projects 
of individuating rational rules of justification. In particular: the problem of 
underdetermination, the problem of theory-ladenness, and the lack of a general 
theory of confirmation. 
 
I shall not address these issues in detail here. Some of them will be discussed 
in the following chapters – for example, theory ladenness and underdetermination 
in chapter three. For the purposes of this chapter, it is important to notice that the 
Edinburgh School took as units of analysis wide time-periods and whole cultural 
phenomena. Sociologists ‘of the laboratory’, in contrast, focused on very local 
events and limited periods of time. Theirs has been labelled the ‘micro’ approach 
to SSK, as opposed to Bloor and Barnes’ ‘macro’ approach.  From this point of 
view, it marks a sharper discontinuity with traditional philosophy of science. 
Micro SSK began to study ‘laboratory life’. 
 
1.6. The sociology of the laboratory 
 
                                                 
17 Such a claim was directed in particular against the ‘rationally reconstructed’ history of 
science advocated by Lakatos (1971) and his pupils (see, e.g., the case studies in Howson, 
ed. 1976). 
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In Laboratory Life, Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar (1979/1986) looked at a 
small community of scientists as an anthropologist would study a tribe, and 
described the events in the laboratory as they resulted from the interaction of the 
agents, their negotiations, the social conventions that regulate their behaviour. One 
outcome of scientists’ work is the ‘discovery’ of scientific facts, which are said to 
be ‘constructed’: they are the result of a number of operations performed by 
actors constrained by social rules, conventions, and institutions. Without such 
rules, institutions,  conventions, etc., the ‘facts’ would not be there, would not be 
(accepted as) facts, or would be interpreted in a different way. 
 
Latour and Woolgar studied the discovery-construction of a thyrotropine 
releasing hormone (TRH) by a group of scientists later to be assigned the Nobel 
Prize in medicine. In order to do so, they held an agnostic position on scientific 
knowledge, arguing that an anthropologist should be neutral towards the form of 
life she is studying and restrain from applying categories that constitute the very 
object under investigation. Latour and Woolgar, therefore, did not pronounce on 
the status of statements produced in the laboratory, and tried not to use epistemic 
categories that played a role in the settlement of the controversy over TRH. 
 
The authors of Laboratory Life pointed in particular to the macro-approach’s 
inability to account for the overwhelming importance of the ‘technical’ in the fine 
structure of laboratory work (1979/1986, pp. 25-27). The advertised attention to 
practical aspects, non-verbalised actions, and the importance of the material 
and technical apparatus in the laboratory, however, took a rather strange form in 
Latour and Woolgar’s work, who took ‘literary inscriptions’ as the basic unit of 
analysis for the sociologist of science. The production of scientific papers was 
taken as the main goal of scientific activity, and the widespread use of inscriptions 
(notes, data, drafts, articles) a key feature of scientific work. Latour and Woolgar 
distinguished between five types of statements corresponding to different degrees 
of ‘facticity’. The goal of a scientist is to produce so-called ‘type 4’ statements, 
i.e. uncontroversial, explicit claims corresponding to new, uncontroversial 
scientific facts (1979/1986, pp. 76-81). The shifting of a statement from one type 
to another is a matter of negotiation between the agents working in the 
laboratory, as well as between them and the outside social environment. The 
construction of scientific facts is ‘social’ because the decisive factors for the 
assignment of a ‘type-4 facticity’ to a statement are (allegedly) social. 
 
As it appears especially from the second edition of Laboratory Life (1986), 
however, anything is ‘social’ from the anthropologist’s perspective (1979/1986, 
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p. 281). ‘Construction’ is “the slow, practical craftwork by which inscriptions are 
superimposed  and accounts backed up or dismissed” (1979/1986, p. 236). The 
game played by the scientific tribe being “directed [...] toward [...] operations on 
statements” (p. 237), every step in the construction can be seen as ‘craftwork on 
statements’ rather than on real entities. Gaston Bachelard’s (1953) original idea of 
‘phénomenotechnique’, or that phenomena cannot exist without the apparatus 
used in their production, was therefore severely weakened by Latour and 
Woolgar. The technical, material aspects of laboratory work, apparatus and 
technology, were treated as ‘inscription devices’ (1979/1986, p. 51), statement-
producing machines. The principal units of analysis being literary inscriptions, the 
approach adopted in Laboratory Life seemed unable to highlight the distinctive 
traits of science as opposed to other statement-producing activities: knowledge is 
constructed and science is just one kind of construction among many others 
(1979/1986, p. 31). 
 
Laboratory Life was nonetheless a pioneering text where many themes crucial 
to the later literature were first addressed, albeit not always discussed in depth. 
Latour and Woolgar, for instance, challenged the traditional habit of studying 
‘ready-made’ products of scientific activity, usually theoretical, often formalised 
accounts as they are published in scientific journals, whose “traces of production 
are made extremely difficult to detect” (Latour and Woolgar, 1979/1986, p. 
176). By rejecting the traditional distinction between context of justification and 
context of discovery, sociologists have started a most fruitful enquiry into the 
preparation and implementation of experiments, with their complex apparatus and 
teams of scientists that make it work. Harry Collins is the sociologist who has 
spent most time studying and illustrating the difficulties of laboratory work, by 
applying the concept of ‘tacit knowledge’. 
 
1.7. Tacit knowledge and underdetermination 
 
The expression ‘tacit knowledge’ is due to Michael Polanyi (1967), and denotes 
the set of allegedly inarticulable skills, unverbalised abilities that make the practice 
of ‘good’ science impossible for those who have not received an appropriate 
training. Tacit knowledge may be a challenge to those interested in scientific 
methodology. Some students of science (and notably traditionalist philosophers of 
science) believe that it is a realm of phenomena in principle analysable and 
articulable; others, like Polanyi, believe that a thorough explication of scientific 
practice is impossible - and this irreducibly tacit dimension would undermine the 
explication and demarcation projects at their roots. If it is impossible to isolate 
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and define precisely a set of criteria to distinguish ‘good’ from ‘bad’ science, 
science is merely what ‘good’ scientists do. Criteria of appraisal would be 
private, and scientific activity could not be assessed in the light of intersubjective 
standards. 
 
Harry Collins has built on Polanyi to argue for what he has called ‘the 
experimenter’s regress’.18 Discussing in particular the case of the discovery of 
gravitational radiation, Collins (1985, ch. 4) argues that when there does not exist 
a clear benchmark to arbitrate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ experiments (such as a 
preliminary knowledge of the properties of the sought-for phenomenon), scientists 
are typically caught in a circle of validation between experiments and results: 
“when the normal criterion - successful outcome - is not available, scientists 
disagree about which experiments are competently done”, and “when there is 
disagreement about what counts as a competently performed experiment, the 
ensuing debate is coextensive with the debate about what the proper outcome of 
the experiment is. The closure of a debate about competence is the ‘discovery’ or 
‘non-discovery’ of a new phenomenon” (1985, p. 89). 
 
Collins’s case studies are alleged to show how a high degree of arbitrariness 
follows from such a circularity: scientists might have trusted an apparatus that had 
been rejected very early in the controversy, or the other way around. Finally, it is 
possible to argue from arbitrariness to the social construction of science. The 
order that we believe characteristic of natural phenomena is merely a historical 
contingency, the result of negotiation and a chain of arbitrary decisions. 
 
It is worth discussing the argument for social construction in Changing Order 
because it is a standard one we find in most micro-sociological analyses of 
scientific activity. The scientist is initially facing some task, e.g. the construction of 
a complicated apparatus such as a laser. His work typically proceeds on the basis 
of a set of presuppositions, tacit conventions, background knowledge, acquired 
skills, and goals. The most characteristic feature of laboratory work is that nothing 
goes smoothly. Experimenters proceed by trial and error, and at each stage a 
number of possible strategies are open to them. A typical list of options includes: 
to give up and just accept that the task is in fact impossible (for instance, because 
those who claim to have successfully performed the experiment earlier lied - recall 
the cold fusion case); to decide that the apparatus is responsible for the failure, 
                                                 
18 The notion of experimenter’s regress has sparked quite a big controversy; cf. Franklin 
and Howson (1984), Collins (1985), Franklin and Howson (1988), Radder (1992), Franklin 
(1994) and Collins (1994). 
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modify the instrument; to decide that there must be something wrong in the theory 
about how the effect obtains, modify the theory; to decide that the problem is due 
to a lack of the experimental skills, go and get more information or training; to 
decide that the problem lies in the analysis of data, use other techniques; simply to 
try again hoping that the next time it will work, etc. The history of an experiment 
looks like a chain of decisions taken in highly uncertain circumstances. 
 
The next step in the sociologists’ argument is a formulation of the well-known 
(logical) principle of underdetermination of theory by data: empirical evidence 
alone cannot settle controversies nor establish changes in conceptual order. The 
question then arises quite naturally: why do scientists do what they do?  (SSK is a 
scientific discipline, looking for explanations.) Old and new epistemologists 
provide a number of answers to such a question, trying to answer the 
underdetermination challenge in a logical or methodological fashion. Some of 
these solutions will be illustrated in chapter three, and their relevance to 
understand the development of a real controversy in experimental economics 
discussed in detail. SSK students share the view that no answer of this sort is 
correct, and thus point to a different direction. 
 
Step three is to claim that scientific debates, in practice, are closed by 
convention. It is through conventions that the social comes into play. Collins’ 
depicts the situation by means of a metaphor of ‘networks’ of concepts and 
practices (1985, p. 131).19 The idea is that of a holistic structure where 
everything is related to everything else. Changes in the network cause 
‘reverberations’ that potentially affect any element in the structure. If 
reverberations are not welcome by some elements in the net, they will be resisted. 
An analysis in terms of ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’ is usually adopted at this stage in 
order to explain why some changes (discoveries) are accepted while others are 
not: the scientist can choose whether to challenge more and more links in the 
network, and (here is the step from conventionalism to sociologism) his choice is 
guided by ‘social convenience’.20 
 
Accepted scientific facts, then, result from a sort of equilibrium between all 
the actors and the forces at work in the situation at hands. When the system 
equilibrates, the product of scientific activity becomes a ‘fact’. Andrew Pickering 
(1995b) talks of a process of ‘tuning’ leading to a ‘robust fit’ between the 
                                                 
19 Andrew Pickering, similarly, speaks of ‘matrices’ (1984) and more recently of a ‘mangle’ 
(1995). 
20Cf. e.g. Collins (1985), p. 138; Latour and Woolgar (1979), chs. 5-6. 
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components. The concept of ‘equilibrium’ fits well Latour and Woolgar’s 
(1979/1986) description of scientific activity as a sort of bargaining. 
 
 A scientific fact, then, is what comes out of such a process of adjustment in 
the network. It is - to use Kuhn’s terminology - what ‘meshes’ with the scientific 
paradigm. The SSK paradigm is typically a theoretical entity - a set of 
preconceptions, presuppositions, commitments, interests, metaphysical beliefs, 
and goals. Sociologists of science, thus, have often been read as claiming that 
nature is causally inefficient in the production of scientific knowledge; that the 
order we admire in nature is superimposed on nature and is merely a historical 
contingency, the result of negotiation; that the order we create is arbitrary and 
artificial.21 
  
1.8. The epistemology of experiment 
 
The sociological literature on experiments has typically been received by 
philosophers in either one of two opposite ways. On the one hand, many readers 
have been impressed by the general philosophical conclusions contained in these 
works: epistemic relativism and constructivism have been used to support 
postmodern, feminist, and critical positions of various sorts. On the other, 
philosophers concerned with the traditional projects of demarcation and 
explication have generally seen the sociology of scientific knowledge as a threat, 
and fought it with all the means at their disposal. But of course these are not the 
only options. A small number of philosophers, for example, have seen in the new 
studies of experiment an invaluable source of ‘empirical data’ on science.22 The 
new sociological literature provided in fact students of science with accounts of 
scientific practice carried on at an unprecedented level of detail. It was possible, 
disregarding the overall conclusions contained in SSK studies, to build on these 
accounts in order to try to supersede both the traditional views, and the new 
philosophy of the constructivists. 
 
Ian Hacking’s Representing and Intervening (1983) was probably the first 
book in the philosophy of science to adopt such a strategy. One can find in 
Hacking’s  work as well as in subsequent studies an attention for traditional 
issues, such as the problem of realism of the unobservables, the problem of 
                                                 
21 Latour and Woolgar suggest this point in the chapters dedicated to ‘reification’ and to 
the discussion of order vs. disorder (cfr. 1979/1986, chs. 1 and 6). 
22Some sociologists seem to look at such an approach in a rather sympathetic fahion - see 
Collins (1991b) and Latour and Woolgar (1979/1986, p. 280). 
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explanation, and the problem of how to produce reliable scientific knowledge. A 
common theme in such literature is the attempt to overcome the traditional view 
and at the same time to avoid the pitfalls of constructivism, by downplaying the 
role of theory in science. This is done in a number of ways, and I shall try to 
provide a brief overview in the next few pages. (Some of these ideas will be 
discussed further and sometimes put into practice in later chapters, so what I am 
saying here should be taken as an appetiser for what is to come.) 
 
(a) Science is more than theory testing 
 
Popper is often quoted for his claim that “theory dominates experimental work 
from its initial planning up to the finishing touches in the laboratory” (1934/1959, 
p. 107).  Popper noticed that even low level observational claims involve general 
terms such as ‘lever’, ‘screen’, ‘microscope’, etc. which presuppose some 
theories about the dispositional behaviour of levers, microscopes, screens, etc. 
Hacking has pointed out that such a view is true only in its most trivial sense. Any 
scientific claim involves theoretical presuppositions of some sort; but no particular 
insight is gained by calling all such presuppositions ‘theoretical’ without distinction. 
On the contrary, by so doing one will open the door to the holism of paradigms, 
with its alleged relativistic consequences. 
 
A first useful distinction to be drawn is between ‘high’ theory (or ‘Theory’ with 
capital ‘T’) and ‘low level’ experimental assumptions and hypotheses. The main 
difference lies in the first being explanatory of the phenomena observed in the 
laboratory, whereas the latter constitute the ‘background’ against which 
phenomena are individuated. Experimental assumptions typically involve 
hypotheses about the functioning of the apparatus, about the absence of 
interferences, about the correct application of statistical techniques of data 
analysis, and so on. Theory (capital ‘T’) will in contrast provide a causal account 
of the phenomena observed, possibly in rigorous and mathematical form. 
 
Once such a distinction has been introduced, it is clear that not all experiments 
are tests of some ‘Theory’. Many involve mere calibration of the instruments, 
refinement of a yet unexplained effect, or exploration of a new domain of 
phenomena.23 The distinction  is important because experiments performed with 
different goals in mind are appraised in the light of different standards, and 
produce knowledge of a different kind.   
                                                 
23For some examples see e.g. Franklin (1986; 1990), Galison (1987) and Hacking (1983); on 
exploratory experiments, cf. also Steinle (1997). 
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(b) Experimental and theoretical knowledge are often independent 
 
A number of philosophers have pointed out that the main goal of experimenters is 
to establish phenomena, rather than to test theory. They have invoked an 
independent epistemology of experiment, a set of rules and standards applied 
when the main concern is to make sure that an experiment has been performed 
correctly - rather than to check whether a certain phenomenon has been 
explained correctly. Allan Franklin (1986; 1990) has stressed that the 
elimination of experimental errors should be the main subject of such an 
epistemology.24 Franklin (1990, p. 104; 1998) has compiled a list of techniques 
customarily applied in order to detect errors and make sure that what is observed 
is a real property of the natural world rather than an illusion produced by our 
techniques of investigation. (I shall present and discuss Franklin’s list in chapter 
three below.) 
 
The historian Peter Galison (1987) has similarly argued on the basis of a 
number of examples taken from the physics of small particles that most 
experimentation can be characterised as the attempt to isolate an effect from the 
‘noise’ that surrounds it. This is done, roughly speaking, in two different ways: 
either by ‘calculating’ or by ‘shielding’. In the former case, the contribution of the 
causal factor of interest to the observed data is spotted by eliminating the noise on 
paper, by means of calculations. In the latter case, in contrast, the effect is 
‘carved out’ from the background by means of materially constraining the 
environment so as to prevent the disturbing factors from contaminating the data.  
 
The fact that background elimination can often be performed even when the 
phenomenon is imperfectly understood accounts for the fact that experimental 
results have, to use Hacking’s slogan, ‘a life of their own’. Moreover, from a 
historical point of view, changes in Theory do not necessarily coincide with 
changes in experimental knowledge. The trajectory of the laboratory sciences is 
often independent of the developments of high level theory. Such a thesis has 
been used by different authors (see Hacking, 1983; 1992; Ackermann, 1985; 
Galison 1987; 1997; Buchwald, 1993) in order to question the monolithic 
character of Kuhnian and sociological paradigms. The objectivity and 
progessiveness of science, in fact, can be defended only if a continuous, rather 
stable empirical basis underlies changes in Theory. Philosophers of experiment 
                                                 
24See also Galison (1987), Hon (1989) and Mayo (1996). 
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believe that experimental knowledge can provide such a firm bedrock, surviving 
drastic revolutions in theoretical explanation. As opposed to the traditionalists, 
though, the bedrock is not constituted by observational statements (only) but by a 
set of instruments and techniques for the elicitation of data, together with some 
‘home truths’ (low level causal claims) about their functionings, and eventually 
some historically robust ‘phenomenological laws’. 
 
(c) Empirical data and high theory are not deductively connected 
 
Another way to vindicate the independence of experimental from theoretical 
knowledge is to challenge the traditional view about the connection between 
Theory and observation. According to the standard accounts of explanation and 
theory testing (the D-N and the H-D models), observational statements are 
deduced from theory, initial conditions and auxiliary assumptions. More recent 
accounts tend in contrast to stress the role of heterogeneous models in the 
explanation of data, building in particular on Patrick Suppes’ (1962) semantic 
approach. Suppes argued that several layers of models connect high Theory to 
observation. These usually include models of the theory, models of the 
phenomena, models of the data, and models of the experiment, none of which is 
logically entailed by any other model.25    
 
The role of models is a central theme also in Nancy Cartwright’s How the 
Laws of Physics Lie (1983) and in her later work. Cartwright argues that the 
construction of a good model of the phenomena involves the skilful application of 
a number of techniques of data-reduction, approximation, and idealisation.26 
Theory is one among many tools applied in constructing empirical models. 
Moreover, it is in models of the phenomena that the empirical content lies. Low-
level models are true of the phenomena (if anything is), whereas abstract laws are 
strictly speaking false (and hence ‘lie’ about the real world) due to their 
incompleteness, abstractness, or idealised character. Bogen and Woodward 
(1988)27 have synthesised some of these ideas in their distinction between data 
and phenomena. Given that such a taxonomy will be used extensively in chapter 
three, I do not want to spend too much time on it here. Suffice it to say that the 
reason for a distinction lies in phenomena being neatly and rigorously explicable, 
                                                 
25 For an illustration of Suppes’ view with some examples, cf. Mayo (1996, ch. 2). 
26On the procedure of ‘preparing a description’ upon which to theorise, see also Lynch 
(1990) and Gooding (1990). 
27 See also Woodward (1989) for further arguments and examples. 
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whereas data are mostly unpredictable and deductively inexplicable from high 
Theory. 
 
(d) Science is intervening as well as representing 
 
Finally, experiments are quite independent of theory (singular) in the sense that 
they depend on theories (plural) of different sorts. In contrast with the logical 
positivist accent on the unity of science, a renewed interest for its disunified 
character has followed, once again, Suppes’ (1981) proposal. Some authors 
have turned the disunity of science thesis into the exploration of a metaphysical 
alternative (Dupré, 1993). Others have used the fact that science is disunited in 
order to argue for the objectivity of scientific knowledge. 
 
Having recourse to different theories in order to interpret empirical data, in 
fact, does not necessarily involve any kind of vicious circularity - as long as the 
theories used to back up an experimental result are independent from those used 
to explain the result itself.28 The disunity of science, then, is ‘healthy’ as long as it 
provides us with a set of tools to independently support scientific results.29 
 
The argument from independence plays an important role also in Hacking’s 
argument for the realism of unobservable entities. In Representing and 
Intervening, Hacking points to the obvious fact that our belief in science derives 
at least as much (if not more) from our being able to use science to manipulate the 
world than from our trusting the representation of the world provided by it. 
Applying such an intuition to the problem of realism, Hacking (1983, ch. 11) 
argues that belief in the reality of what is observed through microscopes comes 
(1) from the fact that different microscopes (polarising, electron, fluorescence, 
light microscopes, etc.) present the same visual structures; and (2) that when we 
manipulate the object under study the visual data change in a way that is 
consistent with the existence of an object with certain properties. 
 
Both are typical ‘no miracle’ arguments: it would be an incredible coincidence 
if instruments working according to completely different principles produced the 
same illusory effects; and it would be a sort of cosmic conspiracy if every time we 
intervened on an object, the expected effect took place without our basic causal 
beliefs being at least approximately correct. In a subsequent chapter (ch. 16), 
                                                 
28 Cf. Kosso (1989) for a rigorous discussion of this argument. 
29 See also Hacking (1996) and the whole volume by Galison and Stump (eds. 1996). 
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Hacking exploits the argument from intervention in a rather different way. 
Unobservable entities can not only be manipulated, but also used as tools in order 
to study other aspects of nature. In order to hunt free quarks, for example, small 
particle physicists make use of tiny magnetised balls of a material called niobium. 
The charge is varied by spraying the niobium ball with positrons and electrons, so 
that different measurements of its level of transition from positive to negative 
charge become possible. According to Hacking, “If you can spray them, then 
they are real” (1983, p. 23). We believe in electrons and positrons not (only) 
because we believe in theories of the electron, but because we think we can build 
reliable instruments that, we think, use electrons to perform a number of tasks. 
“Engineering, not theorising is the best proof of scientific realism about entities” 
(1983, p. 274).30 
 
(e) The ‘material’ plays a crucial role in science 
 
Rudolf Carnap (1934) once introduced a famous distinction between two 
alternative ways of speaking about a given subject. To speak in the ‘material 
mode’ is to put forward claims directly about extra-linguistic objects. To speak in 
the ‘formal mode’, in contrast, is to put forward claims about linguistic entities 
only. Philosophers of science have for a long time (more or less consciously) 
followed Carnap’s advice that philosophy should deal with the logic of the 
language of science, leaving extra-linguistic objects to science itself. Thus, they 
have studied science focusing on what scientists say about reality (and about the 
instruments used to investigate it). Philosophers of experiment have urged that we 
turn to reality itself and speak about it ‘in the material mode’. Such a view is held 
in common by a number of scholars of different views, and is an obvious way of 
further downplaying the role of theory and possibly avoiding the paradoxes of 
social reductionism. 
 
A standard strategy to challenge the Strong Programme, in fact, is to try a sort 
of reductio ad absurdum by pointing out that reality cannot be merely reduced 
                                                 
30Hacking’s argument raises two worries. First of all, it restricts the set of entities one is 
allowed to believe in to just those one can play with in the laboratory. Hacking (1989b) has 
chosen to bite the bullet and indeed reject realism about non laboratory entities such as 
galaxies and black holes. Secondly, the argument from intervention is based on the 
assumption that there exist low level causal relationships that are known by the experimenter 
but are independent from high theory. Morrison (1990) has questioned such an assumption, 
showing by means of concrete cases – including those presented by Hacking – that ‘low 
level’ causal relationships are most often embedded in, and dependent on, highly 
sophisticated theoretical frameworks. In order to be interpreted correctly, then, interventions 
seem to require a lot of reliable Theory in the background. 
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to whatever is consistent with the prejudices held by the community. Such a form 
of idealism (social prejudices, conventions, ideologies, etc. are after all ideas) 
seems inconsistent not only with the history of science (which is full of examples of 
theories that have clashed against ‘hard facts’ and have thus been abandoned no 
matter what their proponents believed or desired); above all, it goes against 
common sense: reality is not the slave of our desires and cannot be shaped at will. 
 
Such an intuition is of course central in older accounts such as Popper’s 
falsificationism (according to which reality plays the pivotal role of saying ‘no’ to 
human attempts to capture it by means of bold theoretical hypotheses), but had 
been severely weakened in the light of the well known problems of falsificationism 
and of the holistic theses of Duhem and Quine. A renewed interest in the 
‘material’ aspects of science has recently stimulated an interesting dialogue among 
constructivists and epistemologists of experiment. David Gooding, in his 
Experiment and the Making of Meaning (1990), has argued on the basis of a 
number of case studies in the history of electromagnetism that the goal of 
laboratory work is primarily to achieve a stable interaction between the 
experimenter(s) and the real world. Focusing on the concept of human agency in 
the material world, Gooding claims that “the world and our representations are 
made to converge by the activity of the observers” (1990, p. 86). 
 
Gooding shows by means of examples that the ‘creation’ of a phenomenon 
involves a manipulative activity on reality as well as, simultaneously, the 
construction of a series of models of the phenomenon. When these two activities 
converge by mutual adjustment and a stabilisation is achieved, the phenomenon is 
established, the practices are routinised, and experimental knowledge diffused. 
Gooding’s examples fit well the ideas of Ian Hacking and Nancy Cartwright, 
according to which ‘preparation of materials’, ‘creation of phenomena’, and 
‘preparation of descriptions’ account for a great deal of everyday scientific 
activity.31 
 
Andrew Pickering has recently (1995a; 1995b) begun to talk about science in 
what he calls a ‘materialist idiom’. Pickering’s up-to-date version of the network 
is called the ‘mangle’. In a number of case studies, he tries to show that in the 
history of an experiment no decision is dictated by any specific element of the 
                                                 
31According to Cartwright (1993; 1995), indeed, models play a crucial role in science 
because theoretical laws are true principally of models and of those real world situations 
that are artificially constructed so as to resemble the models. Very similar views can be 
found in Bhaskar (1975) and Latour (1984; 1986). 
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mangle of practices, beliefs, interpretive accounts, resistance of the material 
world, rigidity of the instruments, etc. Contingency seems to reign: it ‘just 
happened’ that things went as they did; things ‘could have developed otherwise’. 
 
Hacking has endorsed some aspects of  Pickering’s account and spoken of a 
new version of ‘Duhem’s thesis’, in a ‘materialist mood’. When something does 
not match our expectations, we not only modify our representations of the world - 
we can, and do, also modify the world. Using Duhem’s example: we not only 
reformulate a theory of the instrument, we modify the instrument (Hacking, 1992, 
§11). What is a scientific fact, then? For the traditionalists, knowledge is true 
justified belief (or rationally justified belief, if you are a fallibilist). For the SSK, it 
is what meshes with a framework of social habits, practices and beliefs. For 
Gooding, Pickering and Hacking, it is what results from the adjustment of 
theories, practices, and the material world. Scientific facts are established by 
mutual interaction of a number of components, including reality, materiality, the 
technical (cf. Hacking, 1992, p. 58). 
 
Hacking notices however that some theories appear historically robust 
because only they can make sense of the ‘rigidity’ of the apparatus and of the 
‘resistance’ of nature. “The common experience of the laboratory sciences is that 
there are all too few degrees of freedom. (...) It is extraordinalily difficult to make 
one coherent account, and it is perhaps beyond our powers to make several” 
(Hacking, 1992, p. 55). Like Hacking, Peter Galison (1987; 1997) has 
challenged sociologists’s conclusions by means of the notion of multiple 
constraints. Galison - in opposition in particular to Pickering’s (1984) accent on 
contingency  - stresses the rigidity of the network the scientist is working within. 
The debate goes on, and it is not my intention to contribute to it here.32 
 
1.9. Experimenters’ philosophy 
 
An obvious question may be asked at this stage: why should all these 
controversial views be of relevance to the present topic? To begin with, they have 
been developed in the context of philosophical debates concerning the natural 
sciences, and it is not clear why they should matter to economics. Secondly, 
economists surely have developed their own approach to experimentation, and it 
would be wise to start a philosophical study of experimental economics by taking 
a look at what they say about their own work. 
                                                 
32See in particular Galison (1987; 1995; 1997), Pickering (1995a; 1995b), Hacking (1999). 
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Concerning the first objection (economics is not physics) let me postpone a 
reply until the next section, where I shall illustrate and defend my views on 
‘methodological pluralism’. About the second one, I can easily concede that it is 
most sensible to look at how economic experimentalists see their own work. The 
rise of experimental economics took place against the background of a generally 
hostile profession, and therefore experimentalists felt the need to justify their 
approach to a degree that is nowadays quite unusual among economists and 
perhaps even scientists in general. (Few economic theorists, for instance, would 
waste their time justifying the utility of their highly mathematised models, 
sometimes of very remote practical applicability.) Experimental economists, as a 
consequence of this situation, are on average more self conscious of the limits and 
possibilities, pros and cons of their activity than most of their colleagues. 
 
Still, we lack a thorough philosophical discussion of experimental economics. 
Most of the literature on the methodology of experimental economics comes from 
introductory sections of scientific papers, preliminary methodological chapters in 
textbooks, handbooks,33 and a few printed debates between experimentalists 
and/or their critics.34 A third category of publications includes papers written for 
purposes of popularisation, dictionaries, inaugural lectures and other special 
occasions.35 Methodology has been a constant preoccupation to just a few 
authors - Vernon Smith, Alvin Roth and Charles Plott, to name just the most 
authoritative ones. 
 
Professional philosophers have generally speaking neglected experimental 
economics.36 This is the opposite of the trend observed among economists, who 
are more and more attracted to the experimental approach. Why has it been so? 
Probably because it is difficult to construct a suitable pair of ‘philosophical’ 
spectacles through which experimental economics can be analysed in an 
interesting way. Traditional philosophy of science, as we have seen in section 
                                                 
33Hey (1991); Davis and Holt (1993); Friedman and Sunder (1994); Kagel and Roth (eds. 
1995). 
34See e.g. Harrison (1989) and the following discussion in the American Economic Review, 
82, (1992), as well as Kagel and Battalio (1980) and Cross (1980) 
35Cf. Smith (1987a; 1987b; 1989), or Plott (1991). 
36The second volume of the journal Economics and Philosophy featured a paper written by 
Alvin Roth (1986), thus pointing to an area of potential interest for philosophers of science 
and methodologists of economics - but nothing followed. Other isolated attempts to start a 
dialogue were made by Wilde (1981) and more recently Starmer (1999). With the notable 
exceptions of two studies on the preference reversals anomaly (Hausman, 1989; 1992; and 
Tammi, 1997 – more on this in chapter three), however, philosophers have not considered 
experimental economics a subject worth of research.  
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1.4., takes experimental practice merely as an ‘evidence-producing’ machine, 
functional to the aim of verifying/falsifying theories. Nothing intrinsically interesting 
is supposed to happen in the laboratory.37 
 
Given that we lack a general philosophy or methodology of experimental 
economics, we are left with the scattered ideas that can be found in the texts cited 
above. When very general claims are put forward concerning the role of 
experiments in economics, they are usually taken rather uncritically from 
traditional philosophy of science.38 The most valuable contributions, in my view, 
concern rather specific methodological puzzles experimentalists have faced in the 
course of their activity – especially problems that have been traditionally neglected 
by philosophers of science. 
 
The main (and the best, I think) example of this kind is provided by the debate 
on ‘parallelism’. I shall talk extensively about it in chapters four and five, because 
I take  it to be a rare example of a genuine methodological problem that (a) has 
been discussed at length by experimental economists, (b) has been generally 
neglected by philosophers of science, and (c) can teach us something about the 
use of experimentation in other disciplines than economics. In chapter four, in 
particular, I shall examine critically what experimentalists have said about 
parallelism, and try to state the problem in a revised, conceptually more rigorous 
fashion. 
 
I shall also address practitioners’ views at length in chapter two. There, again, 
I shall be concerned with a set of philosophical issues that are quite peculiar to 
economics. I shall in fact try to articulate decision theorists’ ‘methodology of 
normative testing’, a set of rules used to appraise normative theories of rational 
choice in the light of experimental evidence. Clearly, such a problem can only 
arise in a hybrid - half descriptive and half normative - science like economics. In 
order to isolate these rules, I shall examine the methodological controversy that, in 
the early fifties, set the French economist Maurice Allais against the defenders of 
the standard view. 
 
                                                 
37 Not surprisingly, no particularly valuable insight came out of the interaction between 
experimental economics and traditional philosophy of science: cf. Smith, McCabe and 
Rassenti (1991). Harry Collins’ reaction to this paper will be discussed at length in chapter 
seven. 
38 Cf. for instance Friedman and Sunder (1994, p. 2). 
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I shall not take experimentalists’ views uncritically but will try to assess them 
and sometimes improve on them. But, one might ask, from which standpoint? 
How can one criticise methodological propositions (claims, moreover, put 
forward by people who are supposed to be experts in the subject in question)? 
These worries revolve around the problem of how to do philosophy of science in 
general, and methodology of economics in particular. 
 
1.10. Methodological monism and pluralism 
 
The philosophy of economics has always oscillated between two extreme 
approaches: methodological monism and methodological pluralism. 
Methodological monism is the doctrine according to which the production of 
knowledge follows a unique set of rules and principles common to all disciplines. 
Economics and physics, human and natural, formalised and non-formalised, 
experimental and non-experimental, micro and macro, fundamental and non-
fundamental sciences – according to such a standpoint – fall under the same 
methodological and philosophical ‘umbrella’. Methodological pluralism, in 
contrast, asserts that different methods of enquiry are appropriate to different 
disciplines, because of their peculiarities in terms of subject, level of analysis, 
content, aims, level of complexity, etc. 
 
This methodological dichotomy has taken different forms in different periods 
and depending on the authors who have addressed it. In its most famous version, 
it has concerned the natural and the human sciences, and has been debated by 
great social scientists and philosophers such as Weber, Marx, von Mises, Dilthey, 
Robbins, Knight, von Wright, von Hayek, Gadamer, Quine, Davidson and many 
others. 
 
Rather than taking the issue of monism vs. pluralism at face value – something 
that would require a PhD dissertation on its own – let me briefly defend the 
position I shall adopt in the following chapters by contrasting it with some other 
approaches that have been popular in the recent past. During the last hundred 
years or so, at a surface level, the methodological gap between economics and 
the natural sciences (physics in particular) has been considerably reduced. Like 
physics, economics has become highly formalised and mathematical;39 it has 
extensively adopted statistical techniques of data analysis;40 it has made use of 
                                                 
39 On the influence of mathematical physics on economic thought, see in particular 
Mirowski (1989). 
40 On the birth and development of econometrics, cf. Morgan (1990). 
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Monte Carlo and computer simulations;41 economists are keen to be seen as 
respectable scientists and have their own Nobel Prize; they have adopted a strong 
empiricist rhetoric; and, moreover, have repeatedly tried to apply philosophical 
doctrines originally developed in the context of the natural sciences to their own 
problems. Logical positivism, falsificationism, Lakatosianism, Kuhnianism, 
Feyerabendism, postmodernism have all been popular at different times among 
economists. 
 
The direct transfer of philosophical doctrines from the natural sciences to 
economics is motivated principally by the apparent power of the natural sciences. 
Physics is the paradigmatic example of a science that ‘works’, whatever that 
means (of course philosophers argue about that as well). If any science has 
achieved the capacity of efficiently manipulating the external world, it is physics; if 
humans have achieved any genuine knowledge of nature, it must lie in physics; if 
any discipline has progressed, it must be physics. If we are looking for a set of 
standards characterising ‘good’ science, so the argument goes, we should start 
taking a look at the best science available. The methods applied in a ‘strong’ 
discipline like physics, in fact, are most likely to constitute a good recipe for doing 
‘good’ science in general. 
 
It is not surprising, then, that almost every time economics (ar another 
‘weaker’ discipline) has entered a state of crisis, some economists have turned to 
the methodology of the most developed sciences looking for inspiration. In the 
thirties, in the middle of the Great Depression and at the dawn of Keynesianism, 
economists looked at neopositivism and (in one case) at falsificationism;42 in the 
seventies, facing the decline of Keynesian macro-models, they turned to Kuhn 
and Lakatos in order to make sense of what was happening and possibly find a 
way forward.43 
 
These applications have been fruitful to the extent that they have provided new 
frameworks for the interpretation of the more or less recent history of the field, 
and have stimulated economists to ask new questions about the meaning of their 
own work. Thanks to the philosophy of science, economists have tackled 
important issues such as: Do our models (theories, laws, axioms, etc.) have 
                                                 
41 The historical and methodological literature on simulations in science (and in economics 
in particular) is scarce. Cf. the works cited in chapter six below. 
42 Cf. Robbins (1932) and Hutchison (1938). 
43 For some early applications, cf. Ward (1972) (on Kuhn and economics) and the essays 
collected in Latsis (ed. 1976) (on Lakatos and economics). 
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empirical content or are they mere formal structures, tautologies, interpretive 
frameworks? Does economics aim at discovering the causes of social 
phenomena? Have economists been successful in predicting events in the past? Is 
it important to anticipate novel facts in order for a science to be progressive? 
More fundamentally, what does it mean to make progress in economics?, and so 
on. The debates that have revolved around these questions have surely increased 
our understanding of economic science, and by comparing economics to stronger 
disciplines (or to the more or less idealised picture of such disciplines provided by 
philosophers of science) we have clearly gained some insights about its limits and 
potentialities.44 
 
1.11. The unbearable lightness of economic methodology 
 
Yet, such methodological monism seems unable to satisfy the needs of the 
philosopher eager to learn from economics (as opposed to the economist or 
historian of economics interested in understanding his or her own discipline). The 
problem can be exemplified by means of the following dilemma. Suppose we 
compare some methodological doctrine originally developed in the context of the 
natural sciences (let us call it Mn) with economists’ practice. We shall find 
ourselves in either one of the following two cases: 
 
(a) if economic practice satisfies at least approximately or for the most part Mn’s 
methodological precepts, then economics gets good marks while the 
normative value of Mn (grounded on the unquestioned power of the natural 
sciences) is little enhanced; 
 
(b) if, in contrast, economists’ practice does not satisfy Mn’s standards, then 
economics scores low in the game of science, whereas the value of Mn is left 
equally intact. 
 
The dilemma, in other words, stems from the fact that economics seems to be 
too weak a science either to constitute the ‘empirical basis’ for an autonomous 
methodology (that is why contemporary monists turn to natural science 
methodology in the first place) or to ‘falsify’ any methodological doctrine 
developed in the context of a stronger science. If economics does not work very 
                                                 
44 A number of authors, for example, have assessed positively the attempts to apply 
Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programmes to economics and the history of 
economic thought. See Hands (1990, p. 79), Backhouse (1994, pp. 186-188), and Salanti (1994, 
p. 31). 
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well (or at least not as well as other disciplines such as physics), then it is idle for 
the philosopher of science to look at economics in search of philosophical 
inspiration. To look at physics straight away is a much better strategy. Economics 
is too weak to bear the weight of methodological construction. 
 
Such a consideration has rather devastating effects, especially in the light of 
those theories of methodology (or ‘meta-methodologies’) that assign a crucial role 
to scientific practice in the assessment and improvement of philosophical theories 
of science. Lakatos’ (1971) ‘virtuous’ circle of justification between scientific 
practice, history of science, and philosophy of science – to take a well-known 
example – does not even start spinning in the case of economics. If in economics 
(as recognised by someone sympathetic with openly normative philosophy of 
economics) “it is difficult to agree on a list of undisputed scientific achievements”, 
and “it cannot be taken for granted that what is commonly regarded as best 
practice is directed towards discovering the truth” (Backhouse, 1994, p. 184), 
then we are left with the natural sciences as the only ‘normative basis’ for our 
methodology. As a matter of fact, Lakatos himself argued that “a good 
methodology - ‘distilled’ from the mature sciences -  may play an important role 
for immature and, indeed, dubious disciplines” (1971, p. 137, n. 4).45 
 
1.12. How to (dis-)solve the dilemma  
 
In the light of such reflections, what role is left for economic methodology? In this 
section I intend to show how the dilemma above can be, if not solved, perhaps 
dissolved. The arguments presented in the previous section rely on the assumption 
that economics is weak. It must be stressed again that such an assumption has 
origins that can be easily traced back in time: periods of intense methodological 
and philosophical debate coincide almost invariably with periods of deep crisis in 
economics. Sometimes the crisis is opened by the rise of a new paradigm 
replacing an old and established one; but most often the crisis is ‘external’ to the 
discipline, arising from economists’ incapacity to anticipate and deal with major 
economic events such as the Great Depression of the thirties or the persistent 
stagflation of the seventies. 
 
                                                 
45 My position on Lakatos’ methodology and on its role in appraising economic theories 
has been influenced and stimulated by many years of discussion with Matteo Motterlini. 
Matteo, however, would not necessarily agree with all my conclusions (see Motterlini, 
1999). 
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In such situations, economists’ inferiority complex towards other disciplines 
like physics, which appear to proceed from one predictive and technological 
success to another, becomes deeper than ever. But this feeling of inferiority may 
be more a contingent effect of such critical circumstances than the result of a 
rational and systematic comparison between economics and the natural sciences. 
My proposal to get out of the dilemma, then, is to reject the background 
assumption that economics is a ‘weaker’ science than (and therefore has to learn 
methodology from) physics. 
 
In order to question the assumption of inferiority, I shall begin by refraining 
from talking about economics as a whole. To speak in too general terms is the 
best way to fall back into the dilemma. John Sutton, in a forthcoming book, 
follows a similar strategy and focuses on a set of situations in which economic 
models seem to work well - not much worse than many physical theories that are 
customarily cited as exemplars of scientific excellence. In this dissertation I shall 
be even more cautious and concentrate on a rather small bit of economics – 
experimental economics – giving up the ambition of making general claims about 
the scientific status of economics in general.46 I take this attitude to be consistent 
with the message of recent philosophy of science, a philosophy that urges us to 
abandon big units of analysis and to concentrate on singular cases with their local, 
specific, contingent peculiarities. By proceeding this way, of course, one faces the 
risk of missing the ‘big picture’ (with its big and very important questions) and 
getting lost in useless, detailed narratives of local events of minor importance. I 
think that the risk is worth taking, and bet that it will pay off in terms of a more 
realistic, fuller, more exciting picture of what contemporary science is and of what 
economists can (and cannot) do. As in several other cases, of course, the proof 
of the pudding is in the eating. 
 
A third reason - beyond escaping the dilemma and achieving descriptive 
accuracy - to endorse localism is strictly philosophical in character. Traditional 
philosophy of science was engaged in the bold project of articulating a universally 
valid, content-free, purely analytical scientific Methodology (capital ‘M’). It 
aimed, in other words, at a purely formal set of inferential rules analogous to those 
of deductive logic. Had such a formal system been found, the validity of a 
scientific inference could have been assessed independently of the situation, the 
                                                 
46 Of course I cannot help but having some views about economics in general, and such 
views will surely be rather transparent to the reader who will be patient enough to get to the 
end of this dissertation. They should not, however, be taken as the fundamental message of 
the present work. 
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content (empirical truth) of the propositions involved, and any contingent facts of 
the matter. 
 
Such a hope has now been abandoned, for reasons that were already in nuce 
in Pierre Duhem’s writings, were clear to Otto Neurath and have more recently 
revived by Quine. The problems of induction and underdetermination have 
severely undermined the project, in a way that for reasons of space I can only 
illustrate by means of an example. The riddle of induction is often taught to 
philosophers by means of a short story widely known as ‘Russell’s chicken’: “The 
man who has fed the chicken every day throughout its life at last wrings its neck 
instead, showing that more refined views as to the uniformity of nature would have 
been useful to the chicken” (Russell, 1912, p. 98). Russell’s chicken had very 
good (inductive) reasons to believe that the farmer was carrying food on the fatal 
day, as he had always done. One of the morals that can be drawn from this story, 
and from the history of the inductivist programme, is that a general rule of 
inductive inference and no matter how much evidence will not suffice to produce 
reliable knowledge. Much more information of a substantive sort is needed to 
avoid the chicken’s fate. Had the chicken known about the general context in 
which its actions were taking place, and of the background conditions underlying 
the regularity in question, he could have done better. The same moral can indeed 
be drawn from the Duhem-Quine problem and used against purely deductive 
methodologies such as Popper’s falsificationism. Notice that problems of this sort 
undermine the idea of a universal and purely formal scientific Method, not the 
methodological enterprise itself. In our chicken world there are correct inferences 
to be made every single day; but evaluating which inference is correct will depend 
on many contingent facts, not least on how the world is. If we want to do 
normative methodology, we better study in an empirical way the local, 
contingent, ‘refined’ methods (small ‘m’) applied by scientists case by case, 
giving up the hope of a universal Method valid a-priori.47 
 
Of course no one denies that there are circumstances in which economics does 
not work well; the point is, this should not push us to throw too much (say, the 
neoclassical paradigm, or even economic science as a whole) away.48 Even the 
most advanced sciences like physics can predict with precision the behaviour of 
                                                 
47For an outline and defence of the argument in relation to the philosophy of the social 
sciences, see Kincaid (1996, ch. 2). Cartwright, Cat, Fleck and Uebel (1996) trace the origins 
of this approach to methodology back to Neurath’s work. 
48 Sutton (forthcoming), for example, is very critical of general equilibrium modelling and the 
influence it has had on economic theory (e.g. on the new classical macroeconomics). 
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only a limited number of systems while struggling in vain with important 
phenomena that still require an explanation. According to an old analogy, indeed, 
the social phenomena economics is concerned with are more similar to natural 
phenomena like the weather than to the phenomena that have been successfully 
tamed by physicists. They are similar, of course, from the point of view of 
complexity. 
 
The striking successes of physics are to a great extent due to the possibility of 
dealing with simple, closed, tightly controlled and ‘artificial’ systems. Were the 
capacity to predict storms the standard of appraisal for physics, physics would 
not look much better than economics. When one cannot tightly control and 
manipulate the initial conditions of the system under study (no matter whether the 
system is a physical or a social one) rather poor knowledge is going to be 
produced. If we look at the history of an old and famous problem such as the 
explanation of the perihelion of Mercury, for example, we see that it has evolved 
in several respects like many economic controversies, with periods of relative 
agreement followed by new harsh controversies that questioned the old results. 
The observation and explanation of most astronomical phenomena is indeed 
affected by problems of sparse and poor data, constant interferences, 
impossibility of collecting new evidence, difficult measurements, controversial 
theoretical assumptions, etc. to such an extent that every result is imbued with 
radical uncertainty and a consensus is rarely if ever reached by the community of 
experts.49 Thus, the problem with economics - as with many branches of the 
natural sciences - may lie in the complexity of the subject matter rather than in 
some alleged methodological inferiority. Despite its simplicity and plausibility, such 
an argument has been surprisingly unpopular among philosophers of economics.50 
(It is more likely to be found in the mouths of some economist or econometrician 
apologising for his or her predictive failures.) 
 
Sutton (forthcoming) shows by means of a number of examples how 
economics works reasonably well in simple situations that are structurally similar 
to those described in its models. Experimental economics provides us with a 
further test of the ‘complexity’ hypothesis: if situations in which economic models 
work could be created in the laboratory with a certain ease, the differences 
between physics and economics would appear less dramatic than it has often 
                                                 
49The history of the controversy on the perihelion of Mercury is told in a non-technical way 
by Will (1988, ch. 5). For a recent study of the ‘radical uncertainty’ of macroeconomic 
modelling and the ‘interpretative flexibility’ of economic data, cf. Evans (1997). 
50But see Hausman (1992) for a notable exception. 
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been assumed. I think that this conclusion can be legitimately drawn from the 
examples that I shall examine in the chapters below. Indeed, I believe that some 
form methodological pluralism can be defended but is ‘orthogonal’ to the 
traditional distinctions between economics and physics, ‘Naturwissenschaften’ 
and ‘Geisteswissenschaften’: it is much more interesting to focus on distinctions 
like laboratory vs. non-laboratory, mathematical vs. non-mathematical, statistical 
vs. non-statistical, etc. Different techniques are applied in different areas of a 
same discipline, depending on the problem situation, and providing results with 
varying degrees of reliability. 
 
 
1.13. The strategy of this dissertation 
 
My strategy, to sum up, will be the following. I shall look at a number of cases of 
experimental ‘good’ practice - at cases in which economics ‘works’51 - and use 
them as paradigm examples of how experimental economics can (and should) be 
done. One could reply that the choice of examples betrays an overenthusiastic 
attitude towards my subject. But the goal here is not to advertise experimental 
economics: for any positive example chosen, one can surely find some ‘bad’ 
experiment that has been devised and published by a respected economist. I shall 
leave this exercise to someone else. Whenever I shall think appropriate, I shall 
also highlight the methodological defects of the experiments discussed, point out 
that they do not necessarily or entirely support the claims the authors put forward 
in their papers, and sometimes even try to suggest how they might be improved.52 
 
A radical empiricist approach to philosophy of science will be followed, and 
the arguments grounded as much as possible on cases of real scientific practice. 
From this point of view, I shall be faithful to the way of philosophising that has 
characterised the best traditional philosophy of science as well as much of the 
new philosophy of experiments. I shall try as much as possible to look at what 
economists do, as opposed to what they say they do, keeping in mind that “most 
scientists tend to understand little more about science than fish about 
hydrodynamics” (Lakatos, 1970, p. 62 n. 2). 
 
                                                 
51At this stage I can only leave an analysis of what ‘to work’ means to later chapters. As I 
shall show especially in chapter three, ‘to work’ can be identified with the elimination of 
alternative explanations of the data; in Guala (unpublished), with technological success; but 
there surely are several other measures of success in economics and in science in general 
(see Backhouse, 1997, for an attempt to pin them down). 
52 See in particular chapters four and five. 
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The approach will be mostly normative, the principal aim of scientific 
methodology being to understand how genuine scientific knowledge is produced 
and perhaps to help scientists to clarify (if not improve) their methods of enquiry. 
To isolate, make explicit, explicate, articulate, and possibly formalise methods that 
are often only implicit and unconsciously applied by scientists – that is the 
philosopher’s task.53 
 
I shall be cautious about the extent to which economists’ methods of 
experimental enquiry can be generalised outside their own domain. To reiterate 
once more, a taste for ‘localism’ is one of the legacies of recent philosophy of 
science. In chapter three, however, I shall argue that the strategies adopted by 
experimental economists in order to tell real phenomena from artefacts do not 
differ from the methods used by the natural scientists, and that all such strategies 
fall under two general arguments that are well known to philosophers of science. 
In chapters four and five, I shall also suggest that the problem of parallelism, that 
has been a constant preoccupation to experimental economists, should be of 
concern to other scientists too. 
 
I shall use in a number of cases ideas put forward by old and new 
philosophers of science. From the new literature on experiments, in particular, I 
shall take the suggestion to focus on the details of experimenting, the idea that 
theoretical aspects are less important for science than philosophers have tended 
to assume, and the taste for ‘localism’ and ‘pluralism’. I shall not, in contrast, deal 
with some of the typical controversies that one finds in that literature: the debates 
between constructivists and realists, between those who see the history of science 
as characterised by radical discontinuities vs. those who see it as a cumulative 
process,54 between those who stress tacit knowledge vs. those who see 
experimenters as applying rational and formalisable methods of enquiry.55 
 
                                                 
53Some philosophers believe all normative, meta-theoretical enterprises to be radically 
misguided and philosophically hopeless (cf. Rorty, 1979). Such views have become quite 
popular among economists (see McCloskey, 1985), but a serious attempt to criticise them 
would take me too far away from the main subject of this thesis. Similarly, I shall not try here 
to defend in detail the naturalistic approach to epistemology that I adopt. On these issues, 
at any rate, I happen to share many of the views put forward by Dan Hausman in his (1992, 
pp. 263-269 in particular). 
54 See for example Galison (1987; 1995; 1997), Pickering (1995a; 1995b ), Hacking (1989; 1992; 
1997), Stump (1996). 
55 Cf. e.g. Franklin and Howson (1984; 1988), Collins (1985; 1994), Franklin (1994). 
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Economic experimenters (just like experimenters in general) do several 
different things.56 I have tried to take such variety into account as much as 
possible when choosing the examples and case studies. In chapter two I examine 
experiments devised in order to test and develop normative theories of behaviour; 
in chapter three, experiments aimed at establishing the producibility a 
phenomenon in the laboratory; in chapter four, experiments to validate the 
existence of a phenomenon outside the laboratory; in chapter five, experiments to 
reproduce in the laboratory a phenomenon that has allegedly occurred outside of 
it. 
 
The theories at stake vary from case to case too: models of individual decision 
under risk will be central in chapters two to four, whereas game theoretic models 
of auctions will be prominent in chapter five. It is also worth making clear from the 
start that some interesting aspects of experimental economics have surely been 
neglected. In this thesis one will not find very much, for instance, concerning 
purely game theoretic experiments,57 border-line experiments between 
economics, cognitive science and psychology,58 or experiments on animal 
behaviour.59 Experimental economics has become such a big business that to give 
an exhaustive picture of what is going on in the field (if possible at all) would 
require much more space than allowed in a PhD dissertation. 
 
1.14. The content of this dissertation 
 
In the second chapter I shall try to tackle a rather general question, which is of 
crucial importance for the purposes of this dissertation. Economics has 
traditionally had an ambiguous status. To some, it was a science totally grounded 
on a-prioristic foundations; others have interpreted it as a normative science of 
rational behaviour. According to these views, of course, very little room is left for 
an experimental branch of economics. I shall show how, in the early fifties, the 
French economist Maurice Allais (one of the fathers of experimental economics) 
got involved in a heated controversy with the defenders of Bayesian decision 
theory, about the status of their model and of the experimental counterexamples 
which apparently ‘falsified’ it. The ‘Neo-Bernoullians’ - as Allais named his 
opponents - began to defend their theory from a normative perspective. Instead 
                                                 
56 See also section 1.2 above. 
57See Camerer (1997) for a discussion and survey. 
58 See for example Egidi (1995) and the exploratory experiments done at the Experimental Lab 
of the University of Trento in general. 
59Cf. Kagel, Battalio and Green (1995). 
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of giving up altogether and simply challenging the received view on a descriptive 
basis, Allais insisted that his counterexamples could prove the inadequacy of 
Bayesian decision theory also from a normative respect. During the controversy, a 
true ‘methodology of normative testing’ was developed, and the history of 
decision theory shows that Allais was right in pursuing the battle on both fronts. 
The moral I shall draw from this case is that normative commitments are crucial in 
economics. Models of individual decision making have to satisfy certain precise 
rationality requirements before they become accepted by the community of 
scientists. Still, this leaves a lot of room for experiments, both on the normative 
and on the descriptive side. I shall illustrate the point by means of examples from 
the history of decision theory, at the same time introducing some basic technical 
concepts that will be used in the rest of the dissertation. 
 
In the third chapter I shall focus on a famous empirical anomaly, known as the 
‘preference reversal’ phenomenon. The latter is a counterexample to all theories 
of individual behaviour under risk that satisfy a very basic principle of consistency 
- the transitivity axiom. The phenomenon was first ‘produced’ in the laboratory by 
a group of psychologists, and only later addressed by economists. A number of 
attempts to ‘explain the phenomenon away’ as an artefact of the experiment 
proved to be unsuccessful, and now preference reversals are generally accepted 
by economists as an established experimental fact. I shall use this case to illustrate 
how different techniques can be applied in order to test different explanations of 
the experimental data. These techniques do not differ substantially from those 
used in other laboratory sciences, and I shall also devote some time to illustrating 
the relationship between the problem of artefacts and more traditional 
philosophical puzzles such as the ‘theory-ladenness’ and the ‘Duhem-Quine’ 
problems. Experiments allow one to establish a phenomenon up to a degree of 
certainty that is rarely achieved in other branches of the social sciences. 
Eventually, agreement becomes almost unescapable even in a notoriously litigious 
discipline like economics. These, I shall argue, are the ‘pros’ of experimentation. 
 
I shall turn to the ‘cons’ in chapter four. Economic experiments in fact have 
problematic features that do not seem to arise in other fields. In particular, 
established experimental results are not automatically generalisable to non-
experimental domains. Given that economics is in great part devoted to the study, 
explanation, and control of non-laboratory phenomena, this problem is a serious 
one. Experimentalists have called it the problem of ‘parallelism’: how can 
experimental results be generalised from the laboratory to real-world economies? 
I shall discuss the problem from an abstract point of view, and at the same time 
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review some arguments for ‘parallelism’ that have been put forward by 
practitioners. Finally, I shall propose a new formulation of the problem and also a 
solution to it. I shall use the case of preference reversals again in order to illustrate 
how a rigorous analysis of the problem may provide guidance to experimentalists 
in devising and interpreting their experiments. 
 
In chapter five I shall build on the previous discussion in order to sketch a 
general characterisation of the role of experiments in economics. Experiments, I 
shall argue, are just an intermediate step in the testing of an economic hypothesis: 
they act as ‘mediators’ between theoretical models and the target systems whose 
behaviour they aim at explaining. The argument is illustrated focusing on 
experiments on the ‘winner’s curse’ phenomenon. In this case the tests were 
devised in order to check whether the occurrence of a certain phenomenon 
allegedly hidden behind ‘field’ data could be established in a tight fashion. After 
the ‘winner’s curse’ was rather uncontroversially (re-)produced in the laboratory, 
experimentalists made use of field data in conjunction with experimental evidence 
in order to argue that the parallelism step could be taken with confidence. I shall 
also suggest that parallelism arguments are analogical in character. 
 
The last chapter - chapter six - is devoted to some general comments and 
conclusions. I shall discuss a general issue concerning the nature of experiments in 
economics. What is the difference between a genuine experiment and a 
simulation? And in which category do economic experiments fall? Developing an 
insight due to Herbert Simon, I shall argue that a distinction between simulations 
and experiments can be drawn neatly from a conceptual point of view: a ‘pure’ 
experimental system is made of the same material as the target system of interest; 
a simulation in contrast makes use of different ‘stuff’ in order to reproduce 
properties similar, at a certain level of abstraction, to those of the target system. In 
practice, however, economic experiments are often hybrid objects sharing both 
experimental and simulating features. This is not necessarily a problem, because 
experiments and simulations are used in a very similar way. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Testing Normative Theories of 
Rationality 
The debate on expected utility theory 
 
 
 
‘And does a man remain at unity in himself 
in all these experiences? We saw that 
there could be conflict and contrary 
opinions about the same objects in the 
realm of vision; isn’t there a similar 
conflict and internal struggle in the realm 
of action?’ 
(Plato, The Republic, Part 10, 603c-d) 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The status of economics among the empirical sciences is a notoriously 
controversial issue. To begin with, economists’ desire to be considered empirical 
scientists is a relatively recent phenomenon. Secondly, as I have briefly mentioned 
in the introduction, it is not clear whether empiricist commitments go much further 
than mere rhetorical statements.60 Thirdly, even if economists were really for the 
most part empiricists, they would be so in a way that departs from most 
traditional empiricist philosophical accounts.61 
 
Be that as it may, I am not concerned with economics as a whole here, but 
with a rather limited portion of it - namely, experimental economics. 
Experimentalists are indeed professed and practicing empiricists, who turned to 
the laboratory in order to acquire a better empirical basis for economic science. 
Yet, the success of experimental economics depends very much on the issue 
                                                 
60See Blaug (1980/1992) and McCloskey (1985), two authors who disagree about more or 
less everything but this particular issue. 
61But see Hausman (1992) for a recent attempt to square economics with Millian empiricism. 
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above: were economists (in general) not empiricists, the work of the small 
laboratory community would have little if any impact on the discipline as a whole. 
 
The strongest and most die-hard antiempiricist doctrine in economics has 
probably been so-called ‘a priorism’. According to a priorists, economic 
theories are assessed on grounds that are independent of (and ‘prior to the 
collection’ of) empirical evidence.62 Such grounds may be of various sorts: old a 
priorists like Menger, von Mises and Lionel Robbins took the fundamental 
principles of economics as Aristotelian ‘essences’, Kantian ‘categories’, 
necessary conditions for the analysis of the subject matter. Modern a priorists in 
contrast tend to assess theories in the light of their mathematical elegance, or their 
consistency with a certain economic tradition (for example, in the light of their 
using equilibrium analysis rather than not). 
 
According to a most influential tradition, indeed, economics is defined as ‘the 
science of rational behaviour’. Vilfredo Pareto, for example, characterised pure 
economics as the study of “the many logical, repeated actions which men perform 
to procure the things that satisfy their tastes” (1906, ch. 3, §1). Such a view is by 
no means of mere historical interest: claims of a similar sort can be found in 
modern textbooks, and economics is often praised for its normative power - 
rather than for its purely descriptive capacity to explain how real economies 
work.63 ‘Normativism’ is particularly strong in specific areas of economics that 
have grown and proliferated in close contact with experimental economics, such 
as game theory and decision theory. But if game and decision theorists are mainly 
concerned with rational decision making, isn’t the experimental collection of 
evidence about real decision making an idle activity? 
 
I shall approach this important question by examining a particular debate that 
started in the early fifties and continued with fluctuating intensity for about three 
decades. The debate was sparked by the French economist and future Nobel 
prize winner Maurice Allais, one of the founders of experimental economics. 
Allais, as I shall show in more detail shortly, claimed to have falsified by means of 
experimental data a model of rational decision making well known to every 
student of economics - the Expected Utility (EU) theory that had been formalised 
                                                 
62Notice that according to my definition Mill, Cairnes and Neville Keynes do not belong to 
the a priorist tradition because they believed in introspection as a method of theory 
validation. Blaug (1980/1992) calls them in fact ‘empirical a priorists’. 
63Cf. for instance Kreps (1990, p. 7). 
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a few years earlier by von Neumann, Morgenstern, and a number of other 
economists and mathematicians. 
 
This alleged ‘falsification’ provoked a reaction from the supporters of the EU 
model, who tried to resist Allais’ conclusions by defending their theory from a 
normative standpoint. Allais could have simply shuddered and taken the theory 
as falsified from a descriptive point of view. Instead, he questioned the normative 
adequacy of EU theory as well, and started a controversy that ended up with the 
abandonment (in the decision theory community, at least) of the old model and its 
replacement with other ‘generalised’ theories of decision under risk. But what 
does it mean to ‘falsify’ a normative theory? The issue is not entirely clear even 
nowadays, and surely it was not clear at all when Allais and his opponents started 
their debate. Their controversy, thus, was as much about the value of their 
theories as about the methodology that should be applied in order to appraise 
them. 
 
In the first part of the chapter (sections 2.2-2.3) I shall reconstruct this 
controversy in order to show how a ‘methodology of normative appraisal’ slowly 
emerged from the debate. Since experimental evidence plays a crucial role in such 
a methodology, I shall use this case to argue that even if disciplines like decision 
theory (or game theory, in the context of which the EU model was originally 
developed) were entirely concerned with normative questions, there would still be 
room for experiments in them. A more realistic picture of these areas of research, 
however, involves a mixture of normative and descriptive considerations. In the 
second part of the chapter (sections 2.4-2.5), thus, I shall try to show how certain 
basic normative principles must be built into every model aspiring to be accepted 
by the profession. Such principles act at the same time as a sort of ‘precondition’ 
for the acceptance of a theory, and as ‘heuristic guidelines’ for its construction. 
Again, this supports Allais’ intuition about the importance of fighting his battle at 
both the descriptive and the normative level. 
 
One disclaimer: historical accounts of the development of decision theory are 
almost non-existent, and mine should not be taken as an attempt to fill this gap. 
The narrative I shall propose focuses on a very limited set of features of the story 
- the debate about normativism and the role of rationality principles in post- von 
Neumann and Morgenstern developments of decision theory. There are several 
aspects that are not addressed in this chapter but which surely have played a 
crucial role in directing research in this area: the difficult relationship between 
economists and psychologists, and between experts in decision theory, 
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management scientists and general economists, or the influence of military-funded 
operation research during the war, just to name a few. 
 
My reconstruction nevertheless highlights some aspects of the story that have 
been neglected by the existing accounts. The latter have customarily tried to 
separate the descriptive from the normative concerns of the protagonists, usually 
by focusing on the former and omitting the latter. Fishburn and Wakker (1995), 
for example, have produced an analysis of the different formulations of expected 
utility theory as they emerged in the pioneers’ writings. Their story, by focusing on 
the formal aspects, abstracts completely from the dialectical contrapositions, both 
on descriptive and normative issues, that provided the impetus for theory-
development. Mongin (1988a) puts forward a fuller picture by reconstructing the 
debate as a successful struggle with the problem of identifying the assumptions 
responsible for empirical refutations to the received theory. Decision theorists are 
portrayed as good empiricists applying a reasonable strategy in order to solve a 
methodological puzzle, the Duhem-Quine problem, ubiquitous in the natural and 
social sciences. The solution, according to Mongin, was dictated by the nature of 
the empirical falsifiers and by the formal structure of the falsified theory. 
 
My version of the story aims at improving on formalist ones by concentrating 
on the problem-situation lying behind theoretical change. In particular I shall focus 
on the strict relation between the problem of the interpretation of the rationality 
principle and the problem of its normative justification. Are there many 
principles of rationality, or is there a unique legitimate candidate? And what is the 
criterion for their assessment? I shall not tackle these questions directly, but 
illustrate how they were discussed in the history of contemporary decision theory. 
I should make clear right from the start that the approach of this chapter will be 
mainly descriptive. Although the issues discussed below raise very important 
methodological questions (for example: is it legitimate to let normative 
considerations constantly influence descriptive ones?), I shall mainly focus on 
decision theorists’ peculiar logic of discovery: the problem of normative 
justification will be shown to play a crucial role in guiding the development of 
alternative descriptive theories of human behaviour under risk. My account also 
aims to improve on ‘descriptivist’ reconstructions by showing that it is impossible 
to make sense of much of the debate without taking normative questions into 
account in the framework of analysis. It is also intended as a tentative contribution 
to the largely unexplored field of economic heuristics. 
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In the second section I shall put forward a ‘potted’ history of early expected 
utility theory, from Bernoulli to von Neumann and Morgenstern and the 
emergence of the first ‘paradoxes’. Then, I shall analyse the defensive strategies 
adopted by orthodox theorists in order to explain away the counterexamples, and 
the debate between Allais and the ‘American School’ on the foundations of 
rational choice theory (section 2.3). In the fourth section I shall discuss an 
alternative model of decision, Machina’s ‘generalised expected utility analysis’ 
and its normative status. Finally, it will be shown how weaker and weaker 
informal notions of rationality have been employed in order to justify more radical 
departures from the received model. 
 
2.2. The rise of expected utility theory 
 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a ‘logical paradox’ is “a statement 
or proposition which, despite [apparently] sound reasoning from an [apparently] 
acceptable premiss, leads to a conclusion that is against sense, logically 
unacceptable, or self-contradictory”.64 It is not, however, the sense in which the 
term has usually been used by decision theorists, as we shall see. Common 
denominators of paradoxes are self-contradiction, absurdity, or just the property 
of being contrary to “received opinion and belief” and “preconceived notions of 
what is reasonable or possible”. According to official historiography, expected 
utility (from now on EU) theory was generated by a mathematician in order to 
solve a paradox of probability theory: the famous Saint Petersburg paradox, 
proposed in 1713 by Nicholas Bernoulli to the mathematician Montmort.65 
Imagine tossing a fair coin until a head appears; if the first head occurs at the nth 
toss you will win 2n dollars: for any integer n you have a probability of 2- n of 
winning 2n dollars. The paradox arises from the consideration that if one follows 
the apparently ‘reasonable’ rule of maximising the expected monetary payoff of a 
lottery, he should be ready to pay any sum to enter such a lottery with a 
potentially infinite payoff. But, of course, no reasonable man would give all his 
money to participate in the Saint Petersburg game. It is a true logical paradox: an 
unreasonable conclusion is derived from rather plausible premisses. In 1738 
Daniel Bernoulli suggested to replace the premiss with a more realistic one: agents 
aim at maximizing 'moral values' rather than sums of money, and since the 'moral 
value' of the monetary gain decreases as n increases, it is possible to find a finite 
value for the game. Such a solution, by creating EU theory, provoked also the 
                                                 
64For the same definition of ‘paradox’ with a number of examples, see also Sainsbury (1988). 
65For a history of the Saint Petersbug paradox, see Jorland (1987). 
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first shift in the theory of rational decision under risk. Denote a typical lottery by x  
= (x1, p1; ...; xn, pn), where the xi refer to the outcomes and the pi to the 
associated probability values. Bernoulli replaced the conjecture that in case of 
random lotteries agents act so as to maximise the mathematical expected 
monetary gain 
 
(0) ii xpEG ∑=  
 
with the conjecture that agents maximise the mathematical expected ‘moral value’ 
 
(1) EU = pi∑ U(xi).66 
 
Bernoulli's 'moral value' was later assimilated to the notion of 'utility', formally 
representable by a number assigned to an outcome, and intuitively corresponding 
to the introspective degree of 'pleasure' and/or 'pain' experienced by agents 
should that outcome occur.67 Neoclassical economists (Jevons, Edgeworth, as 
well as - though not so explicitly - Marshall) conceived utility as a cardinal 
measure of happiness independent of the context (whether risky or not). 
Typically, the metaphysics underlying classical cardinalism takes utility to be a 
‘psychophysical’ entity (pleasure/pain) and leaves no or little role to the 
preference concept. But for our purposes we may gloss over this fact and 
introduce a notion of cardinalism applicable both to the earlier writers and some 
modern economists: this notion postulates that utility differences represent 
differences in the intensity of preference among certain outcomes. Taking (x, y) 
>> (z, w) to mean that the difference in preference between two objects of choice 
x and y is greater than the difference in preference between two other objects z 
and w, a cardinal utility scale must satisfy the condition 
 
(1*)   (x, y) >> (z, w) ⇔ u(x) - u(y) > u(z) - u(w). 
 
In the light of his rationale for the adoption of (1) - namely, that moral value 
diminishes at the margin - Bernoulli arguably took utility as a cardinal measure of 
                                                 
66Bernoulli proposed a definition of utility as a logarithmic function of wealth. For an 
English translation, see Bernoulli (1738/1954). 
67Modern utilitarians rank pains and pleasures on a same scale, in order to make possible an 
arithmetic calculation of the best solution available. Bentham, on the other hand, 
distinguished between different ‘circumstances’ (metrics) of pleasures and pains (see 
Mongin, 1995). Early utilitarians were not primarily concerned with problems of rational 
individual decision, but rather with problems of welfare economics, and thus the 'best' 
solution was defined as that which maximizes the happiness of all individuals in the society. 
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satisfaction in a riskless context.68 However, as we shall see shortly, the expected 
utility formula can also hold for another utility representation, thus defining another 
notion of cardinality than the ‘difference in preference’ one.69 
 
Cardinalism was to be challenged on the philosophical point that it is not at all 
clear how to compare (introspectively or otherwise) two differences in utility. 
Pareto showed as early as 189870 that in fact cardinality is not required in order 
to obtain the theorems of neoclassical economics, and just conjectured the 
existence of an ordinal utility function, which was later shown to be equivalent to 
assuming merely asymmetric, transitive, and continuous preferences. Pareto was 
mainly concerned with the fact that only indirect evidence could be presented in 
favour of the existence of a cardinal utility scale, which could not be directly and 
intersubjectively measurable. An ordinal ‘index’, by contrast, could be obtained 
by direct observation of economic choices. By dismissing cardinality, the 
‘ordinalist’ revolution which followed Pareto71 was to have significant 
consequences for EU theory, as explained shortly. 
 
In (1926), Ramsey - in an initially almost completely ignored paper - sketched 
an ‘empirical’ basis for the axiomatisation of EU theory. The full axiomatisation, 
as well as the systematisation and diffusion of decision theory under risk and 
uncertainty,72 came only in the forties with the work of von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944) (vNM from now on), who adopted the Bernoullian 
hypothesis of maximisation of mathematical expectation (1) above.73 Ramsey had 
                                                 
68Cf. Bernoulli (1738/1954): “any increase in wealth, no matter how insignificant, will always 
result in an increase in utility which is inversely proportional to the quantity of goods 
already possessed” (p. 25). But the issue is not clear: according to Jorland (1987, p. 161), 
Bernoulli “comes close to define units of utility in terms of probability”. 
69In a purely mathematical sense, an index is cardinal if unique up to a positive linear 
transformation, and the EU representation is cardinal in this sense. However, the EU formula 
(1) above does not ensure by itself that the U functional represents preference differences in 
the sense of (1*). Bouyssou and Vansnick (1990) analyse in detail the formal relationship 
holding between the classical cardinalist (‘difference in preference’) and the vNM 
(‘preference among risky prospects’) functions. 
70But see Pareto (1906) for the most famous exposition. 
71Cf. in particular Hicks and Allen (1934). 
72The distinction between risk and uncertainty is classic since Knight (1921): in a ‘risky’ 
prospect, given (objective) probabilities are assigned to states of the world; in an 
‘uncertain’ prospect, the probabilities are subjective. 
73It should be stressed that (as for many of the authors mentioned in this section) vNM’s 
interest in utility theory was self-confessedly merely “opportunistic”, as the “treatment [of 
the conceptual and practical difficulties of the notion of utility] is not among the primary 
objects of [our] work” (1944, p. 8). A model of decision under risk was needed, in particular, 
in order to solve games with mixed strategies, but vNM’s game theory does not need to rely, 
strictly speaking, on any particular interpretation of payoff figures. The utility interpretation 
may have been simply an attempt to capture economists’ interest. 
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shown how a utility function may be determined by observation of choices among 
risky prospects.74 The measurement procedure is also implicit in vNM, and has 
since then become well-known: starting with three outcomes x, y and z such that 
x > y > z, the utility scale is normalized by assigning U(x) = 1 and U(z) = 0. A 
subject is then presented with the choice between the prospect y for sure and the 
prospect [p, x; (1 - p), z]; if she prefers either the risky prospect or the sure 
outcome, the probabilities of the former are varied until she is indifferent between 
the two. At this stage, the expected utility of y can be computed by U(y) = p, and 
the procedure iterated for any value between x and z. The resulting utility curve 
will display some interesting features: its shape, in particular, will be representative 
of the agent’s ‘attitude towards risk’. If we define a risk-averse subject as one 
who prefers the expected monetary value of a prospect rather than the prospect 
itself, and if his utility curve can be represented by a vNM function, then the 
second derivative of the U function of a risk-averse subject will be negative. 
Following Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1971), the ‘absolute risk-aversion coefficient’ 
−
′ ′ U (x)
′ U (x)
 is customarily used as a measure of risk-aversion.75 Importantly, the 
use of derivatives in this formula, and the whole discussion of risk attitudes in the 
vNM theory, assumes that it makes sense to compare differences in utility values. 
Hence, it assumes a notion of cardinalism - albeit not the same as ‘classical 
cardinalism’. The latter - Bernoulli’s - belongs to the theory of riskless choice, 
whereas the vNM notion is specific to the theory of risky choice. Pareto’s and his 
follower’s ‘ordinalism’ is explicitly directed against ‘classical cardinalism’ but has 
arguably no negative impact on ‘vNM cardinalism’.76 
 
The importance of vNM's book lies in its providing the first formalisation of 
the theory, although the goal of a complete axiomatisation was achieved only later 
with Marschak (1950), Herstein and Milnor (1953), Luce and Raiffa (1957) and 
other works. A representation theorem for (1) was proved from the following 
axioms: 
 
                                                 
74Ramsey (1926) devised a general method for ‘measuring’ utilities and subjective 
probabilities; his approach to uncertainty was to be pursued further by Savage (1954). 
75The absolute magnitude of the second derivative of the expected utility function, in fact, 
cannot be used as a measure of risk-aversion because like expected utility functionals it is 
unique only up to a linear transformation. Hence the ratio formula adopted by Pratt. For a 
discussion of some methodological problems arising from the Arrow-Pratt measure, see 
Hansson (1988). 
76A majority of today’s theorists working in the tradition of ‘ordinalism’ accept the vNM 
notion of cardinality as being unproblematic, while they strongly reject Bernoulli’s. See the 
update accounts of the ‘two cardinalities’ issue in Bouyssou and Vansnick (1990) and 
Fishburn (1989). 
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(A1) > is a weak-order relation: 
(x > y) ⇒ ¬(y > x)  [asymmetry] 
(x > y & y > z) ⇒ (x > z)  [transitivity] 
 
(A2) (x > y > z) ⇔ [px + (1 - p)z > y > qy + (1 - q)z ] 
for some p and q strictly between 0 and 1 [continuity] 
 
(A3) ∀p such that 0 < p ≤ 1, 
(x > y) ⇔ [px + (1 - p)z] > [py + (1 - p)z]   [independence].77 
 
Formally, the theorem states that  if an ordering > satisfies (A1), (A2), (A3), 
there exists a real utility function U (defined on outcomes) such that: for every two 
lotteries x and y, 
 
(3)   x > y ⇔ EU(x) > EU(y), 
 
where EU is defined as in (1) above. Furthermore, the class of U’ which satisfy 
the representation condition (3) is exactly the class of positive affine 
transformations of U. 
 
The proof of a representation theorem is a very important step in the history of 
EU theory. Firstly, the axioms stated the restrictions imposed on individual 
preferences in order to obtain an EU function in a clear and rigorous fashion, and 
built a fixed target for possible counterexamples - a point towards which I shall 
turn my attention in the next section. Secondly, with the proof of a 
representation theorem rationality came to be regarded as implicitly defined 
by the axioms. This is a crucial point: the first formulation of a rationality principle 
was achieved as a result of the solution to the problem of operationalising utilities. 
In the early fifties, the problem of rationality got intermingled with the problem of 
operationalisation: the following meaning-shifts of the rationality principle and later 
attempts to find a justification to its different formulations cannot be understood 
without taking such a background into account. Third, in a loop of justification, 
the prima facie ‘reasonableness’ of the axioms provided the empirical hypothesis 
that economic agents are EU maximizers (put forward, e.g., by Marschak, 1950) 
with some plausibility, thus shifting the burden of proof towards the (at this stage, 
still incipient) opposition. 
                                                 
77Here the strict preference relation ‘>‘ is chosen as the primitive concept. Alternative, but 
equivalent, axiomatisations can be given in terms of the weak  preference relation ‘≥’ (‘is at 
least as preferred as’). 
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At the end of 1952, Allais produced a series of empirical counterexamples to 
EU theory. In a famous and controversial experiment (from then on known as 'the 
Allais paradox'), he asked people to choose first between a lottery (a1) with the 
sure prize of one million dollars and a lottery (a2) with a 10% chance of winning 
five millions, an 89% chance of winning one million, and a 1% chance of winning 
nothing. Then, he asked them to choose between a3, a lottery with a 10% chance 
of winning five millions and a 90% of winning nothing, and a4, a lottery with an 
11% chance of winning one million and an 89% chance of winning nothing. The 
gambles are represented in the decision matrix below, with s1, s2, s3 for possible 
states of the world with the respective probabilities attached to them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 s1 (p = 0.10) s2 (p = 0.01) s3 (p = 0.89) 
a1 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 
a2 5,000,000 0 1,000,000 
a3 5,000,000 0 0 
a4 1,000,000 1,000,000 0 
 
A majority of the subjects chose a1 in the first experiment, and a3 in the 
second, in apparent contrast with EU theory predictions, and in particular with 
axiom (A3). According to the latter, the outcomes under s3 should not be relevant 
for the choices in the first {a1, a2} and in the second {a3, a4} experiment; 
therefore EU theory prescribes treating the two choices as identical. Allais’ 
primary goal was to demonstrate the superiority of his own account of risky 
choice over the EU approach. He endorsed classical cardinalism as I defined it, 
and thus assumed the existence of a cardinal utility function u(.) derivable from 
agent’s choices under certainty. Taking u(.) to denote a classical cardinal function 
satisfying (1*), and U(.) to denote a vNM utility function as measured by 
observation of choices among risky prospects, Allais intended to deny that u(.) 
and U(.) are equivalent (that is, that u(.) = U(.), up to a linear transformation). 
 
Allais’ belief in classical cardinalism was supported by evidence independent 
of risky choices, in particular by introspection, along the lines of Jevons and 
Marshall. Referring to Savage’s defence of the equivalence above, Allais claimed 
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that "there is no justification for using the term 'index of utility' to refer to the 
index whose existence he demonstrates subject to certain conditions. It is 
impossible to show that this index represents cardinal utility in the usual sense of 
the term" (1979, p. 509). Before Allais’ challenge Friedman and Savage 
(1948)78 and Baumol (1951) had interpreted vNM’s ‘risky’ U(.) function as 
equivalent to the classical cardinalist ‘riskless’ u(.) function. This was surely the 
‘natural’ interpretation, given vNM’s rather unclear statements on the subject 
matter.79 Samuelson (1950), Weldon (1950), and Arrow (1951), on the 
contrary, had argued that the new vNM-utility should have been kept distinct 
from old classical cardinalist utility. Allais’ critiques were crucial in making EU 
theorists aware of the distinction among the two concepts, a distinction further 
highlighted by Ellsberg (1954), and then by Luce and Raiffa (1957) and Baumol 
(1958). After 1952, orthodox decision theorists generally endorsed the ‘two 
cardinalities’ position, although accidental identifications of U with u never ceased 
to be made, and a handful of theoretical dissenters remain.80 Allais, on the 
opposite wing, kept arguing for the ‘one cardinality’ position, but identifying the 
true cardinal utility with the classical difference-in-preference notion. 
 
 u(.) ≅ U(.) u(.) ≠ U(.) 
 
one cardinality 
Friedman & Savage 
(1948), Harsanyi (1977) 
 
Weldon (1950), Baumol 
(1951), Allais (1953) 
 
two cardinalities 
 
Samuelson (1950), Arrow (1951), 
Friedman & Savage (1952), Savage (1954),  
Ellsberg (1954), 
Luce and Raiffa (1957), Baumol (1958) 
 
Allais’ strategy seems the more remarkable, because the diagnosis of failure of 
the EU hypothesis in his experiment is in fact logically independent of his 
conception of utility.81 Let us denote these two elements of Allais’ work by (i) - 
the proposal to keep a riskless utility function as the fundamental tool of analysis 
                                                 
78But see their rectification in Friedman and Savage (1952). 
79Regarding the position of vNM (1944), see Ellsberg (1954) and especially Fishburn (1989), 
who has shown how the distinction between the two cardinalities can be detected in the 
footnotes of the Theory of Games. 
80Harsanyi (1977) is probably the most vigorous (but isolated) defender of this standpoint 
among today’s decision theorists, but it is unclear whether he adheres to it for reasons other 
than the fact it is needed for his defense of utilitarian ethics. See Mongin and D’Aspremont 
(1996). 
81For a retrospective outline of Allais’ strategy, see his (1992). 
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for risky decisions as well, and (ii) the falsification of the EU hypothesis, 
respectively. When, in 1952 during the C.N.R.S. Colloquium in Paris, Savage 
accepted that  (i) u(x) ≠ U(x), Allais concluded that (ii) "as a matter of fact, the 
neo-Bernoullian index whose existence Savage claims to have proved only exists 
on the paper" (1979, p. 509). In fact, not only (i) "to treat this index on the same 
footing as cardinal utility is deliberately to delude the unwarned reader into 
believing that the theory on which it is based provides a measure of [classical] 
cardinal utility" (ibid., p. 509), but (ii) the function U(x) could only represent the 
function maximized by an ideal agent obeying the vNM axioms, and unfortunately 
this does not seem to be the case for real agents. 
 
In other words, the Allais paradox can be interpreted in at least two ways. On 
the one hand, (i) moving from the assumption that agents maximize a classical 
cardinal utility function, one can use the empirical data to argue that it is 
impossible to measure it by means of vNM’s method. The difference in value 
[u(1,000,000) - u(5,000,000)] as measured in a certainty context cannot be used 
to predict the outcome of the risky experiment. On the other hand, (ii) it is 
possible to use the data to show that the preferences displayed by subjects are 
inconsistent with EU axioms, and therefore that no ‘index’ of preferences U(.) 
can be constructed from them. If preferences were consistent with the 
independence axiom, in fact, there would exist a function linear in the probabilities 
representing such preferences, contrary to experimental evidence. 
 
Although the tradition has mainly retained aspect (ii) of Allais’ work - i.e. the 
falsification of the EU hypothesis - it should be stressed that it is just one aspect 
of his rich and sophisticated approach. The thesis (i) about the existence of a 
riskless cardinal utility function and of its primacy over risky indexes of choice, 
despite its being logically independent of (ii), is crucial in order to understand 
Allais’ positive heuristics in all multifarious aspects, and also the reasoning behind 
his experimental achievements. 
 
2.3. Is every ‘counterexample’ a counterexample? Normativism and its 
problems 
 
Before the Paris conference, EU theory had been interpreted mainly as a 
descriptive theory of human behaviour. The Allais paradox provoked a major 
shift in the problem of decision under risk, and many decision theorists began to 
defend EU theory from a normative point of view. The roots of economics being 
in the field of the moral sciences, normative interpretations are much older than 
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any ‘descriptivist’ view. ‘Normativists’82 claim that their theories aim to describe 
the behaviour of an ideal rational agent, but not only because such an 'ideal type' 
is useful in order to understand the behaviour of real agents; rather, models of 
rational behaviour are significant for evaluative purposes.83 
 
The 'Neo-Bernoullians' - as Allais labelled the strong defenders of EU theory - 
slowly shifted to a different terrain in order to save their model of rational choice: 
theories of rational behaviour have a normative status and, therefore, should not 
be modified in the light of 'irrational' choices. According to Allais, the shift from a 
descriptive to a normative interpretation deprived EU theory of its scientific 
content. Nevertheless, Allais accepted the challenge and, as we shall see, gave a 
substantial contribution to the subsequent debate about normativism. This was an 
extremely important move: had Allais decided not to fight his battle on both fronts, 
much of the methodological debate I am going to reconstruct would have simply 
not have taken place. The clash focused on the meaning and content of the 
rationality principle, and led to a series of meaning-shifts which proved to be very 
fruitful for the development of decision theory. In the next sections I shall try to 
assess these shifts and analyse their theoretical implications. 
 
It is interesting to notice that, despite his being primarily interested in the 
descriptive value of EU theory, Allais in a sense was forced to take the 
normativist position at face value. Marschak (1950) had argued that the prima 
facie ‘reasonableness’ of the axioms confirmed the validity of the model as a ‘first 
approximation’ to human real behaviour under risk, thus elaborating on vNM’s 
standpoint.84 Real economic behaviour, as de Finetti (1952) had put it, can be 
seen as the result in the aggregate of rational behaviour plus an error component. 
By devising a model of rational behaviour, therefore, progress both on the 
descriptive and the prescriptive dimensions is achieved. Allais similarly subscribed 
to a heuristics of successive approximations to a true, complete and accurate 
description of human decision under risk, but followed a different strategy. He 
decided to start by modelling an introspectively well-established human motive, 
i.e. the desire to maximize ‘absolute satisfaction’ (a psychophysical sensation in 
the Fechner-Weber sense), and then add other factors arising from the perception 
of risk. Real human behaviour, to him, is the result of the attempt to maximize 
utility, plus the impact of four ‘fundamental factors’ and of ten ‘secondary 
                                                 
82Of course ‘normativism’ and ‘descriptivism’ are labels created to better illustrate my point, 
and do not correspond to any real ‘school’ in economics or decision theory. 
83In modern economics, the origins of this position can be traced back to Walras. 
84Cf. also his remarks in C.N.R.S. (1953), pp. 25-26, 35, 152. 
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factors’. The results of his experiments, for example, could not be explained by 
EU theory because the latter neglects a fundamental factor (the ‘dispersion of 
psychological values’) which is present in almost all risky choice-situations.85 
Without going into the details of Allais’ own theory, it is important to stress that in 
order to hit the ‘Neo Bernoullian’ position at its heart it was necessary to show 
that the axioms of EU theory are not so reasonable after all. This way, even the 
‘heuristic value’ of vNM’s approach could be denied. 
 
As noted, the first normativist interpretation of vNM’s model was probably 
due to Marschak (1950), who also proposed to take the theory as descriptively 
valid to a ‘first approximation’.86 Arrow (1951) and Baumol (1951) followed the 
same approach. Savage, who had in the papers written with Friedman put the 
theory to descriptive use, focused in later papers on its normative properties. In 
(1951), (1952), and then in his Foundations of Statistics (1954), subjective EU 
axioms are presented and defended as describing the behaviour of a rational 
agent facing risk and uncertainty. Savage’s and Allais’ positions constituted the 
opposite poles of the debate that took place at at the Paris Colloquium of 1952. 
Savage (1952) presented his subjective EU theory explicitely as a normative 
theory of behaviour from the start. He acknowledged that sometimes people’s 
behaviour should agree with the theory, which suggests a possible empirical test 
‘in certain cases’ (1952, p. 29), but his emphasis is very different from that of the 
Friedman and Savage articles (1948; 1952). Allais, in contrast, challenged 
Savage’s model as a theory of rationality, by arguing that certain effects (like the 
‘complementarity effects’ at the origins of his own paradox) cannot be deemed 
‘irrational’ (cf. C.N.R.S., 1953, p. 39). 
  
Among the other participants to the 1952 conference, de Finetti (1952) was 
also keen on defending EU theory from a normative standpoint. (This was 
probably due to his commitment to Bayesianism as an interpretation of subjective 
probability.)  Like Walras before him, de Finetti argued that, in case of deviations, 
agents should be led by correction to approximate the rational model (in 
C.N.R.S., 1952, pp. 52-53). Samuelson’s position was most curious: in (1950) 
he felt neutral on the issue for lack of convincing arguments. In 1950 Savage 
introduced him to Dutch-Book arguments and convinced him of the normative 
validity of EU theory. Still, he remained sceptical of the adequacy of the model to 
                                                 
85Cf. Allais (1953/1979), pp. 39-56. 
86Marschak’s twist was however consistent with the spirit of the time: research with strong 
normative connotations was carried on in the forties in a number of centres (such as the 
Cowles commision) and in operations research in general. 
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represent one-shot choices, when there is no possibility of exploitation or 
learning.87 According to Samuelson (1952), the main virtues of the vNM 
axiomatization are ‘aesthetic and semantic’: the model is in continuity with the 
coherentist approach to preferences that became orthodox with the ‘ordinalist’ 
revolution in consumer theory. Yet, Samuelson during the conference did not 
refrain from defending the ‘reasonableness’ of his own Strong Independence 
Axiom from Allais’ criticism (cf. C.N.R.S., 1953, pp. 147, 157, 163). 
 
The main problem of the ‘Neo-Bernoullians’ was to ‘neutralise’ the anomalous 
evidence and to deny it the status of counterexample to EU theory. By endorsing 
the normative standpoint, they could reject all the apparent counter-evidence as 
due to 'mistakes', 'errors of calculations', etc. Imre Lakatos has described 
defensive strategies of this kind -  which he labelled 'monster-barring' (or 
'monster-elimination') - in his Proofs and Refutations (1963-64/1976), a long 
essay devoted to the logic of mathematical discovery. This procedure consists in 
narrowing the domain of a theory through 'ad-hoc' redefinitions of its terms which 
cut off dangerous falsifiers. In his case study, Lakatos showed how 
mathematicians rejected counterexamples to Euler's conjecture by simply denying 
that a non-Eulerian polyhedron is a ‘real’ polyhedron. In our case, normativists 
tried to reject counterexamples claiming that EU theory is a theory of rational 
behaviour and non-vNM behaviour is not ‘really’ rational. Much of the debate 
between Allais and his normativist collegues focused on the interpretation of 
normativism, on the legitimacy of this defensive strategy, and on the distinction 
between irrationalities and genuine counterexamples. 
 
How can a normative theory be confirmed or refuted? Such a question lies 
hidden behind much of the early controversy on EU theory. At the beginning, no 
general agreement existed about a methodology for assessing normative theories. 
Several different (sometimes only slightly different) points of view can be 
identified; other, more sophisticated, ones slowly emerged as the controversy 
progressed. 
 
At the 1952 Colloquium, Jacob Marschak held that "des postulats choisis 
avec bon sens imposent naturellement des restrictions aux fonctions [...] 
admissibles" (in C.N.R.S., 1953, p. 153). The notion of bon sens, unfortunately, 
is an intrinsically vague one: whose ‘good sense’, to begin with? Suppose that, as 
                                                 
87Cf. the 1965 postscript to Samuelson (1950), in Collected Papers, vol. 1, pp. 124-126. 
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in the case we are concerned with, there exists a radical disagreement about the 
reasonableness of some principle: how can we resolve it? 
 
The most drastic solution to such problems would be a sort of 
‘postulationism’: to define rationality as ‘obeying the EU axioms’. But such a 
move would trivialize the notions of 'making a mistake' and 'irrational behaviour' 
that - correctly, from an intuitive point of view - should demarcate admissible 
from inadmissible counterexamples. It becomes impossible to distinguish 'making 
a mistake' from 'not obeying the EU axioms'.88 The latter being just a definition of 
'counterexample to EU theory', all counterexamples are according to this 
perspective instances of mistakes, irrational behaviour, and thus devoid of 
significance. It is not surprising then, that nobody seriously pursued the strategy.89 
 
Postulationism, thus, seems to be a dead end: why defining rationality in terms 
of the EU axioms, instead of other, possibly incompatible, principles? As noticed 
by Paul Samuelson, "de même qu'on ne peut pas discuter de goûts, de même on 
ne peut pas, du point de vue de la déduction pure, discuter sur les axiomes" 
(Samuelson, 1952, in C.N.R.S., 1953, p. 143). From a purely formal point of 
view any definition is as good as any other, and thus postulationism is acceptable 
only in a more 'liberal' form, which we may call ‘coherentism’. Coherentists 
argued that the behaviour exhibited in Allais’ experiments can be deemed 
'irrational' if and only if the subjects committed themselves to follow EU axioms: 
"[the] normative property is based on the acceptance of the theory" 
(Morgenstern, 1972, p. 712). Amihud similarly argued later that 
 
The theory merely claims that if in a certain situation, given a choice 
between certain lotteries, an individual agrees that his behavior is in 
accordance with the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms - then an 
inconsistency in choices may be pointed out as irrational. [...] 
Clearly, an observation of any pattern of choice whatsoever is 
insufficient by itself to determine rationality (or irrationality). Irrationality 
is rather a result of an action taken by an individual who has agreed to 
accept this particular definition of rationality (Amihud, 1979, pp. 149-
150). 
                                                 
88Notice that there the postulationist position still admits the theoretical distinction 
between errors derived from the adoption of some ‘wrong’ decision rule, and other trivial 
mistakes such as calculation errors. In practice, however, the two become indistinguishable. 
89In his (1979) reply to his critics, Allais tries to attibute such a position to Amihud, but it is 
clearly a polemical misrepresentation of his position. 
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From this point of view, a 'mistake' can only be an error in deducing the ‘right’ 
action from a set of rules that the agent accepts as defining rationality. We now 
have a way of detecting ‘mistakes’: by asking agents what their own theory of 
rationality is. If their choices conflict with their theory, then we can claim that they 
have made a mistake. Irrationality can only be defined as inconsistency between a 
subject’s theory and his behaviour.90 Morgenstern and Amihud played a rather 
marginal role in the EU controversy, but this idea is very important indeed. It lies, 
as we shall see soon, at the origins of the empirical work done by experimental 
psychologists on people’s readiness to revise their choices in the light of (either 
formal or informal) theories of rationality. 
 
Morgenstern and Amihud’s strategy, however, is not very effective in the 
context of a debate such as that on decision theory. It cannot, in fact, help very 
much to make progress in a debate aimed at finding a unique rationality principle. 
Coherentism leaves anyone free to choose whatever principle of normative choice 
she wants to endorse. Why should someone hold a principle of rationality rather 
than another? As Allais pointed out, this amounts merely to saying that "to act as 
a normative guide a theory must be accepted as valid", "but", of course, 
"precisely the question is to know which theory [...] should be adopted" 
(1979, p. 544-545). We have not made much progress, and still have no clue of 
what it means for the agent’s behaviour itself to be coherent. 
 
Of course, we all have a rough idea of what a rational choice is. Formal 
models may indeed be seen as (fallible) attempts to turn our intuitions into a 
precise, rigorous formulation. In this sense, the informal notions of rationality may 
play a regulative role in assessing formal models. The latter - unless we are certain 
of a perfect overlapping - must be corrigible in the light of some counterexample. 
To a fallibilist-normativist, the problem of the legitimacy of counterexample 
changes, so to speak, into the problem of ‘monster-acceptance’. 
Counterexamples are useful for theory-improvement, but not every 
counterexample should be allowed to falsify a theory. 
 
The problem of the nature of counterexamples is particularly puzzling in the 
case of normative theories. In the case of empirical theories, falsifiers should in the 
                                                 
90Notice the contrast between such a point of view and the naive idea that there can be 
mere behaviour-behaviour inconsistencies: nothing can be inferred about the rationality of 
my choices from the mere fact that I choose something in one situation and something else 
in another - that is, without some theory of rationality enabling to interpret my behaviour. 
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best case91 point to the falsity of the universal laws under test.  According to 
Lakatos (1967), falsifiers in mathematics are ‘heuristic’ ones, they point to the 
inadequacy of a formal system to ‘catch’ an underlying informal theory. 
 
If we accept the view that a formal axiomatic theory implicitly defines its 
subject-matter, then there would be no [...] falsifiers except the logical ones. 
But if we insist that a formal theory should be the formalization of some 
informal theory, then a formal theory may be said to be ‘refuted’ if one of its 
theorems is negated by the corresponding theorem of the informal theory 
(Lakatos, 1963-64/1976, p. 36). 
 
These ideas seem to fit very well the case we are concerned with. In 1953 
Allais proposed a ‘quasi-empirical’ criterion in order to 'catch' an informal 
minimal principle of rationality: 
 
Rationality can be defined by having regard to the behaviour of persons 
who are commonly considered rational.92 
 
But people can be legitimately considered rational if and only if "there exists 
independent grounds, i.e. without any considerations of random choices, for 
believing that they behave rationally" (Allais, 1979, p. 467). That is,  an 
abstract criterion sustains the experimental, because "only those whose behaviour 
is in line with the first are usually considered as rational" (ibid. p. 467). Agents 
acting in situations of certainty in accordance to the first two axioms are rational, 
in that they obey to the abstract minimal definition of rationality as consistency. 
 
A man will be deemed to act rationally 
(a) if he pursues ends that are mutually consistent (i.e. not contradictory) 
(b) if he employs means that are appropriate for these ends (Allais, 
1953/1979, p. 78). 
 
Moreover, satisfaction of (first order) stochastic dominance should be taken 
as a necessary prerequisite of any normative theory of decision.93 Such an 
                                                 
91The qualification is needed because of the Duhem-Quine problem (see the next chapter). 
92See for instance Allais (1953/1979), pp. 80, 86; (1979), p. 467. 
93Allais called stochastic dominance ‘the axiom of abslolute preference’, and made it part of 
his definition of rationality (cf. Allais, 1953/1979, pp. 78-80). A lottery X (first-order) 
stochastically dominates Y  whenever the probability assigned to the preferred outcomes is 
higher in X  than in Y. In other words, the cumulative distribution of X is below the 
cumulative distribution of Y. 
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abstract, minimal and allegedly universally accepted definition of rationality as 
consistency at the same time provides a criterion for appraising counterexamples, 
and 'cuts off' those axioms which (because they are not implied by (a) and (b) 
above, e.g. independence) are open to revision in the light of counterexamples. 
Allais allowed counterexamples such as those emerging from his own experiments 
to act as normative falsifiers by ‘stretching’ the concept of rationality: the latter is 
now identified with a broader notion only partly overlapping with the axioms of 
EU theory.94 
 
In a late reflection on the normative status of his own theory, Oskar 
Morgenstern argued in a similar vein that "a norm follows only from [...] another 
norm of more general content", and that "this process should ultimately lead to 
some original norm, which is simply given [taken as] and not derived from any 
other" (1972, pp. 710-711). The problem then is: at what level will agreement be 
reached regarding an acceptable general rationality principle? 
 
Unfortunately, Allais’ criterion of acceptance of falsifiers is still too weak. It 
solved the problem Allais wanted to solve, i.e. it provided a criterion liberal 
enough to legitimise all the counterexamples known at the time - but only those 
counterexamples that hit the independence axioms. The criterion, to put it in a 
different way, is rigid because strictly linked to a specific definition of rationality: 
more formally, it is modelled on the notions of preordering (axiom A1 above), 
and of stochastic dominance. But why accept these two principles? The 
procedure of appraisal of counterexamples had to be further refined. 
 
A crucial step forward in the debate was made when Savage (1954) 
proposed his ‘quasi-empirical’ test of rationality while debating with Allais. It is, I 
think, the best formulation of a critical method of theory-improvement to be found 
in the debate on EU theory. According to Savage's quasi-empirical test of 
rationality, 
 
                                                 
94 'Concept stretching', according to Lakatos is the other side of 'monster-barring'. “For any 
proposition there is always some sufficiently narrow interpretation of its terms, such that it 
turns out true, and some sufficiently wide interpretation such that it turns out false. Which 
interpretation is intended and which unintended depends of course on our intentions. The 
first interpretation may be called the dogmatist, verificationist or justificationist 
interpretation, the second the sceptical, critical or refutationist interpretation (Lakatos, 
1963-64/1976, p. 99). On ‘inflation’ and ‘deflation’ of meaning and Lakatos’ dialectical logic 
see Larvor (1998), ch. 2. 
 
 63 
 
If, after thorough deliberation, anyone maintains a pair of distinct 
preferences that are in conflict with the sure-thing principle, he must 
abandon, or modify, the principle; for that kind of discrepancy seems 
intolerable in a normative theory. [...] In general, a person who has 
tentatively accepted a normative theory must conscientiously study 
situations in which the theory seems to lead him astray; he must decide for 
each by reflection - deduction will typically be of little relevance - whether 
to retain his initial impression of the situation or to accept the implications of 
the theory for it (1954, pp. 101-103). 
 
During the 1952 Colloquium in Paris, Allais presented Savage with a version 
of his questionnaire, and Savage's choices, in line with the majority of people, 
violated vNM's axioms. Thi story has since then become part of the folklore 
(Savage was at the time working on his Foundations of Statistics!). Savage later 
revised his answers, recognising that he had been ‘irrational’, and that he would 
have rather followed EU prescriptions. His quasi-empirical test was conceived in 
order to justify this move. In the passage quoted above, Savage - still holding 
normativism - recognized that EU theory (and the independence axiom in 
particular) was in principle revisable in the light of counterexamples. Then, he 
identified normativity with the convincing power of a theory, and proposed his 
test. Although his method was a step forward in the debate, because it was not 
founded on any formal (however minimal) definition of rationality, it still needed a 
decisive improvement. In particular, the ambiguity of Savage’s reference to 
“thorough deliberation”, “conscientious study of situations”, “reflection”, made his 
method apparently almost empty: how does one know whether he should “retain 
the initial impression” (that is, accept the counterexample) or “accept the 
implications of the theory”? 
 
Allais noticed that Savage's method was questionable if tendentiously applied: 
"Savage presents my counterexample without saying a word about the general 
theory on which it is based" (1979, p. 535). When seen 'through the spectacles' 
of EU theory, of course "the [counter-]example which is only a specific 
illustration of a general theory, is pinpointed as a wayward curiosity 
concealing an 'error' which is easily brought to light" (Allais, 1979, p. 537, 
emphasis in the original). 
 
Allais' remarks highlighted the trivial but crucial point that the alternative is not 
among counterexamples being 'rational' or 'irrational' per se, but 'rational' or 
'irrational' relatively to some theory of rationality. Before asking whether agents 
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want to revise their choices or not, both rival theories should be proposed.95 This 
suggests that the problems of criticism and growth of (normative) knowledge 
cannot be separated. The problem of ‘theory-choice’ cannot be solved 
independently of the problem of ‘monster-acceptance’, because we need 
counterexamples in order to falsify and improve a theory of rational behaviour. 
On the other hand, the problem of ‘monster-acceptance’ cannot be solved 
independently of the problem of ‘theory-choice’, because only a new conjecture 
about the rationale of the falsifying evidence can legitimate a monster and 
transform it into a counterexample. 
 
Again, the problem of the nature of normative falsifiers emerges in its 
complexity: counterexamples are tricky because we do not have intuitions about 
them. This is a typical feature of normative theories, which distinguishes them from 
empirical ones: counterexamples are disturbing because we do not know what 
our attitude towards them ought to be. Intuition is not the ultimate criterion of 
appraisal. It must be guided by reasons, and shaped by arguments. This applies to 
counterexamples in both their interpretations. We need an argument in order turn 
a counterexample into a ‘monster’ as much as to turn it into a ‘heuristic falsifier’. 
This feature plays a very important role in the dialectics of the debate, because 
monsters stimulate proofs in order to justify their rejection.96 
 
To sum up: according to the Savage-Allais method, some intuitive, but so far 
formally undefined, principles of rational behaviour exist. These informal principles 
regulate the acceptance of counterexamples. So, it is crucial that we have at least 
an intuitive idea of the factors which may have provoked the emergence of a 
counterexample, and moreover that these factors cannot be deemed irrational in 
the light of the informal rationality principles which guide agents' choices. 
Otherwise, a ‘monster-barring’ defense becomes legitimate and the 
counterexample can be labelled as an instance of irrational behaviour. Implicitly, 
the Savage-Allais method will accept as superseding theories only models of 
                                                 
95Allais did not seem to get this point, for instance when he claimed (consistently with his 
own methodology presented above) that his experiments proved "that there are people who 
are considered as rational and who take decisions that are incompatible with this [i.e., 
vNM's] formulation. That is enough for me" (1979, p. 546). As I am trying to argue, I think 
that it is not enough. 
96“Intuitionism is here used not for providing foundations but for providing falsifiers, not 
for discouraging but for encouraging and criticizing speculation!”  (Lakatos, 1967, p. 38). 
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rational choice: behind a counterexample there must be a rival theory, and behind 
a rival theory there must always be a rationality principle.97 
 
This method is liberal enough to allow the emergence of counterexamples, but 
strict enough not to let every counterexample count as a falsifier. The intuitively 
plausible idea of human 'mistakes' is preserved and plays a role in the heuristic 
strategy. But is the method too strict? Does it not require that a new, better theory 
be available before we take the old one as falsified? Morgenstern (1979) argued 
in such a methodological-falsificationist vein that Allais produced a series of 
counterexamples without a superseding theory, and therefore his refutations could 
not be taken seriously.98 But of course we should distinguish rejection from 
falsification: in order to consider a (normative) theory falsified, we do not need a 
fully-developed rival theory, a promise is enough. In contrast, an isolated 
counterexample is not enough: we need at least a 'sketch' of a new theory, a 
rough conjecture about the origins of the anomaly. As we shall see, in the light of 
the informal principle of rationality, the clash between the anomaly and the former 
model of rational decision should in the best cases also provide heuristic advice 
about how to develop a new theory that might supersede the old conjecture. 
 
Allais is then responsible for at least three distinctive methodological 
contributions to the debate: a refining of the idea of intuition as imitation of the 
‘rational man’; his well-defined but less demanding notion of rationality; the 
sophisticated falsificationist view that counterexamples come with alternative 
theories in support. From a scientific point of view, Allais provided the sketch of a 
new theory, but thirty years went by before mathematically acceptable 
superseding models were put forward by Mark Machina, John Quiggin and 
others. Before then experimenters had already shown that a majority of subjects, 
when provided with informal arguments, refuse to revise their ‘paradoxical’ 
answers to Allais’ test. Agents’ intuitive rationality appears stronger than 
economists’ formalisations. MacCrimmon (1968) and Slovic and Tversky (1974) 
tried in a number of experiments to implement Savage’s and Allais’ suggestions, 
thus creating some real quasi-empirical tests of rationality. The experiments 
confirmed Allais’ intuition - that the quality and variety of the arguments (the 
                                                 
97Sen’s (1985) notion of ‘reflection rationality’ captures some of the features of the Allais-
Savage quasi-empirical methodology. Sen fails, however, to notice that it is a ‘meta-level’ 
regulative principle. 
98Such a claim is now outdated, thanks to the developments in decision theory to be 
mentioned in next section. 
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‘theories of rationality’) provided by experimenters influence crucially agents’ 
decisions whether to revise their choices in Allais-type experiments or not. 
 
2.4. Generalisations 
 
Up to now I have focused on the debate concerning the normative status of EU 
theory and on its crucial role in making the anomalies acceptable as genuine 
falsifying evidence. To accept such evidence does however open the problem of 
how to revise the refuted theory and replace it with a better one. In this section I 
shall show that normative reasoning played another important role in helping to 
solve this particular problem. The ‘minimal principles’ that emerged from the 
debate on rationality were used as heuristic tools for the discovery of superseding 
models of rational choice under risk. 
 
Let us, to begin with, sketch a very broad heuristic principle common to 
decision theory and perhaps economics in general, stating that every new theory 
should be a theory of rational individual behaviour. Such a principle is compatible 
with other (more specific) ones: Allais’ idea that one should build on the classical 
utilitarian tradition and identify U(.) with u(.), for example; or the commitment to 
operationalism that was common to several economists at the time. According to 
the general principle, at any rate, only rational models of decision will be 
acceptable as superseding ones. Adding more detail, we shall see that the 
development of alternative models of decision proceded in two steps. The first 
one was mainly dictated by Allais’ minimal principle of rationality, telling decision 
theorists which of the axioms of EU theory to abandon and which ones to keep. 
Such a move led to the development of weaker models, able to account for the 
refuting evidence but at the same time with less empirical content than the original 
one. The second step consisted in deriving stronger models from the weak ones 
and some of the anomalous evidence. 
 
Ideally, a full reconstruction of a cognitive process of theoretical discovery 
could identify a rigorous deductive argument from a set of meta-principles 
(metaphysics, methodological rules, tacit commitments of all sorts), the empirical 
evidence known at the time, and the older refuted theory, to the new rival 
theory.99 In practice this is often difficult to effect, because most of the reasoning 
lies hidden in scientists’ mind, and I shall certainly fall short of this goal. I shall 
however present a partial reconstruction supporting a non-trivial thesis: that 
                                                 
99For some examples of full reconstruction, see Zahar (1983). 
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principles of rationality were among the premisses of the reasoning that led to the 
generalisations of EU theory put forward in the early eighties. This will shed 
further light on the importance of the debate on normativity in the development of 
decision theory. 
 
An attempt to solve the Allais paradox was provided by Mark Machina's 
(1982; 1983) 'generalised expected utility analysis'. Like Allais, Machina spotted 
(A3) as the weak axiom in EU theory, and tried to replace it taking the known 
counterexamples into account.100 According to Mongin (1988a, p. 319), the 
decision to hit the third axiom of EU theory can be reconstructed as a rational 
move dictated by the mathematical structure of the refuted theory. There exists, in 
fact, an implicit hierarchy among the axioms of EU theory: the axioms of continuity 
(A2) and independence (A3) become ‘inefficiently precise’ when imposed on a 
non-well-ordered relation (A1). Similarly, independence makes little sense 
without continuity, a necessary condition for proving the existence of a utility 
function. In this sense, one may say that (A3) ‘implies’ (A2), and both ‘imply’ 
(A1). The relation of ‘implication’ (figure 1a below) can be reversed to represent 
the ‘hard core’ and the ‘protective belt’ of vNM’s theory (figure 1b below). In 
case of falsifying evidence, the ‘arrow of refutation’ will be naturally directed 
towards (A3) first.101 
                                                 
100 Allais has denied that there is any continuity between his and Machina’s work, and 
started a harsh controversy in his (1988b); see the issue of Theory and Decision dedicated 
to that debate (vol. 38, no. 3, 1995). The received interpretation among decision theorists 
today is that Machina has captured some important features of Allais’ informal ideas. Allais’ 
ideas are also at the origin of other generalised models of decision, like Quiggin’s ‘Expected 
Utility with Rank-Dependent Probabilities’ (1982), which is presented briefly below. 
101On the notions of ‘hard core’ and ‘protective belt’, already implicit in Lakatos (1963-
64/1976), see in particular Lakatos (1970). 
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It is not clear, however, that such considerations alone determined the decision to 
revise EU theory by giving up independence. The reconstruction put forward in 
the previous sections has shown that the debate on normativism probably played 
a parallel role, leading to the identification of a ‘normative hard core’ in the 
axioms of weak-ordering and the principle of stochastic dominance. The minimal 
notion of rationality proposed by Allais (1953/1979), in other words, explicitly 
offered the third axiom of EU theory as the ‘natural’ victim of refutation. 
Generalised models of decision such as Machina’s became acceptable as 
economic theories due to their being consistent with some (however minimal) 
principle of rationality. Any historical account of the rise (Fishburn and Wakker, 
1995) and fall (Mongin, 1988a) of the independence principle that sharply 
separates the debate about the descriptive from the debate about the normative 
virtues of EU theory is bound to miss an important aspect of the story. 
 
Mark Machina presents his positive strategy of revision of the received model 
in several stages: starting from the familiar point that the independence axiom 
plays a crucial role in defining a utility function 'linear in the probabilities', Machina 
showed that most counterexamples are compatible with the weaker assumption 
that utility is 'smooth (or differentiable) in the probabilities' (Hypothesis 1).102 
Given that linearity is a special case of differentiability, the vNM function becomes 
a special case of 'generalised expected utility analysis'. However, Hypothesis 1 is 
incompatible with the suggestion that agents act as if maximizing a unique EU 
function independently of the prospects they compare. In Machina’s theory, 
preferences define a set of ‘local utility functions’ maximised by agents when 
choosing in the neighbourhood of a certain prospect. Local utility functions are 
increasing in money, thus formalising Allais’ normative intuition that stochastically 
dominating prospects should be preferred to stochastically dominated ones. 
 
Given that the new theory is apparently a weaker version of the old one, 
Machina put forward a further restriction in order to fully explain the trend of the 
violations of the independence axioms, and proposed (Hypothesis 2) that the 
concavity of a local utility function (and therefore aversion to risk103) be related to 
the property of stochastic dominance: for any two local utility functions over 
lotteries, if one lottery stochastically dominates the other, the function determined 
by the dominant lottery must show a greater risk aversion than the function 
                                                 
102See Machina (1983), pp. 267-276. 
103In a formal sense taken from vNM theory, see above section 2.2. 
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determined by the dominated one.104 Such a procedure is quite typical of 
theoretical ‘discoveries’ in science in general: firstly, the falsified model is 
weakened by relaxing some of its assumptions; then, the generalised model is 
made more precise by imposing some new hypothesis suggested by theoretical 
considerations or empirical data. I shall refer to such a characteristic sequential 
‘deflation’ and ‘inflation’ of empirical content as the ‘zig-zag’ pattern of heuristic 
development.105 
 
Generalised EU analysis provides an interesting example of how falsifying 
evidence can help to build a new conjecture superseding the old (falsified) one. 
As a presentational device, it is useful to use the so-called ‘Marschak-Machina’ 
triangle.106 The triangle permits the mapping of indifference curves among 
lotteries in a diagram delimited by a vertical axis upon which probability values p3 
are represented (0 ≥ p3 ≥ 1), a horizontal axis with values p1 (0 ≥  p1 ≥ 1), and 
by an hypotenuse obtained by linking p1 = 1 and p3 = 1. We can represent 
lotteries with (at most) three preordered outcomes (x1< x2 < x3) on the 
Marschak-Machina triangle: each point in the diagram corresponds in fact to a 
value for p1, a value for p3, and a value for p2 (since p2 = 1 - p1 - p3). The 
Marschak-Machina triangle permits the representation of indifference curves 
associated with agents’ preferences, by tracing a line linking the set of lotteries 
among which the agents are indifferent. EU theory provides some predictions 
about the shape of such curves. In particular, it requires that indifference curves 
run from south-west to north-east in the direction of increasing preferences and - 
as a consequence of assuming independence - be straight lines and parallel to 
each other. The Allais experiment, on the contrary, might suggest that in some 
cases indifference curves ‘fan out’ in the triangle without being parallel. The 
prospects of Allais’ experiment - namely a1 = (1m, 1), a2 = (5m, .10; 0, .01; 1m, 
.89), a3 = (5m, .10; 0, .90), a4 = (1m, .11; 0, .89) - and the related choices (a1 > 
a2, a3 > a4) correspond to indifference curves as in figure 2. 
 
The relative steepness of indifference curves represents aversion to risk; since 
a lottery dominates all those positioned below it on its right in the triangle, 
indifference curves implied by Machina’s Hypothesis 2 fan out non linearly 
towards the outside (the so-called ‘fanning out’ effect - see figure 3). 
                                                 
104See Machina (1983), p. 282. 
105The term is borrowed from Koestler (1959). Contrary to Koestler and following Lakatos, 
however, it is argued here that such a zig-zag pattern does not result from ‘sleepwalking’: 
scientific discovery can be reconstructed as a rigorous and quasi-rational process. 
106Cf. Marschak (1950) and Machina (1982). 
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MacCrimmon and Larsson (1979) replicated Allais’ experiments and showed 
that violations of transitivity are more frequent when lotteries have extreme 
probability values than when lotteries have moderate values. This can be taken to 
mean that indifference curves near the extremes of the Marschak-Machina 
triangle fan out significantly, whereas those in the middle are approximately 
parallel as prescribed by EU theory. Hypothesis 2 essentially builds the falsifying 
evidence into Machina’s theory107 requiring that the utility functions of a certain 
lottery exhibit greater risk-aversion than those of the lotteries it stochastically 
dominates. This procedure highlights once more the crucial role played by the 
debate about normativism in the development of a descriptive theory of choice 
under risk. Machina's theory could have never been 'deduced from the 
phenomena' if such phenomena were treated as mere instances of irrational 
behaviour. Machina fully accepted Allais’ recommendation that the preordering 
and stochastic dominance preservation assumptions be satisfied, in agreement 
with the objective of defining a rational choice model alternative to EU theory. 
Such a step was possible only conditional on a shift at the level of methodology, 
i.e. in the complicated procedure of acceptance of counterexamples described in 
the previous sections. 
 
To corroborate this analysis, it is worth comparing Machina’s model of 
rational decision making with a different, purely descriptive, model put forward by 
the psychologists Kahneman and Tversky (1979) just a few years earlier. 
Kahnemann and Tversky followed another of Allais’ suggestions and tried to 
model an effect of ‘distortion in the perception of the probabilities’ allegedly at the 
origins of Allais’ data. The crucial feature of their ‘Prospect Theory’ is a 
‘weighting function’ π(p), which in order to accommodate the known empirical 
evidence (like the one emerging from the experiments of Allais, Kahneman and 
Tversky, and others) has to be increasing with, but non-linear in, p. The 
hypothesis that agents’ preferences satisfy first-order stochastic dominance, 
however, holds if and only if π  is linear - that is the special case where Prospect 
Theory reduces to EU theory. Kahneman and Tversky dealt with this problem 
conjecturing that dominated alternatives are detected and discarded by subjects 
prior to the evaluation of the other prospects. Such a solution must have seemed 
unsatisfactory to a scientific community that increasingly identified progress with 
formalisation. This may help to explain the rather mild interest raised by Prospect 
Theory among economists: the theory (in its most elegant version) could not be 
interpreted as a model of normative decision making. 
                                                 
107On such a heuristic procedure, cf. Zahar (1983). 
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Quiggin (1982) and others later devised a theory assigning different weights to 
different outcomes with the same probabilities, thus building on Kahneman and 
Tversky’s proposal (e.g. ‘extreme’ consequences get different weights than 
‘intermediate’ consequences, although they all have the same probabilities).108 
Quiggin’s new weighting function h(.) is able to satisfy all of Allais’ requirements 
of rationality including the stochastic dominance requirement.109 Given the fact 
that today Quiggin’s model is probably the preferred generalised model of 
decision among decision-theoretically oriented economists,110 we have here a 
strong confirmation of my thesis: the normativity debate provided meta-criteria of 
acceptance for superseding theories of choice under risk.111 
 
2.5. Intransitive behaviour 
 
I have so far tried to show how the development of contemporary mathematical 
decision theory was strongly influenced by its ambiguous status, as a descriptive 
theory of people’s actual behaviour and as a normative theory of rational agents’ 
ideal choices. In particular, I have reconstructed the history of how the received 
                                                 
108Arguably, this theory originates in another part of Allais’ work (cf. in particular Allais 
1988a). It is also in part due to Yaari (1987) who presented it independenltly but in a more 
particular form. The so-called ‘Rank-Dependent Expected Utility Theory’ (or ‘Expected 
Utility with Rank-Dependent Probabilities’) quickly established itself as a major alternative 
to EUT, at the expense of Machina’s Generalised Expected Utility Analysis. 
109Allais, as usual, has denied any similarity between his own and the Quiggin-Yaari 
approach. Cf. Allais (1988a: 244). 
110 Decision theorists have turned to the systematic evaluation of alternative models 
against empirical data only recently (see for instance the works cited in the next footnote 
below). The results of these exercises being rather controversial, theory appraisal is based 
on mixed considerations based on normative, formal and empirical criteria. It must also be 
stressed that decision theorists outside economics tend to see things in different ways. 
111A similar thesis is suggested by Chris Starmer in a forthcoming survey of generalised 
expected utility models. Starmer (2000) sees normative requirements as impediments to the 
development of an empirically successful theory of decision, with which I agree; except that 
- by narrowing the range of possible solutions – normative principles have also 
paradoxically helped in the derivations of specific ‘superseding’ models. Whether the latter 
are ‘successful’ from a descriptive point of view, is another issue raising interesting, but 
different, methodological questions (cf. for example Harless and Camerer 1994, Hey and 
Orme 1994, and the methodological discussion in Anand 1998). 
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model, vNM’s EU theory, was formulated, empirically refuted, normatively 
defended, normatively falsified, and finally modified. Syntactical, empirical, and 
normative considerations all contributed to the identification of the principle of 
independence as the ‘weak axiom’ in EU theory. Recent developments, however, 
have shown the readiness of some decision theorists to dig deeper into the 
empirical and normative ‘hard core’ of EU theory. Counterexamples to more 
fundamental axioms such as weak ordering have been well-known since at least 
the early Fifties.112 Kenneth May (1954), for instance, performed an experiment 
with college students, where the subjects were asked to choose among marriage 
partners assessed in terms of intelligence, looks, and wealth. The hypothetical 
partners {x, y, z} were ranked x > y > z, y > z > x, and z > x > y according to 
each characteristic respectively. Intransitive patterns arose when subjects were 
asked to choose among pairs of potential partners. In another curious experiment 
reported in the same paper May asked war pilots about their (hypothetical) 
behaviour in case they got caught in a burning plane. Again, cyclical patterns of 
‘desperate choices’ could be observed. 
 
May’s empirical counterexamples had little effect in shaking economists’ 
confidence in transitivity, perhaps because the author touched the issue of 
normativity only incidentally,113 because the article had nothing to do with 
behaviour under risk and uncertainty, and because, of course, to give up a 
theory’s ‘hard core’ can be more painful than to tolerate anomalies. Several 
experiments tried to test intransitivity during the fifteen years that followed May’s 
article;114 although violations were detected, none of them was related to those of 
EU theory. Evidence of intransitive behaviour did not raise much interest among 
economists in general, not until it was widely discussed by decision theorists, at 
least.  Amos Tversky (1969) first published a series of experimental results 
pointing to violations of Weak Stochastic Transitivity - a weakened transitivity 
axiom reformulated so as to take the possibility of random mistakes into account. 
One of the most striking results of Tversky’s experiments was that his subjects 
engaged in cyclical choices even though they held the general view that transitivity 
is a fundamental tenet of rational choice. Tversky, a hard normativist himself 
                                                 
112Cf. the references in Fishburn (1991). 
113May commented critically on the ‘postulationist’ standpoint: “Of course, the whole issue 
[of the descriptive adequacy of the theory] can be avoided by simply asserting transitivity 
as part of the definition of ‘rational behaviour’. The question then is whether rational 
behaviour as so defined has very much importance, either descriptive or normative” (1954, 
p. 8). 
114Tversky (1969, p. 32) cites at least seven papers reporting experimental results of 
intransitivity tests. 
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concerning EU theory, tried to explain the evidence by pointing to the fact (among 
others) that in dynamic choices sometimes agents are not committed to the 
original set of preferences: the elimination of an alternative can cause a change in 
agents’ tastes (1969, p. 31). 
 
Other anomalies and counterexamples to the principle of transitivity emerged 
in the following years. One of them, the phenomenon of preference reversals115 - 
‘discovered’ in 1971 by two psychologists, Sarah Lichtenstein and Paul Slovic - 
achieved what Tversky had not: it became the first instance of intransitive choices 
to be systematically discussed by economists. Lichtenstein and Slovic predicted, 
and in fact discovered, that the majority of people when facing a choice between 
a gamble with a high chance of winning a small sum, and another gamble with a 
low chance of winning a large prize would choose the former; but the same 
subjects, when asked to price these gambles, would sell the low bet at a higher 
price than the high one.116 
 
Economists' first reaction was to make the counterexample disappear and 
'save' the received theory. Grether and Plott (1979) tried unsuccessfully to prove 
the phenomenon to be an artefact of Lichtenstein and Slovic’s experimental 
procedures. Holt (1986), Karni and Safra (1987), and Segal (1988) devised 
ingenious attempts to explain the anomaly away by giving up the independence 
axiom of EU theory (a move by then made respectable by Machina’s and others’ 
generalised models) and showing how the illusion of reversals could result from 
the use of certain mechanisms for eliciting preferences customarily used in these 
experiments. All such attempts are now considered to have failed, and it is now 
generally accepted that preference reversals do really occur in laboratory settings. 
These experiments will be illustrated and discussed in detail in the next chapter 
(see also the references therein). From the point of view of the present chapter, 
the interest of the preference reversals phenomenon lies in its having stimulated the 
development of generalised models of decisions without the transitivity axiom. To 
put it differently, preference reversals have ‘hit’ the hard core of both the EU 
model and some generalised EU theories such as those inspired by Allais’ ideas. 
                                                 
115For an introduction to this anomaly, see Thaler and Tversky (1990). 
116It should be stressed that this is just one possible reading (although a most plausible 
one) of the phenomenon (see next chapter for a full discussion). The discovery of 
preference reversals confirms that competition between rival theories is the best incentive 
for the growth of scientific knowledge. Lichtenstein and Slovic could predict the 
phenomenon because they had observed a high correlation between prices and payoffs and 
between gambles and chances of winning. The experiment described in their (1971) was 
developed in order to confirm their theory, and was only later taken seriously by economists 
(especially after Grether and Plott's (1979) attempt to 'explain the anomaly away'). 
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In 1982 Graham Loomes and Robert Sugden tried to take seriously the 
possibility of violations of the transitivity axiom, and proposed a new theory, 
called 'regret theory', which could account for many counterexamples to EU 
axioms, including the Allais paradox and preference reversals.117 Loomes and 
Sugden replaced vNM's equation (1) with the hypothesis that agents choose so 
as to maximise the expected modified utility Ei
k , defined as 
 
(2) Ei
k = pj
j =1
n
∑ mijk   
 
Here j is an index of the actual state of the world, i an index of the actual 
choice made, and k an index of a possible choice which was never made. The 
crucial difference compared to EU theory lies in the modified utility function mij
k , 
which Loomes and Sugden define as a function of the ‘choiceless utilities’ cij and 
ckj: 
 
mij
k = M(cij ,ckj ). 
 
The idea of 'choiceless utility' apparently sets regret theory in the tradition of 
classical (i.e., Benthamite) utility. Loomes and Sugden think that we can 
meaningfully speak of utilities independently of any choice between gambles, or in 
other words assume the existence of utility as a psychological experience which 
we know about by introspection. 118 'Choiceless' utility "is the utility that the 
individual would derive from the consequence [or state of the world] x if he 
experienced it without having chosen it" (Loomes and Sugden, 1982, p. 807). 
Intuitively, regret theory claims that in terms of pleasure/pain it makes a big 
difference whether a consequence is the result of a process which at some stage 
involved a decision by the agent or not. In the latter case we can speak of 
'choiceless' utility, in the former the situation is more complicated because the 
agent may experience the opposite feelings of regret and rejoice according to 
'what might have been'. Thus, it is important not only to take into account the 
utility assigned to the consequence xij of the actual choice ai in the actual state of 
                                                 
117See Loomes and Sugden (1982), (1983), (1984) and Loomes, Starmer and Sugden (1991).  
118 Sugden (1993) has later devised a presentation of regret theory from a set of preference 
axioms. I stick in the main text to the original version of the theory because it sheds more 
light on the heuristics that generated it, as well as on the normative arguments that may 
support it. 
 78 
 
the world sj (i.e. cij), but also the utility of the consequence xkj of the possible 
choice ak in the actual state of the world sj (i.e. ckj). 
 
If we simplify the function M(.) and define a ‘regret-rejoice function’ R(.) 
assigning a real-valued index to every possible increment-decrement of choiceless 
utility, we can easily show how regret theory takes into account EU theory as a 
special case.119 It is worth noting that the heuristic path to regret theory is similar 
in some respects to that of Machina’s generalised expected utility model. In 
relation to the model to be superseded, the strategy leading to the superseding 
theory is characterised by two steps: one of generalisation and one of restriction 
(‘zig-zag’ heuristic process). Regret theory is apparently a weaker generalisation 
of EU theory, because it has two free parameters instead of one: a choiceless 
utility function C(.) and a function Q(.), defined such that Q(ξ) = ξ + R(ξ) - R(ξ) 
for all ξ. The determination of the C(.) and Q(.) functions (second step towards a 
model with richer content) is entirely an empirical matter in regret theory. It is 
remarkable, however, that, merely by assuming that Q(.) is convex for all ξ > 0 
and that C(.) is monotonically increasing, anomalies such as the Allais paradox 
and preference reversals (as well as others) can be accounted for. 
 
Given that the existence of rival theories of rational choice seems to play a 
crucial role in the procedure of acceptance of a counterexample to a theory of 
decision, it is interesting to investigate whether some theory of rationality can help 
to legitimise preference reversals as normative (rather than mere descriptive) 
counterexamples, and perhaps also legitimise regret theory as a model of rational 
decision making. Intransitive patterns of choices are inadmissible in traditional 
decision models like EU theory. Such models assume that only the consequences 
of an action really matter, not the comparison between them and the 
consequences of alternative actions under the same state(s) of the world. It is 
taken for granted that agents approach the choice-situation with a definite master-
plan of preferences which makes each possible choice consistent with any 
other.120 But we can think of situations where no such master-plan exists, and 
choices are highly dependent on the set of alternatives, so that a choice between 
{a1, a2} is not necessarily consistent with a choice between {a2, a3} and a 
choice between {a1, a3}. This is the particular case regret theory is designed to 
explain. The relation >R in regret theory is not equivalent to the relation >EU in EU 
                                                 
119Assuming that mij
k = cij + R(cij , ckj ) , if R(ξ) = 0, then mij
k = cij . Cf. Loomes and Sugden 
(1982, p. 809). 
120See Sugden (1985). 
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theory: a1 >R a2 does not mean 'having a1 is preferred to having a2', but rather 
'choosing a1 and rejecting a2 is preferred to choosing a2 and rejecting a1 '.121 
 
Normativists supporting EU theory and generalised EU analysis share the view 
that some restrictions must be imposed on preferences in order to make them 
'rational': among these restrictions, there are transitivity and completeness. But are 
such restrictions necessary from a normative point of view?122 Can we not claim 
that even Allais' ‘minimal’ version of the rationality principle is just a specific 
formulation of a more general underlying principle? Loomes and Sugden's theory 
may pass the Savage-Allais quasi-empirical test of rationality, if subjects 
acknowledged that rationality is a feature of choice once beliefs and desires are 
given: "a choice may be rational or irrational, but an experience [e.g. regret or 
rejoice] is just an experience" (Loomes and Sugden, 1982, p. 820). 
 
In what way are elation and disappointment less rational sources of 
pleasure and displeasure than, say, winning a race or having a manuscript 
rejected by a publisher? Economists have not normally thought it their job 
to classify some sources of utility as 'rational' and others as 'irrational'. Our 
belief is that sensations of pleasure and pain are simply sensations, and that 
the issue of rationality is not about what kinds of sensations are felt, but 
about how the individual responds to them (Loomes and Sugden, 1984, p. 
227). 
 
In the light of regret theory, even Allais' 'minimal' principle of rationality turns 
out to be not so 'minimal', after all. The 'ultra-minimal' principle to which Loomes 
and Sugden appeal123 is anchored in an old and prestigious tradition, running 
from David Hume (1740) to Karl Popper (1967). According to that tradition, 
 
Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of passions (Hume, 1740, p. 
415). 
 
Neo-Humeans retain point (b) of Allais' definition of rationality124 - that agents 
employ means that are appropriate for their ends - and reject (a), i.e. do not 
impose any normative restriction on individual desires. According to this 
interpretation, such restrictions can at most be taken as fallible empirical 
                                                 
121See Loomes and Sugden (1982), p. 821. 
122For an extended discussion of this issue, cf. Anand (1993, ch. 4). 
123See also Sugden (1991). 
124See above, section 2.3. 
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hypotheses on early conjectural models, to be later modified in the light of new 
evidence about behaviour deviating from our models. 
 
2.6. Conclusions 
 
‘Normativism’ and ‘descriptivism’ have been strictly entangled in the history of 
decision theory, and this has had some important consequences. First of all, it is 
impossible to give an account of the development of EU theory as an empirical 
theory of human behaviour without taking the problem of rationality (in all its  
subtle aspects) into account. If on the contrary we assume that the problem of 
normative justification was primary in the controversy then we can restore a fuller 
picture of the reasons that guided changes in the content of the theories of 
decision that replaced the received model during the last twenty years. Here, I 
think, the fruitfulness of Lakatos' (1963-64/1976) framework can be best 
appreciated for its ability to explain the dialectics of counterexamples, refutations 
and redefinitions of the formal theory at stake. Heuristics in the mathematical and 
in the normative sciences seem to be founded on a similar mechanism: the formal 
developments of the discipline are in the forefront, but  ‘informal’ theories guide 
them from behind the scenes. I  have shown that shifts in the concept of rationality 
anticipated or immediately followed empirical refutations of positive models of 
decision, thus providing a set of standards to be fulfilled by superseding theories, 
and a normative justification to the anomalous evidence produced in the 
experiments. The debate on normativism can be reconstructed as a struggle for 
the legitimacy of counterexamples and alternative models of rational behaviour. 
 
Earlier reconstructions of the development of decision theory have been 
concerned either with formal aspects only (Fishburn and Wakker, 1995), or have 
projected onto the subject matter a framework of analysis taken from general 
philosophy of science (Mongin, 1988a). It turns out that the axioms of the 
received model to be protected from refutation are the same whether identified by 
a normative argument grounded in rational choice theory (as stressed in my 
approach) or by a descriptive (i.e., growth-of-knowledge) argument (as in 
Mongin, 1988a). The two sets of arguments by and large account for the 
theoretical changes that actually took place. The difference between the two 
reconstructions lies in the content of the heuristics followed by anti-EU theorists, 
rather than in its consequences. 
 
The idea that normative models of behaviour play a heuristic role in the social 
sciences is of course not new, but has usually been stated in rather imprecise 
 81 
 
ways, by saying that rational choice models are ‘ideal-types’, or false but useful 
‘first approximations’ to real human behaviour. In this chapter, I have tried to 
clarify the status of the rationality principle and of its role in improving on earlier 
imperfect models of choice. Most importantly, I have suggested that, in the theory 
of decision under risk, different rationality principles have shaped the standards 
of acceptance of theories in different periods, have implicitly dictated which 
components to revise in the light of counterexamples, and how. A ‘logic of 
normative falsification and theory-improvement’ has therefore provided decision 
theorists with a rather rigorous, quasi-deductive procedure for scientific 
discovery. 
 
So far I have looked at rather simple experiments (whose results, nonetheless, 
proved to be remarkably robust). In the years that followed Allais’ early tests, 
experimentalists have developed sophisticated laboratory techniques in order to 
extend the range of their investigations. Such techniques, however, have also 
made the interpretation of the experimental results more complicated. Often, the 
inference from observed data to a phenomenon of interest involves highly 
theoretical assumptions that are as tricky as the hypotheses under test. In the next 
chapter I shall examine a case of the latter sort, in order to show how problems of 
interpretation can be solved by means of more experiments. I shall suggest that 
the in-principle possibility of further testing in controlled conditions is one of the 
strengths of experimental economics, and the main reason why it should be 
preferred to empirical testing ‘in the field’. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Phenomena and Artefacts 
Preference reversals and the 
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism 
 
 
 
‘The art of representation is therefore a 
long way removed from truth, and it is 
able to represent everything because it 
has little grasp of anything, and that little 
is of a mere phenomenal appearance. For 
example, a painter can paint a portrait of a 
shoemaker or a carpenter or any other 
craftsman without understanding any of 
their crafts; yet, if he is skilful enough, his 
portrait of a carpenter may, at a distance, 
deceive children or simple people into 
thinking it is a real carpenter.’ 
(Plato, The Republic, Part 10, 598b) 
 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Controversies in economics often fizzle out unresolved. One reason is that, 
despite their professed empiricism, economists find it hard to agree on the 
interpretation of the relevant empirical evidence.125 In this chapter I will present 
an example of a controversial issue first raised and then solved by recourse to 
laboratory experimentation. A major theme of this chapter, then, concerns the 
methodological advantages of controlled experiments. Experimentalists 
                                                 
125 I am not suggesting that this is the only reason; for more views on this topic, see the 
symposium in the Journal of Economic Methodology, Vol. 1, June 1994 (with articles by 
Thomas Mayer, Deirdre McCloskey, Roger Backhouse, David Colander and Henry Woo). 
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themselves have put forward some justifications for their laboratory turn. John 
Hey (1991), for instance, focusing on the traditional theory-testing role of 
experimentation, argues that any econometric test is a test of two components: a 
theory (which is supposed to involve a ceteris paribus clause), and a set of 
assumptions about the structure of the ‘disturbing’ factors not modelled in the 
theory. Thus, 
 
if ‘the theory’ survives the test, it could be because both the original 
economic theory and the assumptions about the stochastic variables are 
correct, or because both the original economic theory and the assumptions 
are incorrect. There is no way of telling which. Similarly, if ‘the theory’ does 
not survive the test, there is no way of telling whether this is because the 
economic theory is correct and the stochastic assumptions incorrect, or 
because the economic theory is incorrect and the stochastic assumptions 
correct, or because both are incorrect. Hence, a conventional econometric 
test of some economic theory is not really a test of that theory at all (1991, 
p. 8). 
 
Such an argument will sound very familiar to philosophers of science: it starts 
from a version of the so-called Duhem-Quine problem. Hey goes on to suggest 
that controlled experiments may help to solve the problem. Hey is pointing in the 
right direction, but theory-testing is just one aspect of experimenting, and 
experimenters are often merely concerned about determining whether a certain 
phenomeonon exists or not, or whether, when, and where it can be produced, 
without necessarily engaging in any theoretical explanation of the phenomenon 
itself. In this chapter I shall be concerned mainly with such a case, and focus on 
the example of preference reversals, a phenomenon whose existence was until 
quite recently denied by the majority of economists. Their favourite strategy 
consisted in trying to explain the phenomenon away as an artefact of the 
experimental techniques used to observe it. By controlled experimentation, as we 
shall see, such an interpretation has been discredited, and now preference 
reversals are generally accepted as real. 
 
The second theme of this chapter is then the nature of experimental artefacts 
and of the experimental methods devised to detect them. The problem of 
distinguishing an artefact from a real phenomenon will be shown to be related to 
methodological issues traditionally discussed by philosophers of science, such as 
the theory-ladenness of observation and the Duhem-Quine problem. A large part 
of this chapter is devoted to clarifying these two philosophical problems, and to 
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arguing that only the latter is relevant to the case at hands. The solutions devised 
by economic experimentalists to the Duhem-Quine problem will be presented and 
discussed. I shall show that they belong in two broad categories: independent 
tests of new predictions derived from the competing hypotheses at stake, and 
‘no-miracle arguments’ from different experimental techniques delivering 
converging results despite their being theoretically independent. I shall not try to 
defend the rationality of such procedures and arguments, but rather aim to give ‘a 
concrete account of scientific life’, thus accepting Ian Hacking’s challenge in his 
Representing and Intervening: 
 
If we want a concrete account of scientific life we should consider what, for 
example, it is to have an experiment working well enough that the skilfull 
experimenter knows that the data it provides may have some significance. 
What is it that makes an experiment convincing? (Hacking, 1983, p. 181). 
 
3.2. Experiments 
 
There are two main and related reasons for experimenting in the laboratory: 
replicability and control. Replicability fulfills one of the basic standards of 
science: the requirement of publicity. Whenever a scientific result has been 
asserted, it should be possible for different researchers to check the result by 
replicating it in a different laboratory. This procedure aims at reducing the bias of 
subjective elements in scientific knowledge. The second advantage of laboratory 
experimentation is that, by making it possible to keep a system fixed in all 
respects deemed relevant by general considerations, it permits the acquisition of 
large amounts of data about ‘the same system’ (whereas in the ‘wild’, of course, 
there may be important uncontrolled variations so that successive observations 
are not of the same system). Suppose, for example, we are interested in testing 
the adequacy of a theoretical model to explain some puzzling empirical evidence. 
The model will try to articulate at least partially the processes generating the data 
to be explained; the pattern of data will be derived from the model when 
particular values are assigned to its free parameters and variables. A natural way 
to test the validity of the model is to check whether the observable features of the 
system change in accordance with the predictions of the model when diffferent 
initial conditions are assigned to the variables (keeping the parameters constant). 
We need, in other words, different sets of data generated by the same system 
under different initial conditions. Outside the laboratory this kind of test is 
problematic, because there always is the possibility that two different sets of data 
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be generated by two different ‘data generating processes’. Roger Backhouse 
(1997) has called it ‘the econometrician’s regress’:126 
 
To confirm that we are measuring an economic phenomenon correctly we 
have to show that it occurs in more than one data set drawn from the same 
population; to know whether our data sets are drawn from the same 
population we need to show whether they exhibit the same phenomenon; to 
establish whether they exhibit the same phenomenon we have to be able to 
measure it correctly, and so on (Backhouse, 1997, pp. 146-147). 
 
In the laboratory, one can usually control for the initial conditions more tightly, 
so as to (i) make sure that the data generating process is held fixed, and (ii) 
intervene to change the values of the main theoretical variables and thus test the 
robustness of the relationships at stake. Replicability and control provide the 
means of interpreting empirical evidence in a more straightforward way than field 
research does - by discriminating, for instance, between two alternative 
theoretical explanations of the same data. 
 
Experimentation can therefore help to check the quality of the data. The 
treatment of data is a crucial problem in econometrics.  Econometricians have 
often access only to ‘bad’ data (and have a limited number of them at that), and 
there is always the  danger of performing incorrect pre-filtering of data, stochastic 
misspecification, errors in aggregation, or of having chosen inadequate sample-
sizes. The correct prediction or explanation of phenomena is therefore dependent 
on two main factors: a correct theory of the phenomenon at stake, and a correct 
interpretation and treatment of the data available. Although the quality of the data 
collected in the laboratory is usually much better than that of field data, the same 
problem holds to different degrees in both cases. Laboratory data can be 
misinterpreted when the experimental procedures used to obtain them are not 
understood. This is the problem of ‘artefacts’, and I shall discuss it in detail in the 
following sections suggesting that the techniques experimental economists use to 
solve it are representative of the strategies used in general to support experimental 
claims in science. Artefacts are due to mistaken inferences from data, as I shall try 
to show below. Since data are more messy in field ‘experiments’, it is easier to 
produce artefacts there than in the laboratory. In this chapter, a number of 
techniques to detect artefacts will be illustrated by means of concrete examples of 
experimentation and then discussed. The scope is to let the techniques which 
                                                 
126After Harry Collins’ (1985) ‘experimenter’s regress’. 
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render laboratory experimentation attractive emerge from a description of the 
practice of science. 
 
The case of preference reversals discussed below is not new to philosophers 
of science: Hausman (1991; 1992) has used it as an example of economists’ 
dogmatic attitude towards disturbing empirical results. Tammi (1997) has 
analysed the debate from an argumentative point of view in a way designed to 
uncover economists’ tacit commitments, presuppositions, and rhetoric. Here I 
shall focus mainly on the problem of interpreting experimental results when 
inferences have to be drawn to a phenomenon of interest from data that are 
produced by a rather complicated apparatus.   
 
3.3. Preference reversals 
 
Neoclassical economic theories describe the properties of preference scales. A 
number of techniques for eliciting preferences have been developed by 
experimentalists, mostly based on the notions of willingness to pay. According to 
standard economic theory, the results of these operations should all be consistent, 
the behaviour of economic agents being in all these measurement contexts 
determined by their preferences. Some experimental psychologists began in the 
late sixties to question the very existence of preference scales. They conjectured 
that, far from constituting the stable substratum from which all economic 
behaviour arises, preferences display a much more unstable structure and depend 
heavily on the situation: they are ‘constructed’ and vary from context to context. 
 
Paul Slovic and Sarah Lichtenstein, two psychologists at the Oregon Research 
Institute, designed a two-stage test, later to become famous as the ‘preference 
reversal experiment’.127 I have already introduced these experiments in the last 
chapter, but it is worth recalling their main features. Agents were asked in 
separate tasks to choose among two bets and to price them. The pairs of lotteries 
had a common feature: they consisted of a bet with a high probability of winning a 
moderate amount of money and a low probability of losing a small amount (called 
the ‘P-bet’); and a bet with a low probability of winning a larger sum and a high 
probability to lose a smaller sum (the ‘$-bet’).128 Moreover, they had 
approximately the same expected monetary value. Slovic and Lichtenstein’s 
conjecture was that “bidding and choice involve two quite different processes that 
                                                 
127Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971), (1973). 
128 For instance: P-bet = (.9 to win $5, .1 to lose $1); $-bet = (.3 to win $15 and .7 to lose $2). 
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involve more than just underlying utilities of the gambles” (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 
1971, p. 47). 
 
In previous studies, Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968) had observed a high 
correlation between, on the one hand, prices and payoffs, and, on the other, 
choices and probabilities. An experiment was conceived explicitly to produce 
patterns of choices such that the agents chose the P-bet but bid more for the $-
bet. As a matter of fact, such patterns were observed, and have since then been 
known as instances of the ‘preference reversal phenomenon’. The standard rate 
of reversals observed by Lichtenstein and Slovic, and then in later preference 
reversal experiments, was between 70 and 80%. Not all reversals were of the 
kind predicted by Lichtenstein and Slovic, though: in a ‘standard’ PR experiment, 
from 15 to 25% of reversals are of the non-predicted (or ‘asymmetric’) type. 
 
 Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) performed three experiments. In order to 
control for possible disturbances due to lack of incentives, they used in two of 
their experiments an elicitation procedure known since the mid-sixties as the 
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism. The BDM procedure is a tool 
devised to elicit the selling price of any kind of commodity, and as such has been 
often used to control subjects’ preferences over lotteries. To elicit the certainty-
equivalent of a lottery, in fact, a pay-off mechanism must be used to make sure 
that the price reflects the subject’s real preference. 
 
In a BDM elicitation, a subject is asked to state her reservation price, s, for a 
lottery (say, [x, p; y, (1 - p)]); then, the lottery is auctioned, and if a buyer willing 
to bid a sum b  ≥ s is found, the subject receives b; otherwise, the lottery is 
played, and the subject receives a sum x or y according to the outcome. The 
experimenters draw the bidding sum b from a uniform distribution over some 
relevant set. It is easy to show that a rational utility maximiser must state his real 
selling price.129 
 
The BDM mechanism is often used in conjunction with the so-called Random 
Lottery Selection (RLS) procedure. In general, experimental subjects are asked 
to perform a number of tasks; instead of receiving an aggregate payment, the 
subject is rewarded according to the results of only one task selected at random. 
This procedure controls for endowment effects (when a subject is asked to 
perform several tasks, her preferences may vary because of changes in her 
                                                 
129 Cf. Becker, DeGroot and Marschak (1964). 
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wealth) and reduces experimental costs at the same time. If the selected task is a 
choice one, it is simply played out; if it is a pricing task, the BDM mechanism is 
used. 
 
When other experimentalists began to replicate Lichtenstein and Slovic’s 
findings, they also used the BDM and RLS procedures. David Grether and 
Charles Plott, the first economists to take PRs seriously, investigated the 
replicability of the PR phenomenon at the California Institute of Technology in the 
late seventies. Their research was driven by the suspicion that PRs may have been 
the product of some undetected experimental effect. In their (1979) paper 
Grether and Plott list thirteen possible sources of ‘disturbance’, pointing therefore 
to thirteen possible ways to account for (or ‘explain away’) PR data. These 
included misspecified incentives, income effects, indifference, strategic responses, 
ill-defined subjective probabilities, elimination by aspect, lexicographic semiorder, 
costs of information processing, confusion and misunderstanding, unsystematic 
and sporadic behaviour, unsophisticated subjects, experimenter’s effects. Despite 
great care in designing the experiment to control for such disturbances, the 
experimenters observed the same results Lichtenstein and Slovic had produced a 
few years earlier. The historical-methodological significance of Grether and Plott’s 
experiment has been discussed in depth by Dan Hausman (1991; 1992), and I 
shall refer to his work without further comments.130 
 
 
 
 
3.4. Data and Phenomena 
 
Bogen and Woodward (1988) have forcefully argued that scientists customarily 
explain phenomena, rather than data. Phenomena can be thought of as similar to 
what neopositivists called ‘experimental laws’,131 regularities occurring in some 
specific experimental situation. Like many experimental laws, Bogen and 
Woodward’s phenomena are not directly observable. They are rather inferred 
from data. 
 
Data, which play the role of evidence for the existence of phenomena, for 
the most part can be straightforwardly observed. However, data typically 
                                                 
130 For a non-technical presentation of the early research on the PR phenomenon, cf. also 
Tversky and Thaler (1990). 
131 Cf. Nagel (1961), ch. 5. 
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cannot be predicted or systematically explained by theory. By contrast, 
well-developed scientific theories do predict and explain facts about 
phenomena. Phenomena are detected through the use of data, but in most 
cases are not observable in any interesting sense of the term (Bogen and 
Woodward, 1988, pp. 305-306). 
 
The preference reversals phenomenon is an example of a ‘phenomenon’ in 
Bogen and Woodward’s sense. To begin with, PR are not directly observable. 
We can only observe patterns of behaviour that appear prima facie incompatible 
with the claim that ‘there exists a transitive scale of preferences underlying 
subjects’ choices’. The data obtained in a typical ‘preference reversals 
experiment’, in contrast, may be represented as sentences like ‘subject x has 
chosen the P-bet over the $-bet and priced the $-bet higher than the P-bet’. In 
order to obtain the PR phenomenon, one needs to assume, to begin with, that 
pricing and choosing convey genuine information about preferences. 
 
At this stage psychologists and economists part company. Economists, in fact, 
also presuppose that the same preference structure underlies both pricing and 
choosing, whereas psychologists - as I have already mentioned - doubt that the 
idea of a stable preference scale is useful at all.132 Following the ‘economic’ 
approach one is led to infer the existence of a genuinely intransitive preference 
structure. The phenomenon can then be represented as follows: 
 
(PR)    P >c $ >p P, and >c = >p. 
 
Some theorising has thus taken place on the way from the observation reports 
to the phenomenon in the form above. ‘>c’ stands for ‘preference as emerging 
from choice’, and similarly ‘>p’ for ‘preference emerging from pricing’. The first 
inference involves some assumptions about the correct functioning of our 
instruments of elicitation, whereas the latter involves a commitment to the principle 
of procedure invariance - the idea that all economically relevant behaviour is 
determined by the same preference scale, and thus that all economic behaviour 
can be used as evidence for inferring the structure of preferences. Theoretical and 
                                                 
132For reasons of simplicity, in this paper I shall mainly focus on the ‘economic’ 
interpretations of the PR phenomenon, thus disregarding those which question the very 
existence of a preference structure. I shall therefore often identify the PR phenomenon with 
intrasitive preferences rather than (more correctly) with the non-existence of a transitive 
preference scale in general. For some attempts to discriminate in the laboratory between the 
‘economic’ and the ‘psychological’ interpretations, see Loomes, Starmer and Sugden (1989) 
and Tversky, Slovic and Kahneman (1990). 
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non-theoretical assumptions of this kind sanction the step from reports like 
‘subject x has chosen so-and-so’ while ‘subject y has priced so-and-so’ to 
claims about preferences; or from observed apparent ‘price reversals’ to real 
preference reversals. 
 
It is interesting to notice that the term ‘preference’ is used by both economists 
and psychologists when debating the results of PR experiments. Ironically, the 
‘preference reversal’ label was invented by psychologists, despite the fact that 
they do not believe in preferences. Psychologists use the term in its 
‘commonsense’ meaning, and originally would not distinguish between ‘price-
choice reversals’ (the data) and ‘preference reversals’ (the phenomenon). 
Nevertheless, they did not oppose the economists’ shift to a slightly more 
technical connotation. To economists, PR are data seen through the filter of what 
we may call the ‘beginning’ of an explanation – the low-level assumption that it 
makes sense to speak of preferences in the first place. This presuppostion is still 
far removed from a full theoretical explanation of the data, an explanation that in 
the PR case would involve some precise claim about the structure of 
preferences. 
 
The PR case can be used as a counterexample to a popular interpretation of 
Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962/1970), according to which 
scientific terms and concepts take completely different meanings depending on the 
‘paradigm’ they belong to. This thesis is behind the famous Kuhnian claims that 
different paradigms are ‘incommensurable’ and scientists from different traditions 
‘live in different worlds’. We shall soon discuss at length other aspects of this 
view. For the time being, let us just keep in mind that the experimental activity we 
are going to review in the following sections illustrates how communication across 
paradigms can take place, and be profitable too. There exists a ‘trading zone’, to 
say it with Peter Galison (1997), where scientists negotiate meanings that allow 
communication and often the resolution of disputes. 
 
3.5. Artefacts 
 
The distinction among data and phenomena should help us introducing some 
further conceptual artillery to be used in the next sections. Let us start from the 
concept of ‘artefact’. The word ‘artificial’ has an ambiguous meaning: it stands in 
opposition to ‘natural’, a word with clear normative flavour, and for this reason 
has a definitely negative connotation. An artificial object may be an imitation of an 
original, and as such not genuine, not ‘true’. The artificial can be ‘deceitful’, 
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‘insincere’. In science the term is used in a number of ways, but I shall here be 
concerned with its use in relation to phenomena only. An interpretation is an 
artefact when it is not true, a mere illusion of the instruments of observation. 
Artefacts are a case of potentially misleading connection between data and 
phenomena. 
 
Microscopy textbooks for example report a large taxonomy of artefacts which 
the student is likely to encounter in laboratory work. Bubbles on a slide, fringes 
caused by optical aberrations around the edges of a cell, stains, scratches, folds 
produced during the preparation of the assay and so on. For instance, if the 
membranal border of an organelle seems to be interrupted somewhere, this may 
be due to the chemicals used to preserve the tissue. The ‘natural’ membrane was 
continuous, but the chemical substances used by the experimenter caused its 
deterioration.133 Not being aware of this fact, the experimenter might infer that it 
was a characteristic of the cell ahead of any intervention on her part. 
 
Artefacts are negative features of data for a number of reasons. They 
sometimes render the analysis of the phenomenon at stake very difficult if not 
impossible by irreversibly blurring it or covering it. But above all, artefacts may be 
taken as ‘natural’ properties of the investigated entity. As such, the important 
notion of ‘artefact’ is intrinsically epistemic: an artefact results from our ignorance 
of the effects of the experimental procedure, which we have not been able to 
control properly. If the concept of artefact is an epistemic one, then there must be 
a step where we miss something. In particular, an artefact is a feature 
produced by the method of observation that may lead to incorrect 
interpretations of the data. For instance, when the data are contaminated by 
some unknown factors; or when one has an incorrect theory about the functioning 
of an instrument. In the example above, the artefactual phenomenon is the break 
in the membrane of a certain organelle, and the incorrect inference that led to it 
was suggested by the visual display of the gap in the membrane (the data), and by 
our ignorance of the chemicals’ side-effects. We shall see that economists talked 
about the ‘artificiality’ of the preference reversals phenomenon in a similar way, at 
least in the first stage of the controversy. 
 
3.6. Explaining preference reversals away134 
                                                 
133 Cf. Lynch (1985), ch. 4, for a number of examples from neurobiology. 
134Although I have tried to simplify the issue as much as I can, the contents of this section 
remain quite technical; it should be possible however to follow the general line of argument 
while skipping some of the details. 
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In the mid-eighties some economists began to argue that the PR phenomenon 
could have been an artefact of the experimental procedures used in order to 
control subjects’ preferences: in other words, that inferences from data to P >p $ 
and $ >c P were faulty. Charles Holt on the one hand, and Edi Karni and Zvi 
Safra on the other, independently and almost simultaneously, began to investigate 
theoretically the robustness of experimental procedures to violations of the axioms 
of expected utility theory. These authors pointed out that the controls used by 
Grether and Plott and other experimenters135 “are appropriate if the axioms of 
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory are satisfied” (Holt, 1986, p. 509). 
Their argument were directed towards either the BDM procedure or the 
Random-Lottery Selection (RLS) procedure. The dependence of elicitation 
procedures on expected utility theory was hardly a new discovery: the inventors 
of the BDM mechanism knew and wrote explicitly that “the procedure is based 
upon the [...] well-known ‘expected utility hypothesis’” (Becker, DeGroot and 
Marschak, 1964, p. 226). 
 
As we have seen above, in a PR experiment the subjects are asked to perform 
a number of tasks; from these, one is selected at random (RLS procedure). If the 
chosen task is a choice one, it is simply played out; if it is a pricing task, the BDM 
mechanism is used. According to the probability calculus, a lottery in multiple 
stages can be reduced to a single-stage one, and expected utility theory requires 
that people’s preferences in the multi-stage lottery are consistent with those in the 
reduced one. Formally, the reduction principle states that subjects are indifferent 
between a compound lottery A = (X1, q1;...; Xm ,qm) , giving a chance qi to 
participate in a lottery Xi = (x1
i , p1
i ;...; xni
i , pni
i ) , and the reduced lottery 
R(A) = (x1
1, q1 p1
1;.. .; xn1
1 , q1 pn1
1 ;.. .; x1
m ,qm p1
m;. .. ;xnm
m ,qm pnm
m ) . 
                                                 
135 Cf. Pommerehne, Schneider and Zweifel (1982), and Reilly (1982). 
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Holt conjectured that subjects saw the preference reversal experiment as a two-
stage lottery: in the first stage, the task to be played out is randomly selected; in 
the event of pricing, there is a second stage, i.e. the task is played out via the 
BDM mechanism. Then, Holt showed that if they apply reduction but not the 
independence principle, some subjects who prefer the $-bet to the P-bet may 
reverse their choices during the experiment. Choices observed via RLS 
mechanism, then, may not reveal true preferences. 
 
The suggestion of blaming violations of independence was in line with the 
arguments put forward in that period by theorists working on other anomalies. 
Mark Machina’s (1982) ‘Generalised Expected Utility Analysis’ (GEUA) was at 
the time a fully developed alternative approach to decisions under risk, which 
relaxed the principle of independence and allowed utility functions to be merely 
differentiable rather than strictly linear in the probabilities. Other approaches, like 
Chew and MacCrimmon’s (1979) ‘Alpha Utility’ theory, or Quiggin’s (1982) 
and Yaari’s (1987) ‘Expected Utility theory with Rank-Dependent Probabilities’, 
were being developed which similarly made do without independence or related 
principles (see chapter two). 
 
Loosely, the principle of independence says that only the outcomes that 
distinguish two lotteries are relevant to the decision to be taken. More precisely, it 
says that if a lottery X is preferred to another lottery Y, then the compound lottery 
(X, p; Z, 1-p) is preferred to (Y, p; Z, 1-p). As I have shown in the previous 
chapter, violations of this principle were the first to be discussed by decision 
theorists, thanks mainly to Maurice Allais’ (1953/1979) early experiments. It was 
therefore possible to argue that the illusion of preference reversals resulted from 
violations of the Allais kind.136 According to Karni and Safra (1987), in 
particular, the BDM mechanism may be perceived by subjects as a two-stage 
lottery giving, among its outcomes, the possibility of playing out the priced 
gamble. Suppose the latter is X = (4, 35/36; -1, 1/36) - one of the P-bets used 
by Grether and Plott (1979), typically subject to preference reversals. If, by 
assumption, both the π(X) - the real selling price - and b - the bidding price - are 
restricted to the 1000 different values 0, 1/100, ..., k/100, ..., 9.99 (0 ≤ k < 
1000), the following two-stage lottery results from the BDM procedure: 
 
                                                 
136I follow here the presentation given by Keller, Segal and Wang (1993). 
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A = 4,
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where the δ i stand for degenerate lotteries with probability 1 of getting i, and 
π(X)/10 is the probability of participating in X according to the BDM mechanism. 
The lottery A is equivalent to the tree in figure 2. 
 
By definition of a certainty equivalent (CE), we know that X ~ δCE(X). Thus, 
by applying independence, there follows that 
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The indifference above implies that agents see Tree 1 as equivalent to the tree 
in figure 3. 
 
The task faced by an agent participating in a BDM experiment, then, is 
representable as a maximization problem: what is the value of π(X) that maximises 
the value of the lottery A’? An expected utility maximiser, as Becker, DeGroot 
and Marschak (1964) had shown, will set π(X) = CE(X). Now, by reduction,  
we can obtain 
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with R(A) corresponding to the tree in figure 4. 
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Figure 2: The lottery A 
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Figure 3: The lottery A’ 
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Figure 4: The lottery R(A) 
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Karni and Safra (1987) argued that if the independence principle is not obeyed, 
then it is not true that always setting π(X) = CE(X) maximizes the value of R(A). 
A number of generalised theories which make do without independence (Karni 
and Safra call them ‘Ω-theories’, and I have given a partial list above) can in 
principle be used to explain reversals. Karni and Safra went further by putting 
forward an example of how preference reversals were to be expected in the light 
of Quiggin’s and Yaari’s generalised model, ‘Expected Utility with Rank-
Dependent Probabilities’ (EURDP), given a particular class of lotteries. The very 
pattern of choices observed by Lichtenstein and Slovic, Grether and Plott and 
others - as we shall see in section 10 below - can be accounted for by applying 
EURDP to the BDM elicitation. If agents were EURDP maximisers, the data 
produced by means of the BDM mechanism would not necessarily be inconsistent 
with the transitivity of the underlying preferences, and the preference reversals 
illusory. Karni and Safra (1987) showed also that a large class of BDM-like 
devices would be useless for eliciting non-linear preference relations.  
 
By focusing on the reduction principle, Uzi Segal (1987) argued that 
violations of independence may not be the only causes of the PR ‘illusion’. His 
argument, again, rests on the assumption that the agents perceive their task as a 
two-stage lottery, 
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 where λ is a uniform distribution on the [π(X), 9.99] interval. Segal’s second 
step consists in conjecturing that agents do not satisfy reduction, and in 
conceiving an example constructed on particular pairs of bets: in some cases, 
again, a subject may price items in a way that would not reveal her true 
preferences. 
 
The general epistemic problem highlighted by the critiques of Holt, Karni and 
Safra, and Segal, is one of circularity. The ‘instruments of observation’ 
(elicitation) used in the experiments on individual choice rely heavily upon those 
theories of behaviour in whose investigation they are involved. Mechanisms such 
as the BDM procedure work by constructing further problems of choice under 
risk of the same kind as those under test. There is clearly a problem of circular 
validation here: the phenomenon at stake is inconsistent with EUT, but the 
instruments used to observe the phenomenon are constructed on the hypothesis 
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that EUT is correct. Is such a circle a vicious one? And if it is, how can it be 
escaped? 
 
3.7. Theories and instruments 
 
Gaston Bachelard once claimed that “Un instrument, dans la science moderne, 
est véritablement un théorème réifié” (Bachelard, 1933, p. 140), and the case 
of elicitation procedures seems to instantiate this remark perfectly. The term 
‘reified’ might even be an exaggeration: the material features of this kind of 
apparatus are minimal, compared to those of the instruments one finds in a 
physics’ laboratory. There is more ‘software’ than ‘hardware’. Experimental 
economics’ instruments are theorems, perhaps. 
 
The philosophical problem arising from a circularity between theory of the 
instrument and theory of the phenomena has often been discussed under the label 
of ‘theory-ladenness of observation’. PRs constitute evidence against the 
existence of well-ordered preference structures, but one cannot trust what is 
‘seen’ through the elicitation instruments because their functioning presupposes 
expected utility theory - a theory, moreover, for which there is established and 
extensive evidence of empirical violations. The physicist and philosopher Pierre 
Duhem once remarked that 
 
An experiment in physics is the precise observation of phenomena 
accompanied by an interpretation of these phenomena; this 
interpretation substitutes for the concrete data really gathered by 
observation abstract and symbolic representations which correspond to 
them by virtue of the theories admitted by the observer (Duhem, 1906, p. 
147). 
 
The same, as we have seen, applies to the case we are concerned with - and 
probably to every experimental investigation. A number of inferences lead from 
the data collected in the laboratory to the statement denoting the ‘PR 
phenomenon’. Among the theories admitted by the observer there are some 
about the instruments used in the experiment. If the latter are challenged, the 
interpretational device breaks down. What are we allowed to infer from the data? 
Is not the very existence of the PR phenomenon challenged? 
 
3.8. Theory ladenness 
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Cases of ‘rediscovery’ are common in philosophy. According to the mild 
neopositivism which shaped the standard view in philosophy of science, 
‘experimental laws’ (the regularities produced in experimental situations - 
‘phenomena’, in Bogen and Woodward’s jargon) are independent of the truth of 
any particular scientific theory.137 They constitute the neutral, solid bedrock upon 
which theories are constructed, and against which competing programmes are 
appraised. The reaction against neopositivism partly took the form of a revival of 
Duhem’s thesis of theory-dependence of experimental phenomena. Empirical 
evidence is supposed to test theories, but in fact - anti-positivists began to argue - 
depends itself on theories. According to Karl Popper, one of the earliest anti-
positivists, 
 
Not only the more abstract explanatory theories transcend experience, but 
even the most ordinary singular statements. For even singular statements are 
always interpretations of ‘the facts’ in the light of theories. (And the 
same holds even for ‘the facts’ of the case. They contain universals; and 
universals always entail a law-like behaviour.) (Popper, 1934/1959, 
Appendix *x) 
 
How can we accept observational reports as the objective bedrock upon 
which theory-appraisals should be based, then? The circle seems to be vicious. 
Norwood Russell Hanson in his Patterns of  Discovery (1958) introduced into 
the literature the expression ‘theory-ladenness of observation’; Thomas Kuhn, a 
few years later, argued in a famous chapter of his Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions that scientists interpreting empirical data in the light of different 
theories ‘see different things’ and ‘seem to work in different worlds’ (1962/1970, 
ch. 10). I shall analyse such statements in more detail below. But how and where 
does theory infect observations? Theory-ladenness arguments can (and do) take 
different forms. For example: 
 
a. Scientists with different theoretical presuppositions see different things. 
b. Scientists with different theoretical presuppositions look for different things. 
c. Scientists with different theoretical presuppositions observe different things. 
d. Scientists with different theoretical presuppositions report different things. 
e. Scientists with different theoretical presuppositions infer different 
conclusions from the same observations. 
 
                                                 
137 See Nagel (1961), p. 87. 
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The taxonomy mirrors some relevant activities related to the collection and use 
of empirical evidence. First, experimenters usually design an experiment; they put 
a number of theoretical assumptions at work in order to produce a phenomenon 
of interest and relevant to their research. Sometimes scientists observe naturally 
occurring phenomena, but more often they must carefully arrange the experimental 
set-up in order to observe from a ‘convenient’ point of view. Then, the 
experimenter lets the instruments run and sees something: he looks at some figures 
on a scale, looks at some pictures taken in a bubble-chamber, or records 
subjects’ assertions concerning how much they are willing to pay for some items. 
‘To see’ means here ‘to receive some stimuli from the environment’.138 The 
experimenter may also see that a few of his subjects are wearing suits, whereas 
the majority wear t-shirts (we are in an experimental economics laboratory where 
students are employed for tests), and that there is a stain on the wall, but not 
focus on these features of the environment, nor report them. He may not even 
notice them. The scientist, finally, reports orally and/or in writing what (but 
sometimes not all) he has focused upon. He produces notes, tables of data, 
graphics, and finally interpretations of data. It is at this stage that the step from 
data to phenomena is taken, and at this stage, according to Duhem, theory comes 
into play. 
 
Open any report at all of an experiment in physics and read the 
conclusions; in no way are they purely and simply an exposition of certain 
phenomena; they are abstract propositions to which you can attach no 
meaning if you do not know the physical theories admitted by the author. 
When you read, for example, that the electromotive force of a certain gas 
battery increases by so many volts when the pressure is increased by so 
many atmospheres, what does this proposition mean? We cannot 
attribute any meaning to it without recourse to the most varied and 
advanced theories of physics (Duhem, 1906, pp. 147-8).139 
 
Surely the very language used to draw the conclusions in a scientific paper 
does involve theoretical presuppositions: how could we speak of ‘currents’ and 
‘potentials’ without some theory of electricity, of ‘first order stochastic 
dominance’ or ‘risk-averse behaviour’ without some theory of choice under 
                                                 
138Notice that this is not the sense in which Hanson uses the term: for him ‘to see’ means to 
receive some stimuli and at the same time to interpret them. 
139It must be noticed that this is one of the few passages where Duhem seems to give a 
semantic flavour to his famous thesis of underdetermination, as Quine would explicitly do in 
1953. 
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uncertainty? Duhem, however, was not ready to go further than that. He was not 
willing to question the purity of sense-data, in particular: 
 
When a sincere witness, sound enough in mind not to confuse the play of 
his imagination with perceptions, and knowing the language he uses well 
enough to express his thought clearly, says that he has observed a fact, 
the fact is certain [...]. 
[I]f the physicist restricts himself to narrating the facts he has seen, in the 
strict sense of seeing  with his own eyes, his testimony should be 
investigated in accordance with the usual rules for determining the degree 
of credibility of the testimony of a man (Duhem, 1906, pp. 158-9). 
 
The neutral character of empirical evidence must then be corrupted at some 
stage between the report of what has been perceived (the readings of values on a 
thermometer’s scale, for instance) and the conclusions drawn from them (that the 
temperature was such-and-such). There is no doubt that Duhem’s theory-
ladenness thesis was the one classified under e above. Henri Poincaré (1905) 
used to speak of ‘crude facts’ in a sense similar to Duhem’s ‘practical facts’, as 
the neutral realm of everyday experience common to all sane human beings. The 
post-positivists who revived his argument held more radical views. Thomas Kuhn, 
for instance, seems initially to be restating Duhem’s point: 
 
Looking at a contour map, the student sees lines on paper, the 
cartographer a picture of a terrain. Looking at a bubble-chamber 
photograph, the student sees confused and broken lines, the physicist a 
record of familiar subnuclear events (Kuhn, 1962/1970, p. 111). 
 
Kuhn seems to suggest that both the layman and the expert see lines on paper 
or on the photograph, but only the latter can make sense of them ‘scientifically’ 
(rather than, for instance, artistically). Shortly after, however, such a claim is 
rejected: “what occurs during a scientific revolution is not fully reducible to a 
reinterpretation of individual and stable data” (1962/1970, p. 121). Kuhn makes 
two points: first, two scientists guided by different theoretical presuppositions 
focus on different aspects of the same object under study. The Aristotelian facing 
a swinging stone “would measure (or at least discuss - the Aristotelian seldom 
measured) the weight of the stone, the vertical height to which it has been raised, 
and the time required for it to achieve rest”. Galileo, on the other hand, “measured 
only weight, radius, angular displacement, and time per swing, which were 
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precisely the data that could be interpreted to yield Galileo’s law for the 
pendulum” (Kuhn, 1962/1970, pp. 123-4). 
 
Secondly, contrary to Duhem and the neopositivists, Kuhn did not believe in 
the existence of ‘pure’ observation. He took paradigms to be so pervasive to 
affect the very conceptual framework according to which we classify things. 
Hanson (1958) had already denied that the act of receiving some stimuli could be 
distinguished from that of organising them in an interpreted framework. Similarly, 
to Kuhn “the scientist who looks at a swinging stone can have no experience that 
is in principle more elementary than seeing a pendulum. The alternative is not 
some hypothetical ‘fixed’ vision, but vision through an alternative paradigm, one 
which makes the swinging stone something else” (1962/1970, p. 128). 
 
Kuhn’s version of the theory-ladenness argument includes surely b and c 
above, but probably also a: in later writings, Kuhn noticed that although the 
distinction between stimuli and sensations (what stimuli we are presented with and 
what we ‘observe’) may seem at first sight plausible, it is not true that there is a 
‘correct’ sensation for each stimulus, and therefore since “members of different 
communities are presented with different data by the same stimuli”, “the given 
world, whether everyday or scientific, is not a world of stimuli” (1974, p. 309 n.). 
Paul Feyerabend provides the most radical statement of the thesis: 
 
There are not two acts - one, noticing a phenomenon; the other, 
expressing it with the help of the appropriate statement - but only one, viz. 
saying in a certain observational situation, ‘the moon is following me’, or 
‘the stone is falling straight down’. [...] 
This unity is the result of a process of learning that starts in one’s 
childhood. From our very early days we learn to react to situations with 
the appropriate responses, linguistic or otherwise. The teaching 
procedures both shape the ‘appearance’, or ‘phenomenon’, and establish 
a firm connection with words, so that finally the phenomena seem to 
speak for themselves without outside help or extraneous knowledge. 
They are what the associated statements assert them to be (Feyerabend, 
1975/1993, p. 57). 
 
Feyerabend calls Kuhn’s paradigmatic assumptions ‘natural interpretations’: 
like Kantian categories,“they are instrumental in constituting the field [of 
sensations]”, rather than being “added to a previously existing” one (1975/1993, 
p. 60). Unlike Kantian categories, though, they can change and one can be 
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taught to see differently. Feyerabend surely subscribes to a, the strongest form of 
theory-ladenness. 
 
The move leading to such a radical position consists in conflating the act of 
perceiving a stimulus with the act of interpreting it. Hanson, Feyerabend and Kuhn 
usually argue by means of examples from psychology, like the famous duck-rabbit 
picture (figure 5). 
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In such cases, however, there does not seem to be an objective fact of the matter 
behind the interpretations given by the observers. The picture represents a duck if 
observed from a certain point of view, and a rabbit if one performs the 
appropriate ‘Gestalt switch’. But it is neither a rabbit nor a duck: it is just a set of 
lines on paper.140 The only true, uninterpreted, pre-theoretical, neutral 
observational report would consist in a description (and possibly a reproduction) 
of the pattern of lines. 
 
Take in contrast a drawing such as the one reproduced in Figure 6 below. It 
represents a micro-particle event observed by the inventor of the cloud chamber, 
the experimental physicist Charles Wilson. The first question concerns whether 
Wilson’s sketch is an accurate representation of what he actually saw on the 29th 
of March 1911. Secondly, one can attempt a linguistic description of this visual 
image, which would go more or less in the following way: ‘A circle circumscribes 
twelve narrow lines crossing each other in various ways, while a finger-like dark 
area extends from the south-western edge to approximately the centre of the 
circle’. Upon such a low-level observational statement, one can then build a 
phenomenal description like Wilson’s: “On one occasion in addition to ordinary 
thread-like rays, one larger finger-like ray was seen, evidently a different form of 
secondary ray - giving rise to enormously more ionisation than even ordinary 
[alpha] ray”.141 The observational statement may be true or false, but there seems 
to be little room for disagreement. Much more controversial is the interpretation 
just given, which requires a number of theoretical assumptions above and beyond 
the basic observational report. 
                                                 
140For such a point, see Newton Smith (1981, p. 118). 
141Quoted in Galison and Assmus (1989, p. 261). 
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Figure 6: Wilson’s cloud-chamber event (from Galison and Assmus, 1989, p. 
262). 
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Lines on paper may thus constitute a solid and neutral enough bedrock upon 
which to construct evidential agreement. Common reports at such a rather basic 
level are not sufficient to settle scientific disputes - but at the same time data such 
as the position of a pointer on a scale, or the track on a bubble chamber picture 
are rarely the issues at stake in scientific controversies. Scientists usually debate at 
a higher level of analysis than that, and it is not clear that the radical theory-
ladenness thesis can help us understanding how scientific controversies are 
resolved and why they are not. For philosophical and empirical reasons, the most 
radical form of theory-ladenness argument is also the most difficult one to refute 
(how to prove that I don’t ‘see’ what you ‘see’?), but we do not have to be 
concerned with it here. Experimental psychologists like Slovic and Lichtenstein 
see people choosing and pricing just like economists do, although they may not 
agree on what they prefer (or even that they prefer, in economists’ technical 
sense).142 
 
In the next section, I shall try to show that scientific disagreement has normally 
a two-fold origin: it is either reducible to a problem of (un)reliability of the 
observation statements, or to a problem of fallibility of the assumptions and 
theories needed to infer from data to phenomena. In both cases, I shall argue, the 
problem can be framed in Duhem-Quine form, and the disagreement can in 
principle be eliminated by means of further testing. 
 
3.9. Fallibility and reliability 
 
The first problem with observational reports has to do with the use of theoretical 
terms. Popper thought that even the simplest reports cannot be theory-free due to 
the ubiquity of what he called ‘dispositional terms’. Universal names, “words like 
‘glass’ or ‘water’ are used to characterize the law-like behaviour of certain 
things” (Popper, 1934/1959, Appendix *x). But of course, one does not have to 
know that the term ‘water’ corresponds to ‘a compound of two atoms of 
hydrogen and one of oxygen’, when reporting that ‘the value read on the scale of 
a thermometer immersed in ten litres of boiling water was 97.3 degrees Celsius’. 
It is worth therefore to draw a distinction between theoretical assumptions, in the 
sense of formal, explanatory high theory, and other non rigorous 
                                                 
142My claim, to reiterate, is that in most controversial cases a neutral level of linguistic 
agreement can be reached. I am not, however, addressing the problem of how such a basic 
observational language is formed. On this generally neglected issue, see for instance 
Gooding’s (1990) study on the history of electromagnetism. 
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presuppositions.143 Following the convention introduced in the first chapter, I 
shall whenever relevant write ‘Theory’ (capital ‘T’) to denote the former and 
‘theory’ (small ‘t’) for the latter. High Theory is rarely - if ever - involved in 
reporting ‘crude facts’. There are famous examples of data analysis done by 
laymen: for selecting the 290,000 bubble-chamber photographs taken at CERN 
during the experiments on weak neutral currents in 1973, non-experts were 
employed after a brief training.144 None of them knew the physics of small 
particles. As Hacking (1983) has convincingly argued, knowledge of high theory 
is seldom required in order to become a good ‘observant’, i.e. a person 
particularly skillful at distinguishing certain patterns in a messy complex of sense-
data. 
 
What is the real problem raised by the presence of dispositional terms in 
observational language, then? Popper seems to be concerned with the fallibility 
of sentences including universal names: every such statement, he says, “has the 
character of a hypothesis” (1934/1959, § 25). Universals like ‘glass’, or ‘horse’ 
refer not only to the individuals to which they have been applied in the past, but 
also to all future cases. They therefore cannot be ‘constituted’ by experiences, as 
Carnap and other neopositivists wished, because of the problem of induction 
affecting verificationism. Was the animal we have just seen really a horse? We 
may find out tomorrow, for example, that our theory of the classification of 
animals is partly mistaken (take the famous case of whales - formerly classified as 
fishes and then as mammals). Popper thought the only solution to be a mild form 
of conventionalism on observational sentences: whenever they are questioned, a 
test must be devised to settle the dispute. Quarrels must be followed by further 
tests, until an agreement is reached. The regress can be stopped only by a 
decision to consider some reports as trustworthy. 
 
The Popperian idea of an infinite regress of justification is common to other 
accounts of theory-testing. Clark Glymour’s (1980) ‘bootstrapping’ account of 
confirmation, for example, similarly admits that the relevance of a single body of 
evidence for a single theory be indeterminate. A piece of evidence e is relevant to 
a certain theory T only given a background of assumptions A; other evidence e’ 
can be put forward in order to test A, but it will be relevant only given some other 
background A’, and so on ad infinitum. 
 
                                                 
143Cf. Hacking (1983), ch. 12 for a taxonomy of different layers of theory typically involved 
in scientific activity. 
144The story of this experiment is told in Galison (1987). 
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It is not clear, however, whether such a regress is a vicious one. To shift the 
question of artefacts towards the problem of the fallibility of observational 
statements may on the contrary be a step forward. Once we move out of the 
swamp of incommensurable sense-data, the problem of theory-ladenness 
becomes in fact more tractable. As I shall argue below, problems of fallibility can 
be reduced to Duhem-Quine form, and the Duhem-Quine problem can in the best 
cases be (partially) solved by checking each component of the inference at stake 
in other experimental circumstances, until every source of disagreement has been 
eliminated.145 Laboratory experimentation is particularly efficient in this regard, as 
we shall see in section 3.10. The problem of artefacts, in particular, is mainly a 
problem of fallibility. 
 
A second problem concerns the reliability of our observations. Scientists, as 
a matter of fact, do disagree on observation reports. Their disagreement, 
however, is rarely if ever a question of radical perceptual incommensurability. 
Most often, scientists doubt the correctness of others’ reports, and look for 
mistakes in their data. For instance, the problem of data in the form of 
‘scintillations’ (tiny flashes) counts was at the core of the famous Vienna-
Cambridge controversy on protons and alpha-particles in the twenties.146 The 
parties disagreed upon whether ‘normal’ observers could count the correct 
number of scintillations occurring during an experiment. But, as Bogen and 
Woodward (1988, p. 311) point out, this was a matter of reliability, not of 
theory-ladenness of data. There was here a clear matter of fact at stake - i.e. the 
true number of scintillations - and a solution to the controversy could have been 
reached, if one could just devise an independent and more reliable way to 
ascertain the fact of the matter. 
 
Another common source of disagreement is the quality of the data used to 
draw a certain inference to the existence or not of a phenomenon. During an 
experiment that has become a classic for philosophers of science,147 the physicist 
Robert Millikan established the exact measure of the charge of an electron (a 
measure which is still accepted as the correct one) by ignoring a substantial 
portion of the data he had collected; similar data had led others (e.g., Ehrenhaft) 
to think that not all electrons have the same charge but instead sub-units of charge 
                                                 
145In some limit cases, one may be able to check each component of a system of 
assumptions in isolation. In that case, a sort of ‘reduction’ of the Duhem-Quine problem to a 
minimal size is operated (in a sense, it was only a pseudo-problem generated by a particular 
experimental procedure, which was evidently not the best possible one). 
146See Stuwer (1985). 
147Since Holton (1978). 
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exist. The issue at stake is here the inference from collected data to phenomena, 
not the theory ladenness of observation. The problem is to ascertain whether 
Millikan had good reasons to discard part of his data. Such reasons would, in the 
best case (i.e. excluding the hypothesis of fraud, a hypothesis which in Millikan’s 
case cannot be ruled out in principle148) have involved some theoretical 
argumentation - thus shifting the burden onto the issue of the correctness of the 
theories involved in Millikan’s data selection. To check each bit of the argument is 
often difficult and sometimes impossible in practice, but (and here is the important 
philosophical point) not in principle. 
 
The reason why problems of fallibility and reliability are less worrying for those 
who want to defend the objectivity of scientific knowledge than the radical 
‘theory-ladenness of sense-data’ argument, is that they can be reduced to 
Duhem-Quine form. It is well-known that, according to Duhem, a scientific 
prediction can be made only by putting to work a “whole theoretical scaffolding” 
(1906, p. 185). It is customary today to interpret Duhem’s thesis broadly, and 
include among the premisses used to deduce a prediction a number of 
assumptions about the functioning of the instruments, the non-interferences of 
disturbing factors (or fulfillment of the ceteris paribus clause), the correct 
specification of the initial conditions, and so on.149 When we seem to have 
produced a phenomenon contradicting our predictions, so the argument goes, we 
cannot by deductive logic alone, argue for the falsification of any one in 
particular of the assumptions involved (although we know that at least one must 
be false). 
 
Putting it in terms of ‘autopsychological’ reports,150 for instance, the 
prediction ‘I will read on the thermometer’s scale a value of 100 degrees Celsius’ 
can be deduced from a number of assumptions including the laws of 
thermodynamics, the assumption that the thermometer is not damaged, that the 
measurement has really been made at the sea-level, that the water is pure, 
assumptions about the absence of major disturbances, and the proviso that I will 
not hallucinate when reading the thermometer. If I do not observe the predicted 
values, I shall not know automatically which of the assumptions to blame. But still, 
there will be some way to try and figure it out: by means of further testing. 
 
                                                 
148See the discussion in Franklin (1986), pp. 140-162. 
149Cf. e.g. Quine (1953), Lakatos (1970) and Putnam (1974). 
150Like, e.g., Watkins’ (1984) ‘level-0 propositions’. 
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Problems of fallibility and reliability of data, which can be reduced to Duhem-
Quine form, are more tractable than problems of radical theory ladenness (if there 
exist in science any genuine examples of the latter). In principle, it should always 
be possible to ‘extract’ the relevant assumptions from the ‘theory laden data’ and 
add it as a premise to make a larger Duhem problem.151 When the issue is the 
reliability of these assumptions, experiments can be devised to settle at least some 
disputes. The Cambridge-Vienna controversy was settled, among other things, by 
showing that human visual perception is unable to distinguish with the required 
precision different kinds of scintillations observed through the microscopes 
available at the time. It would have been possible in principle to write down the 
right report, it was just very difficult. Feyerabend and Kuhn’s point applies to 
those cases in which there does not seem to be one ‘right’ way to see something, 
when there simply is no matter of fact to be ascertained. When the issue is 
reliability or fallibility, there is a way out of the corner: by means of successive 
tests we rule out some possibilities from the number of interpretations opened by 
the Duhem-Quine problem. In the next section I shall show how this can be done 
in practice by illustrating some experiments devised to show that preference 
reversals are a real phenomenon indeed. The problem of artefacts is a Duhem-
Quine problem, and this can in principle (i.e. in particular cases) be solved by 
ingenious testing. 
 
3.10. Independent tests 
 
Neither Popper nor any other philosopher aware of Duhem’s problem ever 
argued that a decision can be taken about which element (among the premisses 
involved in a predictive argument)  to revise without a reason. The point is that 
such a reason cannot be an ultimate, logically compelling one. Otto Neurath 
(1934) noticed that in practice one does not have to deal with an infinite number 
of alternative explanations for a given scientific observation. Testing is an obvious 
way to try to reduce the number of plausible alternatives. The same idea can be 
found in Popper’s writings: suppose that, as in the BDM case, someone 
challenges the standard inference from an observation to the falsification of a 
theory by putting forward a rival theory. In order to test the legitimacy of such an 
alternative, one has to devise an independent test for it. 
 
                                                 
151Cf. Worrall (1991) for a similar argument directed against Feyerabend’s version of the 
theory ladenness thesis. 
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 Popper puts forward a definition of independent test that is strictly related to 
his notions of ‘severe test’ and ‘non ad-hoc’ hypothesis. According him (1963), 
an empirical test is not severe if the theory at stake together with accepted 
background knowledge predicts just the same facts that are implied by 
background knowledge alone. The background includes everything that is 
tentatively accepted at the time the theory is tested. Evidence predicted by the 
theory but not by the background alone is said to be ‘independent’. An 
explanation is not ad hoc if the explanans (the theory) is rich in content, i.e. has 
testable consequences beyond the explanandum (i.e. the refuting instances of 
previous tests) at hand (Popper, 1957). 
 
Such intuitions have inspired neo-Popperian criteria of appraisal of  scientific 
theories: according to Lakatos (1970) a theory is non-ad hoc1 if it predicts novel 
facts (Popper’s ‘richness of content’), and non-ad hoc2 if some of these novel 
predictions have been corroborated by empirical facts. In order to capture the 
second intuition, Elie Zahar (1976) and John Worrall (1978; 1985) have 
proposed a rather sophisticated criterion, according to which the facts which truly 
corroborate a theory have to be ‘novel’, but only in a relative sense: they may be 
already known at the time of the production of the theory, but new for that 
particular theory, i.e. truly confirming phenomena must not have played a role in 
the construction of the theory at stake. Worrall and Zahar include among the 
corroborating evidence the data known at the time of the experiment, but which 
were not used to build the prediction at stake. Evidence cannot be used twice, in 
other words, once to construct and once to confirm. 
 
We already said that Karni and Safra’s (1987) paper applies a specific 
generalised expected utility model - EURDP - to PR data. The way i which this is 
done suggests that the application is mostly illustrative. Certain passages indicate, 
however, that Karni and Safra believed that subjects do indeed violate 
independence and that this fact is the basis for an explanation of their 
behaviour.152 But on what grounds? 
                                                 
152 For example: “What Grether and Plott tried and - as our discussion indicates, failed to 
do - is to observe, by means of [the BDM method], the certainty equivalents of given 
lotteries” (1987, p. 676, my emphasis). In a footnote Karni and Safra compare their 
contribution to Holt’s: the latter pointed independently to violations of intransitivity, but 
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Perhaps Karni and Safra were influenced by the general consensus achieved 
by Quiggin’s and Yaari’s EURDP among decision theorists. Generalised theories 
of decision making, however, do not imply that subjects violate independence - 
only that they might. Such theories display in their general form several free 
parameters which have to be fixed in order to derive precise implications about 
subjects’ behaviour. For some special values of these parameters, the 
consequences of EURDP are identical to those of expected utility theory. In other 
words, EURDP may well be true and yet the subjects not violate independence 
when choosing among the lotteries typically used in PR experiments. Some 
specific models must be employed in order to account for PR - as Karni and 
Safra did in order to illustrate their main result. It is clear that such models needed 
independent confirmations before they could be taken seriously. 
 
The models are obtained by ‘ad hoc’ specification: the Karni and Safra 
reinterpretation of the BDM procedure holds, in fact, only for some pairs of 
lotteries and some values of the free parameters of the basic EURDP theory. 
According to the latter, the value V of a lottery (x1, p1;...; xn, pn) is given by 
 
 
V(x1, p1;. ..; xn, pn ) = u(xi
i=1
n
∑ ) f p j
j =i
n
∑
 
 
 
 − f pjj =i +1
n
∑
 
 
 
 
 
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The u is the traditional monotonic increasing real valued function defined on 
some interval in the real line (that is, on a range of monetary prizes). Compared to 
expected utility theory, EURDP has one more free parameter, namely the 
‘probability transformation function’ f. Karni and Safra (1987) show that if the 
following specifications are chosen for f and u, 
 
f (p) =
1.1564p,
0.9p + 0.047,
0.5p + 0.327
p,
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 ≤ p ≤ 0.1833 
0.1833 ≤ p ≤0.7 
0.7 ≤ p ≤ 0.98 
0.98 ≤ p ≤ 1, 
                                                                                                                            
“however, did not present an alternative theory explicating the ‘PR’ phenomenon” (p. 676, 
n. 4, my emphasis). 
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u(x) =
30x + 30,
10x +10,
6.75x + 49,
 
 
 
  
 
 
x ≤ -1 
-1 ≤ x ≤ 12, 
12 ≤ x, 
 
 
then for lotteries such as the ones used by Grether and Plott (1979) - i.e. (-1, 
1/36; 4, 35/36) and (-1.5, 25/36; 16, 11/36) - the ‘announced price reversals’ 
can be accounted for. (Notice: the ‘announced price reversals’ are the data to be 
explained, as opposed to the allegedly artefactual ‘PR’ phenomenon.) Still, these 
specifications are able to account only for the above lotteries: the Karni and Safra 
hypothesis cannot even rationalise all the data known at the time, unless one uses 
different parameter specifications for each experiment.153 But even if this problem 
could be overcome, there would remain a general methodological concern. The 
illustrative model, with its particular parameters and initial conditions, rather than 
Quiggin’s theory is doing most of the work. EURDP cannot by itself even 
account for the particular asymmetries of observed reversals: only the model with 
its specific parameters can. The illustrative model above (theory plus specification 
of the free parameters plus initial conditions) was in fact devised explicitly in order 
to account for the evidence to be explained. The latter, then, cannot provide much 
support to the violation of independence hypothesis. 
 
Following Zahar (1997), let us represent a theory with two free parameters 
(a1 and a2) as T(a1, a2). A specific model of the theory can be devised by 
determining the free parameters on the basis of some empirical evidence e. Such 
evidence is used together with the theory T in order to deduce the values of the 
parameters: [T(a1, a2) & e] ⇒ T(a1*, a2*). The evidence e is in some cases, 
such as the present one, the very evidence the theory was intended to explain. It 
                                                 
153 With hindsight, the popularity among economists of this explanation of PR appears 
puzzling (see also Hausman, 1992, and Hausman and Mongin, 1998): why was Karni and 
Safra’s work so attractive? At least three explanations can be tentatively put forward: (1) the 
PR phenomenon looked so damaging to orthodox theory, that economists were eager to 
believe more or less in any defensive argument whatsoever; (2) the strategy of weakening 
independence to account for counterexamples was then quite fashionable, therefore the 
Karni and Safra argument promoted theoretical unification; (3) the analysis of the BDM and 
RLS mechanisms had independent theoretical interest. 
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is not surprising, then, that e is accounted for by T.154 Some new evidence e’ not 
used to derive the model T(a1*, a2*), but implied by T(a1*, a2*), could confirm 
T more than e did, and even more so if no alternative theory is able to account for 
e’ (which will therefore count as a quasi-crucial experiment with respect to T and 
its rivals). 
 
But why do certain data provide a better test of a hypothesis than others do? 
According to Deborah Mayo (1996, Ch. 6), this does not have so much to do 
with novelty as with expectation.155 Some data test a hypothesis severely only if it 
is very unlikely that those data can be produced while the hypothesis is false. The 
evidence e (the observed choice-price reversals) does not support Karni and 
Safra’s model because the classical PR experiment produces results consistent 
with that model no matter what the real truth-value of the latter. If we repeated 
the PR experiment even a thousand times, it would not be surprising to find that 
the resulting evidence is consistent with the Karni-Safra model - because the 
Karni-Safra model was constructed so as to accomodate the result of a PR 
experiment. The role of experiments is not to produce no-matter-what data. A 
good experiment must produce good data to answer specific questions, better 
than ‘casual’ data would. The original PR experiment was devised to answer 
Lichtenstein and Slovic’s question about the context-dependence of pricing and 
choice behaviour.156 Other PR experiments (e.g., Grether and Plott’s) were 
performed later in order to answer other questions about artefacts. All these tests 
were designed so that it would have been really unlikely that a certain result (e) 
                                                 
154 Notice that e weakly confirms T, because it is logically conceivable that for some other 
theory Ti ≠ T there exists no set {a1*,...,an*} such that Ti(a1*,...,an*) ⇒ e. In the limit case 
in which this were true for all Ti, T would be practically testable ‘in isolation’ and the Duhem 
problem would be drastically reduced. But, as in the case at hand, there usually exist a 
number of alternative theories able to account for e. 
155 Mayo (1996, Ch. 8) argues that her notion of severe test is able to account for all the 
positive intuitions of neo-Popperian theories of confirmation as well as to avoid some of 
their defects. The thrust of her argument against Worrall and Zahar is that there are cases in 
which data are used to construct a scientific hypothesis and at the same time provide a 
severe test of that hypothesis. The interested reader can look in particular at sections 8.3-8.4 
of her book. 
156 See section 2 above. 
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was observed if the tested hypothesis were false.157 The data produced in those 
experiments cannot test Karni and Safra’s hypothesis severely. Some special 
experiment must be devised that is able to answer this new question in a 
convincing manner.  
 
This reasoning can account for the behaviour of economic experimentalists, 
who soon began to look for genuine confirmations to the Karni and Safra 
hypothesis. Subsequent work by Safra, Segal, and Spivak (1990b) was devoted 
to deriving further testable implications from the ‘violation of independence’ 
interpretation of PR’s. According to Safra, Segal, and Spivak’s Proposition 2 
(derived from Karni and Safra’s model), although the optimal selling price (π) of 
a lottery and its certainty equivalent (CE) may end up non-identical in a BDM 
elicitation, they should nevertheless lie on the same side of the lottery’s expected 
value for the lottery (EV). In other words, the two following testable predictions 
(for risk-loving and risk-averse subjects respectively) can be derived from Karni 
and Safra’s interpretation:158 
 
(i) CE(X) > EV(X) ⇒ π(X) ≥ EV(X) 
(ii) CE(X) < EV(X) ⇒ π(X) ≤ EV(X) 
 
According to Segal’s (1987) interpretation of the BDM device, on the other 
hand, (i) and (ii) do not necessarily hold. An experiment testing such predictions 
would certainly count as an independent test of Karni and Safra’s hypothesis. 
Keller, Segal and Wang (1993) ran such an experiment, and found Proposition 2 
to be inconsistent with around 30% of the data. Such a percentage can hardly be 
explained as a random error, since a definite asymmetric tendency is discernible in 
the data: the π(X) > EV(X) > CE(X) pattern is displayed for 22% of the subjects, 
whereas the CE(X) > EV(X) > π(X) pattern is shown for a 9% only (Camerer, 
1995, p. 659). This seems to rule out the explanation of PRs in terms of violations 
of independence put forward by Karni and Safra (1987), leaving open the issue 
                                                 
157 For instance, we can formulate one of the (low-level) hypotheses tested by Grether and 
Plott (1979) as “e is not due to the absence of relevant monetary rewards”. By performing 
experiments with relevant monetary rewards, Grether and Plott constructed a severe test of 
their hypothesis, by making it unlikely that e was produced in their experiment and at the 
same time the experimental hypothesis false. 
158For the technical details of such a derivation, Cf. Safra, Segal, and Spivak (1990b, pp. 187-
188). Notice that (i) and (ii) can be derived also from EUT, since according to the latter CE(X) 
= π(X). 
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whether price reversals are effects of reduction violations (as conjectured by 
Segal) or symptoms of intransitive preferences. 
 
Safra, Segal and Spivak (1990a) also proved that the kind of explanation that  
Karni and Safra gave of the PR phenomenon presupposes similar conditions to 
those known to be at the origins of other anomalies like Allais’ paradox and the 
so-called common ratio effect. All these phenomena (including PRs) ought 
therefore to be explicable in Machina’s Generalised Expected Utility Analysis 
(1982), by assuming ‘fanning out’ of indifference curves in a Marschak-Machina 
triangle as implied by Hypothesis II (i.e. that local utility functions over 
stochastically dominating lotteries show greater risk-aversion than utility functions 
over stochastically dominated ones).159 MacDonald, Huth, and Taube (1991) 
devised an experiment to test the ‘violation-of-independence’ explanation of PRs 
by checking whether there is a correlation between fanning out and reversals. 
They ran Allais-type experiments and then PR experiments, and found that 
subjects who did not exhibit fanning out did not in fact incur fewer reversals than 
the others. 
 
Another example of the same kind is provided by Starmer and Sugden’s 
(1991) attempt to test Holt’s explanation of PRs. Starmer and Sugden designed 
an experiment in which the reduction hypothesis, upon which Holt’s explanation is 
built, is incompatible with  a very frequent violation of independence first 
discovered by Allais (1953/1979), the common consequence effect. The Allais-
type experiment involved a double choice, first between a lottery R’ = (£10, 0.2; 
£7, 0.75; 0, 0.5) and a lottery S’ = (£7, 1); then between R’’ =  (0, 0.8; £10, 
0.2) and S’’ = (£7, 0.25; 0, 0.75). The common consequence effect is a 
tendency to choose S’ > R’ and R’’ > S’’. By reduction, it is easy to show that 
the following equivalence holds between compound lotteries: (R’, 0.5; S’’, 0.5) = 
(S’, 0.5; R’’, 0.5) = (£10, 0.1; £7, 0.5; 0, 0.4). If there is reduction, then, one 
should expect a random pattern of choice between (R’, 0.5; S’’, 0.5) and (S’, 
0.5; R’’, 0.5) whereas common consequence implies (S’, 0.5; R’’, 0.5) > (R’, 
0.5; S’’, 0.5). If there is reduction, in other words, there cannot be common 
consequence effects, and vice-versa. Starmer and Sugden performed the above 
Allais-type experiment with and without the RLS mechanism, and observed the 
same ratio of common consequence violations in all cases. This provided strong 
evidence that subjects did not obey reduction, and the Holt explanation was 
discredited. 
                                                 
159See chapter 2, section 4, for more details. 
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These experiments have reinforced scientists’ belief in the reality of the 
preference reversals phenomenon by elimination of alternative explanations. 
Attempts to explain away the phenomenon have been rejected by testing the 
various alternative hypotheses independently. In all these cases, the logic of 
experimenting seems to follow the classic logic of theory-testing theorised by the 
supporters of the hypothetico-deductive model: a theory is proposed; predictions 
are derived from it (plus initial conditions and auxiliary hypotheses); finally, such 
predictions are checked against empirical data, and either the assumptions are 
rejected, or they are confirmed. There are however other means to increase our 
belief in the reality of a phenomenon or to reduce the plausibility of artificiality 
claims. These have to do not so much with the classic scheme of hypothesis 
testing, but rather take the form of ‘observations without (a unique) theory’. I shall 
turn to these in the next section. 
 
3.11. Phenomena without (a unique) theory 
 
Most of those who have claimed to have responded to Hanson, Kuhn and 
Feyerabend’s challenge have pointed to a solution of Duhem’s and Popper’s 
fallibility (or reliability) problem. Ian Hacking, in particular, devotes a good deal of 
his Representing and Intervening (1983) to defining boundaries to the 
importance of theory. The issue at stake in the experiments on preference 
reversals did not have primarily to do with any explanatory Theory (capital ‘T’). It 
can rather be summarised in the question: how can we know that the observations 
of preference relations made via elicitation mechanisms were reliable? 
 
Paul Feyerabend built his case for Galileo ‘the propagandist’ on a number of 
arguments. In Against Method (1975/1993), Feyerabend argued that a ‘neutral’ 
observer did not have a good reason to believe in Galileo’s observational claims 
rather than in those of his opponents, because Galileo had no theory of how the 
telescope used to observe the moons of Jupiter worked. In the absence of such a 
theory, Feyerabend says, Galileo had to use rhetorical tricks in order to convince 
a (justifiably) sceptical scientific community. If one does not have a theory of 
the instruments, in other words, one is not entitled to believe in what the 
instruments show. It is surprising to find such an argument right at the end of a 
chapter entirely devoted to showing what kind of problems the pervasiveness of 
theory raises to ‘objectivist’ philosophies of science. It is an argument, however, 
which can often be found in the mouths of scientists. It once again dates back at 
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least to Duhem, who suggested that theories of the instruments enable one to tell 
artefacts from real phenomena: 
 
To what strange errors we should be exposed at times, if we naively 
attributed to the observed objects the shape and colour revealed by the 
instrument, or if a discussion of optical theories did not allow us to 
distinguish the role of appearances from that of realities! (Duhem, 1906, 
p. 154). 
 
Echoing Duhem, Edi Karni and Zvi Safra, in their paper devoted to challenging 
the BDM elicitation mechanism, pose the following two questions: (a) “How rich 
is the class of preferences that permits the elicitation of certainty equivalents of 
given lotteries using [the BDM] method?”; and (b) “Are there experiments that 
enable the elicitation of the certainty equivalents of every lottery for every 
reasonable preference relation?”. The first question is the one that motivated their 
enterprise; the second one is rather more ambitious. Of course they are legitimate 
questions, and indeed interesting ones from a scientific (and theoretical, in 
particular) point of view, but their relevance to the issue at stake (i.e. the 
artefactual nature of PRs) is far from clear. 
 
The answers provided by Karni and Safra are respectively that “(a) the 
elicitation of certainty equivalents of all lotteries, using the experimental methods 
of Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak, is possible if and only if the preference 
relation is representable by an expected utility functional; (b) every experiment in 
a larger class of experiments [which Karni and Safra call ‘Q-experiments’] would 
fail to elicit the certainty equivalent of some lotteries for some reasonable 
preference relations” (Karni and Safra, 1987, p. 676). In other words, if 
subjects’ decisions violate independence in the cases at hands, then the BDM 
procedure and similar mechanisms are not adequate instruments to determine 
certainty equivalents in a precise way and in all cases. From this, Karni and 
Safra conclude that “Grether and Plott and others [...], as our discussion indicates 
failed to [...] observe by means of an experimental method developed by Becker, 
DeGroot, and Marschak (1964), the certainty equivalents of given lotteries” 
(ibid.). Apart from the fact that - given what we have seen in the previous section 
and as later research on preference reversals has shown - this is quite clearly an 
overstatement, the point is that such an argument is not in itself sufficient to 
challenge the existence of PRs. To begin with, the first premiss (that agents really 
violate independence in these particular cases) had not been proven. Secondly, 
even if it had been proven, it does not follow logically that preference reversals 
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cannot be observed by means of ‘Q-experiments’. The BDM mechanism and 
similar methods may not be absolutely or generally precise, but still precise 
enough to observe preference reversals. One natural way to see whether this is 
the case or not is to try to observe reversals with and without the BDM 
procedure, and check whether it makes any difference. Let us see more precisely 
how this can be done. 
 
The tests examined in the previous section were devised to discriminate 
between rival interpretations of the PR phenomenon. They aimed at validating or 
refuting one of such interpretations, their perspective was one of struggle between 
theories. But remember the target of Holt, Karni and Safra, and Segal’s 
arguments: they intended to show that it was not intransitive preferences that 
experimentalists had observed in their experiments with the BDM procedure. In 
order to reject Karni and Safra’s, and Segal’s interpretation, therefore, one must 
not necessarily show that their Theories (capital ‘T’) are erroneous. It should be 
sufficient to show that it was really a feature of preferences that was observed in 
the experiments in question. Hacking, in a chapter entirely devoted to discuss the 
reliability of vision through microscopes (1983, ch. 11), argues that powerful 
support to the belief that what we see through electron microscopes is real is 
provided by the fact that the same structures are observed through light 
microscopes. The intuition behind this inference is captured by a so-called ‘no-
miracles’ argument: 
 
Two physical processes - electron transmission and fluorescent re-emission 
- are used to detect the bodies. These processes have virtually nothing in 
common between them. They are essentially unrelated chunks of physics. It 
would be a preposterous coincidence if, time and again, two completely 
different physical processes produced identical visual configurations which 
were, however, artifacts of the physical processes rather than real 
structures in the cell (Hacking, 1983, p. 201). 
 
According to such an argument, evidence obtained via independently working 
instruments provides strong support to the existence of a phenomenon. Our belief 
in the reality of a phenomenon, notice, can be totally independent of the 
explanations we give of such a phenomenon. We may not know the causes of 
the phenomenon, nor have an established theory of the instrument, and yet believe 
in the phenomenon and in what we see through an instrument. 
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Wesley Salmon (1984, p. 216) provides another example: Jean Perrin’s 
determination of Avogadro’s number through studying Brownian motion. In order 
to be sure that he had found the true value, however, Perrin checked his results 
by measuring it in alternative ways. In his 1913 book, Les atomes, Perrin reports 
thirteen different independent methods to ascertain Avogadro’s number. The 
‘miraculous’ convergence of all measures is taken to be an extremely strong proof 
that the result obtained was not an artefact of the procedures he had used.160 As 
Allan Franklin (1986, pp. 131-135) points out, the Review of Particle 
Properties provides detailed information about the devices used for 
measurement. The latter may include automatic spark chambers, counters, 
electronic combinations, emulsions, hydrogen bubble chambers, missing-mass 
spectrometer, xenon bubble chambers, cloud chambers, propane bubble 
chambers, spark chambers, wire chambers, bubble chamber plus electronics, and 
freon bubble chambers. The reliability of a measurement is a function of the 
number of different techniques delivering consistent results.161 
 
In the case of preference reversals, the phenomenon had been observed right 
from the beginning with and without elicitation mechanisms. Of Lichtenstein and 
Slovic’s early tests (1971), only two involved the BDM procedure, but reversals 
were produced in all tests. This fact should have already been a puzzle to the 
Holt-Segal-Karni-and-Safra explanations. Years later, James Cox and Seth 
Epstein, two economists at the Arizona Experimental Lab and De Paul University, 
looked for a way to reproduce preference reversals with incentive mechanisms 
but avoiding possible problems with the BDM procedure: 
 
[...] it was necessary that we not use the BDM price elicitation procedure. 
Furthermore, we concluded that Karni and Safra’s Theorem 2 makes it 
highly unlikely that anyone will be able to design a price elicitation 
mechanism for choices in a lottery space that does not require the 
independence axiom. Therefore, we concluded that it would be impossible 
for us to elicit true selling prices in an experiment that is designed in such a 
way that behavioral inconsistencies with the independence axiom are not 
                                                 
160Even a conventionalist like Poincaré was struck by such a result; see Nye (1972) for the 
full story. 
161The normative force of no-miracles arguments is highly debated by philosophers of 
science: such arguments are to begin with ampliative, thus facing standard problems of 
induction. Moreover, they are special instances of so-called ‘inferences to the best 
explanation’; some criticisms applying to the latter can therefore be turned towards no-
miracles claims. It would be too long here to discuss these philosophical problems - my 
purpose, it is worth stressing once again, being mainly descriptive in character: these are the 
arguments scientists use to settle controversial cases. 
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confounded with more fundamental inconsistencies with decision theory. 
But preference reversals are inherently properties of inconsistent orderings. 
The absolute magnitude of prices is basically irrelevant; it is the fact that the 
less preferred lottery is given a higher price that represents an inconsistency 
with decision theory (Cox and Epstein, 1989, p. 412). 
 
Cox and Epstein managed to create an incentive procedure able to elicit 
orderings without creating compound lotteries. First, they asked subjects to state 
their lowest selling price for both lotteries in each pair at the same time; the lottery 
with the lower price was then paid a fixed sum, whereas the other was played out 
for money. The prices were then compared to subjects’ pairwise choices on 
lotteries obtained by reducing the payoffs of the original lotteries by the 
announced selling price (so that the probability distribution of returns was kept 
constant). The procedure is problematic because - as Cox and Epstein (1989, p. 
422) conjecture - the subjects might interpret the pricing task as a choice task. 
Hausman (1992, p. 139), indeed, suggests that Cox and Epstein’s might not even 
be classifiable as a genuine PR experiment. For our purposes, however, the 
general strategy is what matters: Cox and Epstein’s procedure does not prevent 
the subjects from stating a higher selling price than their true reservation for the 
preferred lottery, but is supposed to ensure that the latter be assigned the highest 
price. Because of the structure of the experiment, it was not possible to control 
for wealth effects and for portfolio effects at the same time; Cox and Epstein 
decided to control for the latter and then cope with wealth effects by means of 
data analysis. Preference reversals were observed; the patterns of reversals, 
however, were quite different from those observed in previous classic preference 
reversals experiments. Many unpredicted reversals and fewer predicted 
asymmetries occurred, thus warranting the suspicion of - at least some element of 
- random choice behaviour (or rather confirming Hausman’s scepticism!). 
 
 Amos Tversky, Paul Slovic and Daniel Kahneman (1990) devised an 
incentive mechanism that was intended to improve on Cox and Epstein’s design. 
The basic idea, again, was that ordering, rather than the elicitation of true selling 
prices is what matters for the PR phenomenon. Rather than doing things 
concurrently, the subjects were first asked to price the lotteries in each pair 
seperately; and then were they faced with the choice task. Subjects were told 
that only one lottery among the highest priced and the chosen one would have 
been randomly selected and played. One can attempt to explain away the 
observed reversals by means of a generalised expected utility model assuming a 
mixed strategy on the subjects’ part, i.e. by supposing that agents prefer a 50% 
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chance to play either the highest or the lowest valued lottery to the option of 
playing one of them for sure. Such an explanation, however, cannot account for 
systematic patterns such as those observed in classic PR experiments and 
replicated by Tversky, Slovic and Kahneman. 
 
Finally, some experimental strategies involve a more substantial use of theory 
in supporting the reality of a phenomenon - but do so in order to justify the 
adoption of the BDM machinery rather than to explain the phenomenon. 
MacDonald, Huth and Taube’s (1992) results suggested that a so-called 
‘isolation effect’ may have been present in their experiments. Subjects, in other 
words, seemed to choose as though they evaluated each lottery in isolation, 
without multiplying its chances for the probability of its being selected by the 
BDM procedure. Such a procedure would be consistent with theories of 
decision, like Tversky and Kahneman’s ‘Prospect Theory’ (1979), which assume 
a desire on subjects’ part to minimise the computational costs of decision making. 
MacDonald, Huth and Taube devised an experiment where subjects were offered 
the chance to revise their choice after an RLS was performed at the end of the 
experiment. A subject not obeying independence should change his choice, but 
very few did change despite the fact that strong independence violations were 
observed in previous experiments. Thus, some isolation effect may have been 
there. Isolation effects have the interesting property of counterbalancing the effect 
of independence violations: the BDM procedure, in fact, fails to elicit true 
certainty equivalents only if independence is violated and reduction is obeyed. If 
subjects violate both independence and reduction by isolation, then the BDM 
machine may work well (as suggested by Camerer, 1989). 
 
3.12. The reality of reversals 
 
Colin Camerer, in a recent survey of the PR experiments, concludes that the PR 
phenomenon can hardly be considered an artefact of the instruments of 
observation. This is today the standard view. Of the arguments he cites in its 
support, two are from refutation of alternative explanations: (a) from failed 
predictions derived from generalised expected utility models; and (b) from the 
evidence of ‘isolation effects’. The third argument (c) starts from the recognition 
that the same phenomenon seems to be observable via different mechanisms 
relying on different principles (Camerer, 1995, p. 659). They may not know 
exactly how the BDM mechanism works (although we surely understand it better 
now than ten years ago), but experimental economists are confident today that it 
may be used to observe preference reversals. Experimentalists rely on several 
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resources to establish the reality of a phenomenon. Allan Franklin (1990) lists nine 
possible strategies adopted by scientists in order to provide “reasonable belief in 
the validity of an experimental result” (1990, p. 104): 
 
1. Experimental checks and calibration, in which the apparatus reproduces 
known phenomena. 
2. Reproducing artifacts that are known in advance to be present. 
3. Intervention, in which the experimenter manipulates the object under 
observation. 
4. Independent confirmation using different experiments. 
5. Elimination of plausible sources of error and alternative 
explanations of the result. 
6. Using the results themselves to argue for their validity. 
7. Using an independently well-corroborated theory of the phenomena to 
explain the results. 
8. Using an apparatus based on a well-corroborated theory. 
9. Using statistical arguments. 
 
The strategies we have been concerned with in this reconstruction of the 
debate on PRs belong to the italicised categories four and five above. Thanks to 
such strategies, the debate on the existence of PRs was in effect brought to an 
end, and disagreement eventually more or less eliminated. This, it must be 
stressed, is quite a remarkable event in economics, where controversies tend to 
last for decades without parties ever converging on a common position.162 Such a 
result was made possible by the use of controlled experimentation. Other 
strategies in Franklin’s list were clearly not available to economic experimentalists 
in the case at hand: the phenomenon under study, for instance, was inconsistent 
with accepted economic theory, which therefore could not be used to increase 
economists’ confidence in the reality of PRs. The theory from which Slovic and 
Lichtenstein predicted the occurrence of reversals, being incompatible with the 
very idea of a preference structure, could not be accepted by economists. The 
theory of the apparatus was undermined by Allais-type violations since the early 
fifties. No artefacts were known to be present in advance.  
 
3.13. Replication and Reproduction 
 
                                                 
162Hausman and Mongin (1998) try to address the question why this is so. 
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The reality of PRs has been (temporarily, perhaps) accepted. One does not have 
to have a theory of light refraction to believe that a telescope accurately reports 
what is there. Similarly, the causes of preference reversals have not been 
established yet, and recent investigations invite the thought that reversals may be 
the effect of the interaction of a number of factors at the same time - but PRs are 
very likely to be real.163 Replication has been a fundamental tool in the course of 
the controversy. This claim may appear inconsistent with economic 
experimentalists’ complaints about their own habits: experiments, they say, are 
rarely if ever replicated. The complaint usually takes the form of a critique of 
economic journals’ standards, which tend to provide disincentives for checks and 
replications of others’ experiments.164 If we take a look at the natural sciences, 
however, we’ll find that the situation is not that different: replications are rare, 
official scientific rhetoric notwithstanding. Harry Collins (1975) has convincingly 
shown that scientists rarely if ever check other experimenters’ claims by repeating 
exactly their procedures. Given that I have begun by praising replicability as a 
fundamental advantage of laboratory experimentation above field data analysis, 
there is here a puzzle to be solved. 
 
Mulkay and Gilbert (1986) have argued that scientists use the term 
‘replication’ in two different senses: (1) ‘mere’ or ‘exact’ replication of someone 
else’s experiment, to check his procedures; and (2) replication ‘through 
experimental variation’. More importance is usually attributed to the latter activity, 
because “the use of various independent methods strengthens confidence in the 
conclusion by showing that it does not depend solely on one specific kind of 
experimental manipulation” (Mulkay and Gilbert, 1986, p. 27). It is useful to 
introduce some terminology to distinguish the two activities. Following Cartwright 
(1991), I shall speak of ‘replication’ and ‘reproduction’, respectively, to denote 
the activities (1) and (2) above.165 PRs have in this sense now gone through both 
stages: the stage of replication and that of reproduction.  
 
‘Replicability’ is a property of experiments. Using once again Bogen and 
Woodward’s (1988) terminology, we may see an experiment as a data-
producing device. An experiment becomes replicable when a group of scientists 
achieves a stabilization and a formalisation of the techniques to produce certain 
                                                 
163On the possible causes of PRs, see Camerer’s survey (1995). Cf. also Tversky, Slovic, 
and Kahneman (1990) and Slovic (1995) for a statement of psychologists’ point of view on 
the matter. 
164Cf. Smith (1994) for a similar point. 
165The definitions are of course partly arbitrary. Radder (1996) for instance uses exactly the 
opposite terminology. 
 128 
 
patterns of data in a reliable way, when the interaction between experimenters 
and machines has become such that data with certain characteristics can be 
produced at will. In a replication the same ‘data generating process’ as the one 
used in the original experiment is at work (up to spatio-temporal differences: the 
experiment is possibly replicated by another team of scientists, in another 
laboratory, and surely at a different time). ‘Reproducibility’, on the other hand, is 
a property of phenomena. A phenomenon has been reproduced when 
experimenters have become able to observe it or produce it in a number of 
independent ways, with the use of different instruments. Different data-sets (that 
is, data produced by different ‘data-generating processes’ or ‘causal set-ups’) 
sometimes together with their different theoretical interpretations converge to 
prove the existence of a certain phenomenon. 
 
Experimenters in all sciences usually do not replicate others’ results, unless 
there is some serious worry of incompetence or the data seem ‘too strange to be 
true’. From this respect, then, economists do not differ at all from other scientists. 
Their worries are just an effect of their being prone to the rhetoric of the natural 
sciences, and of the ambiguity of the term ‘replication’. One important 
philosophical issue is whether strategies such as reproduction through variation 
provide rational support to scientists’ belief in a result.166 Collins (1984) has 
argued that the practice of reproduction, far from being enforced by its intrinsic 
rationality, is an effect of sociological incentives (such as ‘publish or perish’).167 
But this is not necessarily a criticism nor a challenge to the rationality of science. 
In certain cases publishing standards can be seen as institutions evolved to 
stimulate an efficient and rational pursuit of scientific research. Experimental 
variation is an efficient mean to serve an epistemic goal: it makes the construction 
of alternative causal stories extremely difficult. 
 
 
 
3.14. Conclusion 
 
Many students of the natural sciences have noticed that experimenters are often 
concerned with establishing the existence and the conditions of reproducibility of 
some phenomenon, rather than with its theoretical explanation. In this chapter, I 
have tried to show that the same is true in experimental economics as well, and to 
                                                 
166See footnote 26. 
167Collins’ paper is a reply to Franklin and Howson’s (1984) attempt to explicate the 
procedure of replication/reproduction by means of a Bayesian analysis. 
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illustrate some of the techniques used to warrant an experimental result. I suggest 
that the possibility of eliminating alternative explanations and of using different 
tools to elicit the same phenomenon distinguish laboratory practice from other 
empirical branches of economics. When data are collected in the field, the 
inferences drawn from them are much more questionable. Even some basic 
macroeconomic measurement which are normally taken for granted for policy 
purposes - such as those of inflation or stage of the business cycle - seem to be 
built on very shaky grounds.168 Yet, the experimental economist must face up to 
a trade-off. The laboratory data my be more reliable, but there is a clear and 
major impediment to the direct use of laboratory results for intervention: before 
policy conclusions can be drawn, it is necessary to demonstrate that the 
knowledge gathered in the laboratory can be generalised to the ‘real world’ 
economies. How - if at all - can this be done? In the next chapter I shall state the 
problem in a more precise fashion and then discuss in detail how it can be 
tackled. 
 
 
                                                 
168 For a historical study of the ‘construction’ of business cycles, see Epstein (1999); I have 
learned about the problems of measuring inflation from Reiss (unpublished). 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
The Problem of ‘Parallelism’ 
Some conceptual analysis and an application 
 
 
 
‘And what about the carpenter? Didn’t 
you agree that what he produces is not 
the form of bed which according to us is 
what a bed really is, but a particular bed?’ 
‘I did.’ 
‘If, then, what he makes is not “what a bed 
really is”, his product is not “what is”, but 
something which resembles “what is” 
without being it. And anyone who says 
that the product of the carpenter or any 
other craftsman are ultimately real can 
hardly be telling the truth, can he?’ 
‘No one familiar with the sort of arguments 
we’re using could suppose so.’ 
(Plato, The Republic, Part 10, 597a) 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
As noticed by Peter Galison, when scientists ‘do not see how to make a 
phenomenon go away’ (1987, p. 235) that phenomenon is accepted as ‘real’. Of 
course, and crucially, there are various epistemic constraints on the strategies 
considered legitimate in explaining phenomena away. In experimental economics 
such strategies fall into either one or another of two main categories. 
‘Explanations’ of the first kind have been at centre stage in the last chapter: there, 
I have mainly focused on the resources experimentalists use in order to reduce 
disagreement about the meaning of data, or in other words to tell phenomena 
from artefacts of the experiment. Artefacts of that kind, I have tried to argue, are 
a product of scientists’ incapacity to interpret data correctly, rather than a real 
characteristic of the object studied. But there are also artefacts of a different kind. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, an ‘artefact’ is 
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Something observed in a scientific investigation, experiment, etc. that is not 
naturally present but originates in the preparative or investigative procedure 
or extraneously. 
 
This definition highlights a crucial ambiguity in the notion of artefact. The 
‘contrast class’ of ‘artefacts’ (in the sense seen in the last chapter) is 
‘phenomena’. A phenomenon is surely real - otherwise, it would not be a 
phenomenon at all, just a wrong inference from data (an ‘artefact’). Phenomena 
may not occur spontaneously, i.e. when the situation is not constructed so as to 
have the ‘right’ conditions, but this does not affect their reality. In contrast, we 
have seen in the last chapter that scientists often speak of artefacts as ‘illusions’: 
for instance, that whereas announced price reversals are real, preference reversals 
are not. 
 
But according to the Oxford English Dictionary, the first definition of 
‘artificial’ is “made by or resulting from art or artifice; constructed, contrived; not 
natural (though real)”.169 Of course such a definition is not entirely satisfactory 
either: men are, after all, part of nature, and so are the objects they produce. The 
dichotomy ‘spontaneous vs. forced’ is just as questionable as the ‘natural vs. 
artificial’ one: no phenomena occur spontaneously in the economy, because they 
are the effect of the intentional actions of a number of human beings.170 What 
therefore does ‘artificial’ mean in this case? The experimental economist Vernon 
Smith suggests the following account: 
 
Once replicable results have been documented in laboratory experiments, 
one’s scientific curiosity naturally asks if these results also apply to other 
environments, particularly those of the field. Since economic theory has 
been inspired by field environments, we would like to know, if we were 
lucky enough to have a theory fail to be falsified in the laboratory, whether 
our good luck will also extend to the field. Even if our theories have been 
falsified, or if we have no theory of certain well-documented behavioural 
results in the laboratory, we would like to know if such results are 
transferable to field environments (Smith, 1982, p. 267). 
                                                 
169Cf. Hacking (1988, p. 285) for a discussion of the notion of ‘artefact’ which follows a 
similar line of reasoning. 
170The final result may of course not correspond to any of the individual agents’ intentions 
(for instance, the price in a perfectly competitive market, according to neoclassical theory, 
cannot be determined by any of the agents in the market), but is still not ‘spontaneous’ in 
the sense of occurring independently of human action. 
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According to Smith,171 economic theory is mainly concerned with a certain 
realm of social phenomena, namely market phenomena. The latter mostly occur in 
environments that are fairly different from the experimental situations where 
phenomena like preference reversals have been first produced and then studied. 
Such experimental environments are ‘artificial’ in the sense of being created 
especially for a certain scientific purpose. They do not clearly belong to the 
intended (or at least the traditional) domain of economic theory. It is therefore 
important to check whether a claim about some experimental phenomenon can be 
generalised to situations lying outside the (laboratory) domain where the 
phenomenon has first been observed. If it does not, the phenomenon is ‘artificial’: 
real (as all phenomena are) but produced in the laboratory. Another way 
(perhaps more familiar to philosophers of science) to put it is this: scientific 
generalisations can be put in conditional (or causal) form - if certain conditions 
are instantiated, then some phenomenon will occur.172 One then naturally asks 
whether circumstances ‘sufficiently similar’ (sufficiently for the instantiation of the 
phenomenon) to those obtaining in the laboratory are likely to occur ‘naturally’ 
(i.e. non deliberately). 
 
In order to clarify the terminology, we may speak of artificial phenomena as 
either ‘artefacts1’ or ‘artefacts2’. Artefacts1 are misinterpreted data, mere 
‘illusions of phenomena’. Artefacts2 are phenomena, but may be artificial 
nonetheless in the above sense. 
 
 
 
 
 
 real unreal 
 
instantiated in the 
intended domain of 
economics 
 
genuine economic 
phenomenon 
 
artefact1 
                                                 
171And to a very distinguished tradition in economics: cf. e.g. Mill (1836), Pareto (1907) and, 
for a contemporary formulation of the same view, Hausman (1992). 
172This applies also to phenomenal claims not grounded (yet) on any Theory (capital ‘T’). 
For instance, in the case of preference reversals, one can define the phenomenon and add a 
rough description of the experimental conditions under which it can be produced. In other 
words, ‘if...then...’ statements should not be necessarily identified with formal, rigorous, 
explanatory laws. 
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not instantiated in the 
intended domain of  
economics 
 
artefact2 
 
artefact1 
 
For instance, preference reversals, according to Holt, Segal, Karni and Safra, 
do not exist at all; they are ‘illusions’ produced by a mistaken theory of the 
instruments of observation (lower right-hand box). The experiments reviewed in 
the last chapter have shown that this is very probably not the case (left-hand 
boxes); but they have not shown that preference reversals are phenomena falling 
in the ‘intended domain’ of economics (upper right-hand box). The preference 
reversal phenomenon may be ‘non-genuine’ just like an artificial heart is not a real 
heart (lower right-hand box). It is not an artefact of the instruments of 
observation, but it may be an artefact of the experiment in general: the 
phenomenon does occur in the laboratory, but does it occur in ‘real’ markets? In 
this chapter, I shall try to show how such a question may be answered. 
 
Economists are particularly aware of the importance of overcoming this 
‘second-level’ artificiality test before acknowledging experimental results. Indeed, 
they have created a special terminology for dealing with this issue, and often 
speak of the problem of ‘parallelism’.  Parallelism is, at least from a historical 
point of view, the major philosophical problem of experimental economics: the 
one accompanying the field right from its beginning, and to this day the most 
debated one (it is debated in other sciences, of course, but perhaps not with same 
acrimony as in economics173). In this chapter I shall mainly be concerned with 
trying to define the problem of parallelism in a clear, coherent and useful way. 
What is ‘parallelism’, and why does it raise a ‘problem’? A historical answer to 
these questions is as follows. 
 
Long before the term ‘parallelism’ was invented (by Vernon Smith, 1976; 
1982), experimenters were confronted with criticisms of the following sort: 
 
These papers are undoubtedly interesting and remarkably ingenious ones. 
Probably they are useful additions to knowledge in such fields as 
psychology [...], but their relevance within economics is not convincingly 
established. One suspects that the economists of the next generation will 
                                                 
173Other scientists, e.g. experimental psychologists, speak of ‘internal’ vs. ‘external validity’ 
of the experiment. More on this terminological distinction later (see section 9 below). 
Physiology and experimental medicine is another field where problems of parallelism are 
particularly relevant (cf. e.g. La Follette and Shanks, 1996). 
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view such discussions in the same light in which they view the more exotic 
disputations preceding Niceae. The last paper in particular [Edwards, 
1953], one believes, though admirable in many ways, is essentially 
misdirected. It makes use of the experimental method, a technique that has, 
perhaps, been neglected by the economist. But the facts that it describes 
and discovers, the experiments that it summarizes, are surely of 
negligible significance within economics. Of what possible concern to 
the economist is the conduct of Harvard students in gambling small sums on 
a crooked pin-ball machine? True, their conduct requires a cardinal 
measure for its summary. But this does not mean that any important aspect 
of consumer or entrepreneurial behaviour is thereby explained (Weldon, 
1953, p. 350, emphasis added). 
 
This is the transcript of a comment read at a meeting of the Econometric 
Society in the early fifties. The target is a paper reporting the results of some 
experiments on expected utility theory by the psychologist Warren Edwards 
(1953). It is most interesting that this is all Weldon had to say about Edward’s 
experiments: that laboratory experimentation of the kind done in those years by 
several economists and psychologists was useless for the sake of economic 
knowledge. Instead of engaging in a full historical reconstruction and discussion of 
the debate on parallelism, however, I shall first and foremost try to analyse the 
two terms of interest: What can ‘parallelism’ mean? And what kind of 
‘problem(s)’ can it raise? Mine will be a characteristic exercise in ‘explicating’ a 
concept which happens to be used in an inconsistent, unclear, and sometimes 
confused fashion by scientists.174 
 
The plan of the chapter is the following: in the first part I shall try to tackle the 
above questions from a purely conceptual point of view, and formulate a number 
of different theses about parallelism. Whenever possible, I shall relate my abstract 
discussion to what the economists actually engaged in the debate on parallelism 
have said about it, and try to fit their claims into the categories I have proposed. 
Section 4.2 contains a preliminary discussion of this issue; section 4.3 reviews 
some metaphysical versions, and section 4.4 some methodological versions of 
parallelism. At the end of section 4.4 I shall identify - in the requirements of 
theory-completion and domain unrestrictedness of theories - a crucial principle 
invoked in order to justify most versions of parallelism (both metaphysical and 
                                                 
174A classical discussion of the methodology of ‘explicating’ can be found in Carnap (1950, 
pp. 5-6). 
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methodological). The last part of the chapter is devoted to criticism and 
application of the categories thus identified. In section 4.5 I shall argue that these 
requirements are too strong, and thus conclude (in section 4.6) that only an 
empirical version of parallelism is acceptable. The case of preference reversals 
will be re-examined in section 4.7 to show how in practice parallelism claims can 
be tested empirically. Section 4.8 contains a discussion of the preference 
reversals case in the light of the thesis of empirical parallelism, and section 4.9 
states sharply the main conclusions of the whole analysis. 
 
4.2. The relation of parallelism: preliminary discussion 
 
The problem I am concerned with in this chapter can be summarised as follows: 
What is the bearing of experimental results (concerning, e.g., the truth of some 
economic generalisation, the existence of some phenomenon, or the measurement 
of some parameter) on claims concerning some real-world market? The issue, 
then, is the value of studying a set of objects (experimental markets or individual 
laboratory behaviour) to collect knowledge about another set of objects (real 
markets or individual behaviour outside the laboratory). The very use of the word 
‘parallelism’, however, suggests that economists have often framed the issue in 
terms of a relation of some sort (a relation of ‘parallelism’) between the two sets 
of entities themselves.175 This approach is not entirely satisfactory, and in the 
following sections (especially from section 4 onwards) I shall shift progressively 
towards formulations that reflect the former way of putting it (i.e. in terms of the 
relevance of experimental findings to economic generalisations).176 For the time 
being, let me take as a starting point for my discussion an admittedly vague, and 
philosophically defective, definition of parallelism: 
 
[P1] Phenomena observed in the laboratory are similar (in some relevant 
respect to be identified more precisely) to phenomena in the real world. 
 
The word ‘parallelism’ itself evokes some kind of relationship between two 
groups of objects. The above formulation thus provides a preliminary answer to 
three questions that arise naturally: What are the objects claimed to be ‘parallel’? 
And given that the word ‘parallelism’ is clearly used metaphorically, What is the 
actual relation holding between them? And finally, Why is such a relation relevant, 
interesting, or problematic? 
                                                 
175But not always: see Smith’s quote in footnote 171 below. 
176I owe this point to Dan Hausman, who made the distinction between the two 
perspectives clear to me. 
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The first question (What are the relata?) is surely the easiest one to answer: 
the terms of the parallelism relationship are, on the one hand, laboratory 
economies, and, on the other, ‘real-world’ economies.177 What kind of relation 
is a parallelism relation, then?  Surely, a laboratory and a ‘real-world’ system 
cannot be identical: they differ in their spatio-temporal coordinates, at the very 
least. Parallelism is rather a relation of similarity between real and laboratory 
economies: a laboratory phenomenon may or may not have a ‘parallel’ one (its 
real-world counterpart) in a real economy, and conversely. Relations of similarity 
can be of many sorts, however. There can be ‘commonsense’ similarity (in both 
cases real people are engaged in prima facie similar activities like bargaining, 
bidding, or betting); similarity from the point of view of theory (the two economies 
share all or at least the most important observable characteristics that economic 
theory deems essential for a social system to be considered an economy); and 
structural, ‘deep’ similarity (the same causal principles are at work in both kinds 
of system). Finally, Why is such a relation relevant, interesting, or 
problematic? In order to understand why, we need first to examine various 
possible interpretations of the parallelism relation. The answer to the last question, 
in other words, varies with the answer to the second one. In the next section I 
shall start investigating these issues, by identifying and then discussing various 
versions of parallelism. 
 
4.3. Metaphysical versions of parallelism 
 
I shall begin by presenting some positive statements about parallelism, vaguely 
defined for the time being as a similarity relation of some sort (as in the previous 
section). Let me first introduce a distinction between ‘nomic’ and ‘exhibited’ 
parallelism. Parallelism is said to be exhibited when the behaviours of a 
laboratory and of a real-world system are both determined by the same causal 
mechanism or structure. There may be a mere token difference (such as the 
difference between my bike and yours), or a difference in scale (such as the 
                                                 
177The word ‘real’ has been put between scare-quotes because, as I have already argued in 
the introduction to this chapter, such a terminology is not only imprecise, but also 
misleading. It suggests that the (‘artificial’) systems studied by economists in the laboratory 
are not as ‘genuine’, as ‘good’ as those (the ‘real’ ones) outside the laboratory. But of 
course laboratory economies are just as real as any other economy. ‘Natural’ would not do 
the job either: ‘real’ economies are a human product just as much as experimental, ‘artificial’, 
ones. It should perhaps be better to speak of ‘historically evolved’ economic systems. This 
is the true contrast-class: those systems that were already ‘there’ before experimenters built 
their laboratory systems. I shall nonetheless go on speaking of ‘real-world’ versus 
laboratory economies for reasons of simplicity. 
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difference between a professional’s and a kid’s bicycle), but the structure must be 
the same. Nomic parallelism asserts that the components of two systems obey the 
same causal laws or principles, but does not require structural similarity. Two 
wire-spoked wheels, a tubular metal frame, a saddle-like seat, handlebars, etc. 
do not necessarily make a bicycle - it depends on the way they are put together. 
For an economic equivalent, take the case of monetary payoffs: even granting that 
laboratory subjects were rational maximisers, for example, it does not follow that 
they will behave like real economic (i.e., typically, self-regarding) agents; one has 
to ensure that monetary payoffs are sufficiently high to render all other motives 
(other-regarding behaviour, for instance) irrelevant. Exhibited parallelism implies 
nomic parallelism, but not the other way around. Nomic parallelism implies only 
some counterfactual claims about exhibited parallelism: ‘If it were the case that a 
laboratory system was arranged in such and such a way, then it would behave just 
like that real-world economy’ - but this arrangement may never hold.178 
 
In order to justify nomic parallelism, one can appeal to a doctrine about the 
‘uniformity of nature’. In economics, such a doctrine may take the form of a claim 
that human beings act according to the same principles and motivations inside as 
well as outside the laboratory. This does not mean, of course, that every 
observed laboratory phenomenon has its real-world counterpart: the conditions 
inside and outside the laboratory may differ enough to lead (sometimes, often, or 
even always) to different results. The idea is rather that when this is the case the 
difference can be explicated in terms of laws and principles that are valid in both 
domains. From the doctrine of the uniformity of nature there follows only that 
 
[P2.1] Parallelism is exhibited whenever the same causally relevant 
conditions and the same causal laws hold. 
 
This principle recalls the old metaphysical dictum ‘Same cause - same effect’. 
Should (whatever the true law says are) the relevant conditions repeat themselves 
exactly twice, the same events (or probability distribution over possible events) 
                                                 
178The distinction between nomic and exhibited parallelism is implicit (but not made clear) in 
Smith’s account. As for the nomic version, see Smith’s original formulation of the ‘precept 
of parallelism’ (a ‘precept’ being one of “a proposed set of sufficient conditions for a valid 
controlled microeconomic experiment” (Smith, 1982, p. 261)): 
“Parallelism: propositions about the behaviour of individuals and the performance of 
institutions that have been tested in laboratory microeconomies apply also to nonlaboratory 
microeconomies where similar ceteris paribus conditions hold” (1982, p. 267). 
Smith adds that even taking the above thesis for granted, “Which kinds of behaviour 
exhibit parallelism and which not can only be determined empirically by comparison 
studies” (1982, p. 267, my italics). 
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will follow.179 The intuitive idea is that the behaviour of a certain economic system 
is determined by a subset of its own properties and of the properties of the 
surrounding environment only. Other characteristics are not causally efficient in 
determining what will happen. If we call the causally efficient properties ‘nomic’, 
we obtain a first sense in which the parallelism relation can be seen as a relation of 
‘nomic similarity’ between systems. The problem of determining which properties 
are nomic and which not is of course open (we do not know the true laws of 
most, perhaps all, systems), but it is an epistemic problem we can shelve for the 
time being. We shall see later that experimenters have an answer to this question, 
and that economic theory is supposed to play a crucial role in identifying (albeit 
imperfectly) the nomic properties of economic systems. 
 
Who subscribes to a metaphysical view of the parallelism relation? Vernon 
Smith refers indeed to the idea that “as far as we can tell, the same physical laws 
prevail everywhere” (1982, p. 267, my emphasis). It should be stressed, once 
more, that from the metaphysics of the uniformity of nature it does not follow that 
any parallelism will be actually exhibited. Laboratory and real-world systems may 
have the same dispositional properties without ever exhibiting similar causal 
structures. Suppose there is an inherent characteristic of economic laboratories 
invariably influencing the economic systems under study (a practically ineliminable 
experimenter’s effect, to take a fictional example): such systems may very well 
obey the same laws as a real-world economy (in that if the experimenter’s effect 
was eliminated, the same outcome would be exhibited), and yet never exhibit 
parallelism. The two economies may be, in other words, different machines (like a 
bicycle, a tandem and a tricycle) working according to the same general principles 
(those of mechanics). But the proviso (‘as far as we can tell...’) is even more 
important: the uniformity of nature thesis is supposed to be accepted as a 
conjecture, only until proof to the contrary has been put forward. This leads us to 
the fundamental problem with metaphysical doctrines. If we take metaphysics to 
be concerned with factual but not directly testable matters (as it is now customary 
to do, at least in the analytical tradition), for any metaphysical doctrine it should 
be possible to imagine another one incompatible with the former with the same 
(zero) direct empirical content. How can we choose between them? 
 
One answer is that metaphysics has to be ultimately assessed ‘empirically’. 
Although metaphysical doctrines cannot be tested directly, one can collect 
                                                 
179The amendment is needed to make indeterminism possible: ‘Same conditions - same 
probability distribution’. 
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indirect evidence about them. The idea that the state of the universe is strictly 
determined at any instant by some laws and by its configuration at the immediately 
preceding state (i.e. the doctrine of determinism), for example, can be indirectly 
assessed in the light of past scientific achievements, by checking to what extent 
scientists’ attempts at reducing every indeterministic explanation to a deterministic 
one have actually paid off. This is arguably the sense of that ‘as far as we can tell’ 
in Smith’s quote. But then, parallelism becomes (albeit indirectly) a factual 
statement to be accepted or rejected on the basis of empirical evidence. 
 
The second strategy consists in arguing that to endorse a certain metaphysics 
may be useful independently of its truthfulness. But one can think of examples of 
fruitful as well as of instances of misleading metaphysical doctrines. For instance, 
the Cartesian metaphysics of action at contact, however plausible, was an 
impediment to the acceptance of Newtonian mechanics, which later proved to be 
a much more progressive research programme. How can you tell a fruitful from a 
regressive metaphysics? The answer depends of course on the goals one is aiming 
at. We are entering here the realm of methodology, and leaving that of 
metaphysics. A metaphysical version of parallelism (as a positive statement) 
seems to lead eventually to either empirical or methodological versions, or both. 
I shall postpone the discussion of an empirical assessment of parallelism until the 
end of the chapter; in the next section I shall discuss normative, methodological 
versions of parallelism. 
 
4.4. Methodological versions of parallelism 
 
Let me return to the basic idea of nomic parallelism: an experimental and a non-
experimental system are nomically parallel if and only if they feature the same 
dispositional properties, or obey the same counterfactual laws - ‘if it were the 
case that economic system ξ was arranged in such and such a way, then it would 
display the property P’, where ξ is supposed to vary over the set of all laboratory 
and non-laboratory systems. Of course we are faced with the problem of 
discovering and establishing valid claims of this sort. 
 
A set of methodological rules similar to those proposed in other sciences has 
been put forward by experimentalists for this purpose. As I shall try to show, such 
rules often presuppose some form of nomic parallelism without directly arguing 
for it, and therefore I shall discuss them under a different heading, as 
‘methodological’ versions of parallelism. These forms of parallelism are 
‘methodological’ in character because they usually appear in methodological 
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arguments. The idea is that ‘real-world’ and experimental systems should, for 
reasons having to do with the advancement of science, be treated on a par. Take 
for instance the rule stating that 
 
[P3.1] Every counterexample obtained in testing a theory in the laboratory 
justifies the rejection of that theory. 
 
In this case, experimental falsifications are said to be ‘methodologically’ 
justified. An experimental counterexample will tell us that the proposition under 
test is not generally valid, and this constitutes a good enough reason to reject it. 
Such a falsificationist version of parallelism is indeed often justified by appealing to 
a methodological requirement of generality and universality imposed on scientific 
theories. From the claim that good scientific theories should be general and 
universal in scope and applicability, it follows that they should be able to explain 
behaviour outside as well as inside the laboratory. The experimental economist 
Charles Plott says explicitly that “[economic] models are general models involving 
basic principles intended to have applicability independent of time and location” 
(Plott, 1991, p. 905).180 In other words: 
 
[P3.1.1] Every negative result obtained in testing a theory in the laboratory 
informs us that the theories under test are not generally valid. 
 
The above reasoning vindicates the relevance of a negative experimental result 
independently of its actual instantiation outside the laboratory. Such a simple 
falsificationist argument should be distinguished from another one adding to the 
evidence of laboratory falsification the prediction that the anomaly will (probably) 
occur in the real world (and thus parallelism will be actually exhibited, to adopt 
the terminology of the previous section). It is an inductive argument from failure in 
simple cases to failure in complex ones: in the simple case (the laboratory) the 
outcome phenomenon results from the interaction of a number of factors, let us 
call them X1,...,Xn. In the complex case (the ‘real world’) the outcome results 
from the interaction of m > n factors X1,...,Xn,...,Xm. It may be the case that the 
claim 
                                                 
180Plott adds: “A staggeringly large number of theories exist. One purpose of the laboratory 
is to reduce the number by determining which do not work in the simple cases. The purpose 
is also to improve the models by exploring how a model might be changed to make it work 
better in the simple cases. General models, such as those applied to the very complicated 
economies found in the wild, must apply to simple special cases. Models that do not apply 
to the simple special cases are not general and thus cannot be viewed as such” (1991, p. 
905). 
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(1)      ‘For all systems in L, if it were the case that X1*,...,Xn* then it would be 
the case that Y*’ 
 
is false (L is the set of laboratory economies in which only X1,...,Xn are active, 
Xi* is a particular value of a variable Xi), whereas the claim 
 
(2)       ‘For all systems in W, if it were the case that X1*,...,Xn* then it would be 
the case that Y*’ 
 
turns out to be true (W is the set of ‘real world’ economies in which m factors are 
at work), because the ‘extra’ factors Xn+1,..., Xm have the effect (jointly with 
X1,...,Xn) of determining the value of Y. According to the argument I am referring 
to, such a circumstance is extremely unlikely: given that (ex hypothesis) the 
theory under test models only n factors, unless it captures correctly the 
dependence of Y on X1,...,Xn in L, it will hardly be able to capture its dependence 
on X1,...,Xn,...,Xm - or, indeed, on X1,...,Xn in W.181 
 
[P3.1.2] Every negative result obtained in testing a theory in the laboratory 
identifies an anomalous phenomenon that is likely to arise in non-laboratory 
environments too. 
 
The reasoning behind such a claim (let us call it the ‘argument from the 
method of analysis-synthesis’: science should proceed by first formulating the 
                                                 
181Cf. Graham Loomes’ statement: “if one or more of the fundamental axioms of expected 
utility theory fail under such [i.e. laboratory] apparently favourable conditions, there are 
surely grounds for questioning the power of the model as a general theory of individual 
decision-making under risk and uncertainty. If the basic axioms are substantially and 
systematically violated in these simple cases, how confident can we be about their validity 
in more complex cases?” (Loomes, 1989, p. 173). 
Luis Wilde uses the same argument: “if an experiment  includes all parameters relevant to a 
particular theory, and if the theory fails to predict well in the simplified setting of the 
laboratory, then it cannot be expected to predict well in more complex environments. [...] The 
experiment does not need to be ‘realistic’ and no presumptions need be made about its 
connection to more complex (‘real-world’) environments [in order to use laboratory 
experiments to reject some theories as nonsense]” (Wilde, 1980, p. 143). 
Finally, John Hey’s conception of laboratory experimentation as a way of performing a 
preliminary selection of theories seems to rely on a similar line of reasoning. According to 
Hey, experimental economics allows one to treat separately two crucial but distinct issues, 
namely 
“1. that the theory is correct given the appropriate specification (that is, under the given 
conditions); 2. that the theory survives the transition from the world of the theory to the real 
world” (Hey, 1991, p. 10). A theory failing at stage 1, according to Hey, should not be 
allowed to enter stage 2 of testing. 
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laws of a few causal factors acting in isolation, and then by finding out about how 
they interact182) could be used to answer Charles Plott’s ‘problem of 
parallelism’, i.e.: 
 
What use are experimental results to someone who is interested in 
something vastly larger and more complicated, perhaps fundamentally 
different than anything that can be studied in a laboratory setting? (Plott, 
1987, p. 193).183 
 
The argument from unrestrictedness and the argument from the method of 
analysis-synthesis, eventually, point to the same conclusion: if a theory fails in the 
laboratory, too bad for the theory; a theory falsified in the laboratory should be 
abandoned - or at least modified, i.e. abandoned in its present form. Laboratory 
experiments are surely relevant, because theories are supposed to be general and 
must apply to the laboratory as well as to the field. 
 
A statement symmetrical to [P3.1] asserts that 
 
[P3.2] Every positive result obtained in the laboratory supports the theory 
under test. 
 
An attempted rationale for such a claim can, once again, be found in Vernon 
Smith’s writings. According to Smith (1982), if a theory modelling the 
dependence of an effect on n variables has survived the test in a laboratory 
environment where those n factors (and no other) are at work, it should be taken 
as valid wherever those (and no other) factors are at work (by metaphysical 
stipulation - see nomic parallelism above). If other factors not modelled in the 
theory (and therefore not controlled by the experimenter) are at work in the real-
world systems the theory is supposed to explain, then the problem lies with the 
theory, not with the experiment.184 
                                                 
182Cf. Mill (1836) and Pareto (1907) for a presentation and defence of such a heuristic 
procedure in economics. 
183The way the question is posed (by asking ‘what use...’), as well as Plott’s subsequent 
discussion, suggest that his problem is not just epistemic, but more in general pragmatic. I 
shall here focus on the problem of epistemic validity only. 
184“If [an experiment’s] purpose is to test a theory, then it is legitimate to ask whether the 
elements of alleged ‘unrealism’ in the experiment are parameters in the theory. If they are not 
parameters of the theory, then the criticism of ‘unrealism’ applies equally to the theory and 
the experiment. If there are field data to support the criticism, then of course it is important to 
[modify] the theory to include the phenomena in question, and this will affect the design of 
the relevant experiments” (Smith, 1982, p. 268). 
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First of all, such reasoning relies on the metaphysical thesis of nomic 
parallelism discussed in section 4.3. Recall the problem of identifying the 
‘structural’ properties that determine the behaviour of economic (laboratory and 
non-laboratory) systems. Economic theory can give us a helping hand here: the 
theory identifies some explanatory variables as crucial and their interdependence 
is tested in the laboratory where no other factor intervenes. If the theory works 
there, we have no (theoretical) reason to believe that it should not work in the real 
world. If it does not work, we have no (theoretical) reason to believe that it 
should. The argument is directed against those who resist any (positive or 
negative) inference from the laboratory to the real world. If there are any reasons 
suggesting that the theory may be applicable in the real world while failing in the 
laboratory (or vice versa), then such reasons must be rendered explicit by 
modeling them into the theory. According to the metaphysics of nomic parallelism, 
an experimental result may be generalised to any situation in which the same 
ceteris paribus conditions hold: a theory failing in the laboratory and working in 
the real world (or vice versa) has ill-defined ceteris paribus conditions.185 
Smith’s argument works by appealing to a precise methodological standard: let us 
call it the requirement of ‘theory-completion’ (or simply ‘completion’, for short). 
As I shall argue in the next section, completion is strictly related to the 
requirement of generality or unrestrictedness imposed on scientific theories. I shall 
try to criticise both of them in section 4.5 below. 
 
It should be noticed at this stage that the distinction between metaphysical and 
methodological (by completion, unrestrictedness, etc.) versions of parallelism is 
not a clear-cut one. What kind of rationale lies behind, e.g., the requirement of 
generality imposed on economic theories? If theories are supposed to capture the 
true form of social laws, does the generality requirement not after all depend on a 
factual matter concerning directly unobservable features of the social world (that 
is, on how economic laws really are)? In other words, the metaphysical claim that 
the laws governing social phenomena are indeed general in scope, unrestricted in 
applicability and cover all events (or that causally efficient properties are few in 
number and common to all individuals) seems to constitute an obvious rationale 
for the requirements of universality and generality imposed on economic theories, 
                                                 
185 Some experimentalists go as far as to say that to shift the focus from real economies to 
theoretical models was the greatest innovation of experimental economics, and that an 
experiment “should be judged by the lessons it teaches about the theory and not by its 
similarity with what nature might have happened to have created” (Plott, 1991, p. 906). 
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and (a fortiori) for the methodological versions of parallelism [P3.1] and [P3.2]. 
We seem to be caught in a circular pattern of reasoning. 
 
Let us then try to state a purely methodological parallelism thesis. A 
parallelism claim is truly methodological in character only if it is not a claim about 
how the social world is. It should rather start from the assumption that 
 
[P3] It is methodologically appropriate to act on the belief that parallelism 
holds. 
 
Let us take [P3] as the underlying, general presupposition common to all 
methodological versions of parallelism. Acting as if parallelism held is useful if it is 
functional to achieving the goals of economic theorising or to fulfil the standards of 
science. In this section I have introduced some arguments which aim at justifying 
parallelism claims by appealing to standards such as unrestrictedness (generality) 
or completion. In the next section I shall discuss these requirements, to conclude 
that they stand on slippery ground. 
 
4.5. A methodological detour 
 
In order to criticise claims of methodological parallelism, it will be necessary to 
take a philosophical detour into the problem of how to interpret economic 
generalisations. The present section is self-sufficient and may be skipped without 
affecting the general argument. The conclusion will be that the incomplete, 
restricted generalisations of economics may not always be transformable into 
complete, general and unrestricted ones, and this undermines the requirements of 
completion and unrestrictedness. 
 
Let us assume for the moment that scientific laws are appropriately 
represented as claims supporting counterfactuals in ‘If...then...’ form. The 
antecedents of such sentences represent the so-called ‘initial conditions’, a list of 
factors and circumstances causally relevant for the occurrence of the phenomenon 
of interest, which is described in the consequent. A nomic conditional can be 
either true or false, tertium non datur. With respect to a given particular situation 
or system, however, a law-like generalisation186 is either (a) verified, (b) falsifed, 
or (c) vacuously instantiated - depending on whether (a) both the initial conditions 
                                                 
186I.e. a statement fulfilling all the requirements imposed on genuine laws except that of 
being true - a tentatively proposed candidate for a law of nature. 
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and the consequence are instantiated, (b) the initial conditions hold but the 
consequence does not, (c) the initial conditions are not satisfied. Were scientific 
generalisations formulated so as to include an explicit, complete list of factors and 
circumstances considered sufficient for the occurrence of the consequence, there 
would be no problem in discriminating between cases (a), (b) and (c). 
Unfortunately, scientists usually do not (because they don’t know how to) 
exhaustively spell out the conditions for a certain relationship to hold. They rather 
behave in an ‘opportunistic’ manner, so that their nomic claims are better 
characterised as incomplete generalisations including ceteris paribus clauses in 
their antecedents, which are meant to capture unknown disturbances and 
‘background’ conditions. These, together with the explicit initial conditions, are 
supposed to provide a set of jointly sufficient  conditions for the consequent to 
hold, and thus at the same time give deductive closure to explanations and 
predictions from the generalisations.187 
 
Given what just said, it is conceivable that some relationship (say, y = 
f(x1,...,xn)) working well in its intended domain be found not to hold in other 
contiguous domains (and vice-versa).188 The fact that 
 
(3)     ‘If it were the case that X1*,...,Xn* then it would be the case that Y*’, 
 
‘naively’ formulated without ceteris paribus clause, is found to be false in a 
domain D1, may simply mean that Y requires other (unspecified) circumstances 
above X1,...Xn to hold for it to be instantiated. Thus, the modified claim 
 
(3’)     ‘In D2, if it were the case that X1*,...,Xn* then it would be the case that 
Y*’ 
 
may be true, if 
 
(3’’)    ‘Ceteris paribus, if it were the case that X1*,...,Xn* then it would be the 
case that Y*’ 
                                                 
187 All I have said so far can be rephrased in terms of other accounts of scientific 
theorising. In the next chapter I shall rely on the so-called ‘Semantic View’ of theories to 
state a different point. In the semantic framework, at any rate, the problem of specifying the 
sufficient conditions of applicability of a certain model arises in formulating the so-called 
‘theoretical hypothesis’ (e.g. ‘Every physical system is isomorphic to some model of 
classical mechanics’ - see next chapter for further details).  
188To simplify, one can identify the intended domain of economic theory with real world 
economies, and the contiguous domain with laboratory economies; but the intended domain 
may well overlap with the laboratory - it depends, of course, on what economists ‘intend’. 
 146 
 
 
is true, and the circumstances covered by the ceteris paribus clause are generally 
instantiated in D2. It would not be wise, then, always to generalise from a failure in 
the laboratory to a failure in the field, in the absence of further evidence 
supporting this move. In a subsequent section I shall also provide an example of 
what the practical implications of this standpoint are, by focusing on a real 
controversial case of experimentation - the case of preference reversals already 
examined at length in the last chapter. 
 
4.5.1 Restricted, incomplete laws and growth-of-content methodologies 
 
The first rationale for methodological parallelism presented in section 4.4 was that 
only truly unrestricted (general) scientific theories should be deemed acceptable, 
and those failing in the laboratory clearly do not fulfil these requirements. The idea 
that genuine scientific laws are true generalisations of unlimited scope and 
applicability is part of some of the best philosophies of science of this century. It 
informs most reductionistic programmes, accounts of explanation such as 
Hempel’s (1965) covering-law model, normative methodologies such as 
Popper’s (1934/1959) falsificationism, and is part of the intuitive interpretation of 
our best scientific exemplars. Scientific theories do not have a domain of 
application written explicitly in their equations; yet, we know that classical 
mechanics and electromagnetic theory were supposed to hold for all physical 
bodies in the universe. Similarly, quantum mechanics aims at describing all 
particles irrespective of location and time and the same applies to general relativity 
for macro-objects. Of course, not all theories are ‘theories of everything’, but the 
latter have played for a long time the role of ‘exemplars’ of scientific excellence, 
which all other theories are supposed to imitate. The great successes of science 
have often been identified with a progressive explanatory unification of 
phenomena which had previously appeared heterogeneous (like electricity, 
magnetism and light) under the ‘umbrella’ of some theory (like the theory of 
elecromagnetism) of greater domain of application than each of its predecessors. 
Thus, ‘growth of content’ has been an important presupposition of philosophy of 
science: science progresses by reducing the number of theories and extending 
their content.189 
 
                                                 
189Cf. also Friedman (1974) and Kitcher (1981) for an illustration and defence of such a view 
in the context of the debate on ‘scientific explanation’. 
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The so-called ‘special sciences’, however, seem to be at odds with the 
growth-of-content picture. A special science is a discipline concerned with the 
explanation of a certain specific realm of phenomena, usually at a non-
fundamental level of analysis.190 According to a popular picture of the hierarchy 
of the sciences, physics stands as the most fundamental discipline concerned with 
the explanation of the basic structure of the world. Chemistry, biology, 
psychology, and the social sciences are all branches of the tree, concerned with 
explaining phenomena supervening on the physical ones. The special sciences 
make use of nomic relationships that do not hold always and everywhere. General 
equilibrium theory does not describe how bargaining between two people (‘pure 
bargaining’, in economists’ jargon) takes place, nor is the primary aim of 
consumers’ theory to account for human behaviour in a mental hospital. Very few, 
if any, theories in the special sciences like economics can stand up to unlimited-
scope standards.191 In the best cases, they seem to describe some relationships 
holding in isolation from disturbances, when certain background conditions hold 
or, in other words, in a limited domain of application.192 
 
This point can be formulated in terms of clauses and provisos capturing the 
influence of hidden factors and background conditions. Take a generic 
relationship such as 
 
(4)    y = f(x1, x2). 
 
By interpreting it as a ceteris paribus law, we are saying that there exist some 
so far hidden factors which allow the relationship to hold in a certain domain (i.e., 
where those factors are at work). We are saying, for instance, that 
 
(4*)    If x3 = a, x4 = b, and other relevant conditions hold, then 
 y = f(x1, x2). 
 
                                                 
190The present discussion relies mainly on Fodor’s (1974) account. 
191Of course there is a sense in which all scientific generalisations, when suitably 
formulated, have unlimited scope. Take a standard (and tedious) example as ‘All ravens are 
black’. If reformulated as ‘For all x, if x is a raven, then x is black’, the generalisation has 
unlimited scope - i.e. it is a generalisation about all entities x (be them ravens or not). But of 
course the generalisation is ‘vacuously verified’ by all non-ravens. In other words, it is non 
explanatory with respect to all entities that do not feature all the properties (like ‘being a 
raven’) denoted by the predicates in the antecedent. In this - much more interesting - sense, 
‘All ravens are black’ (like most generalisations in the special sciences) has a limited domain 
of application, and I shall stick to it in the rest of this chapter. 
192Jim Woodward (unpublished) defends such a view in detail. 
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Notice that whereas some relevant factors (x3 and x4) and the values they 
have to take (a and b) can normally be specified, others cannot. (4*) is thus, first 
of all, an incomplete relationship, because it does not specify in the right-hand 
side of the equation the sufficient conditions for the values assumed by the 
dependent variable y; and secondly, a restricted one, because it is applicable - if 
at all - only where those (partly unspecified) conditions are instantiated. 
 
Experimentalists eager to find support for their methodological parallelism 
claims could find in philosophers’ writings a number of arguments in favour of the 
requirements of completion and unrestrictedness. Some arguments move from the 
difficulty to test (falsify or confirm) incomplete laws. A once influential 
interpretation of statements such as (4*) was that they are not even candidates for 
scientific laws. According to Popper (1934/1959), for instance, the falsifiability of 
a statement is a necessary condition for its being scientifically acceptable, and 
vague ceteris paribus clauses render laws unfalsifiable. This interpretation of 
ceteris paribus laws has been very popular among methodologists of economics, 
who have endorsed it in various forms. According to Terence Hutchison (1938), 
the non-falsifiability of ceteris paribus claims downgrades them to mere analytical 
statements. Klappholz and Agassi (1959) argue more cogently that they should 
be interpreted as synthetic but in principle untestable statements, and Blaug 
(1980) criticises incomplete generalisations precisely on these grounds. Such 
arguments are however too strictly related to the requirement of falsifiability, and 
therefore fail in the light of the well known fact that no theory taken in isolation is 
strictly speaking falsifiable, if we take falsifiability in Popper’s logical sense.193 
 
The standard view concerning incomplete and restricted generalisations is that 
they should be taken as 'promises' for a true, complete and unrestricted 
explanation. They have the status of "potentially explanatory theories", as Hempel 
(1965, p. 447) once put it. The validity of an incomplete generalisation can be 
established only as long as you are able to progressively incorporate the hidden 
background conditions as explicit variables in the right-hand side of the equation. 
Then, and only then, are there grounds to believe that you have hit a ‘good’ 
relationship, a promising starting point from which to reconstruct the whole puzzle. 
Izabella Nowakowa (1994) has an account of ‘idealised’ (i.e., in our terminology, 
                                                 
193To my knowledge, J. Alberto Coffa was the first one to clarify these issues in his 
doctoral dissertation (1973). For a detailed (and similar to Coffa’s, but independently 
devised) account of the semantic and epistemic features of ceteris paribus laws, see 
Hausman (1989; 1992). The discussion on ceteris paribus and ‘idealised’ laws in physics 
has been revived in particular by Cartwright (1983). Hempel (1988) recognised some of the 
problems raised by the ubiquitous character of incomplete laws and vague clauses. 
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incomplete) laws which captures nicely such an intuition. You start with an 
unqualified generalisation like (4); in the light of anomalous evidence, you qualify it 
with something like (4*), partially completing it but restricting its domain of 
application; in an effort of generalisation you then find a new equation able to 
account for (4) and incorporating a new factor, say x3, which becomes a truly 
explanatory variable; and so on and on.194 
 
Notice that according to these accounts completion and the growth of 
empirical content are necessary, but surely not sufficient requirements imposed 
on new theories. Other restrictions may include the requirement that the theory be 
independently tested; that it predicts new facts and that these are corroborated at 
least now and then; that the new model is not obtained via ‘ad-hoc’ modification 
of the previous, falsified, one (whatever ‘ad hoc’ means - a highly debated 
question); that the new model is devised coherently with the ‘spirit’ of the 
research programme; that it is simple and elegant; that one sticks to economics’ 
typical language and level of analysis, and so on. Growth of content is then just 
one among many requirements, but nonetheless a very important one (perhaps 
the most important one), especially in the tradition stemming from Popper’s 
falsificationism. 
 
 Coherently with the Hempelian and the ‘growth of content’ tradition, a similar 
interpretation holds that ceteris paribus statements are to be accepted as genuine 
(albeit incomplete) laws only if they can be progressively expanded to incorporate 
the ‘hidden’ factors in the background.195 A relation like (4*) is a genuine ceteris 
paribus law, in other words, if it is in principle derivable from a genuine general 
and unrestricted law by assigning particular values to some of its variables. For 
instance, in the four-variables case introduced above, g(.) could be a general 
functional accounting for (4) and (4*) as special cases: 
 
(5)    y = g(x1, x2, x3, x4). 
 
 Such a view surely captures one of the most fundamental heuristic strategies 
adopted by scientists when dealing with counterexamples and anomalies. 
Philosophers of science have discussed a closely related idea under the label of 
                                                 
194Cf. also McMullin (1985) and Laymon (1985) for a similar view on the role of ‘successive 
approximations’ in justifying idealised laws. 
195Cf. Hausman (1989; 1992). Fodor (1991) calls it the ‘completer’ account of ceteris paribus 
laws: a ceteris paribus law is a true law if and only if there exist some hidden property 
which, if mentioned explicitely, could transform the ceteris paribus law into a true 
unrestricted generalisation. 
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the ‘correspondence principle’. According to the latter, a new theory should 
supersede an older one by explaining all its corroborated content plus some new 
facts the old theory could not account for.196 Such an identification of the growth 
of knowledge with the growth of theories' content does indeed justify 
unrestrictedness and completion requirements such as those advocated by 
economic experimentalists. It is doubtful, however, whether we should accept the 
growth-of-content picture of science as foundations for the methodology of a 
special science like economics.  As a matter of fact, the special sciences typically 
rely on relationships like (4) or, in the best cases, (4*), rarely being able to 'justify' 
them by means of anything like (5). 
 
More precisely, the question is whether we should take the derivability of 
incomplete generalisations from deeper relationships as a necessary condition for 
the acceptance of theories - rather than merely as a heuristically useful rule. The 
view according to which ‘growth of content’ is necessary for the growth of 
scientific knowledge goes back at least to Popper and to the Standard View. 
Hempel and Oppenheim (1948), in their famous paper on the character of 
scientific laws refer to Popper as a source of inspiration,197 and I shall therefore 
mainly focus on his account for expository purposes. The requirement of unlimited 
domain is in Popper’s philosophical framework an ideal. According to Popper, it 
is a necessary requirement of a superseding theory that its empirical content (the 
set of its potential falsifiers) exceeds the content of the superseded one. The 
content of a theory is a function of its degree of universality and its degree of 
precision. In particular, theoretical content increases with the level of universality: 
a theory or law T’ is ‘more universal’ than T if it is logically true that the 
antecedent of the nomic conditional T implies the antecedent of T’ (Popper, 
1934/1959, § 36).198 The scientist starting with a rather cautious hypothesis is 
                                                 
196Cf., e.g., Post (1971), Krajewski (1977), and Zahar (1983). Notice however that the 
correspondence principle is a very general precept: it says that a new theory supersedes by 
correspondence an older one if it is able to account for all the corroborated low-level 
empirical claims derivable from the latter, but it does not prescribe to keep the variables of 
the old theory in its equations. The new theory (unlike in Nowakowa’s account and in most 
accounts of ceteris paribus laws) may tell a completely new causal story. Moreover, we 
should appropriately speak of correspondence when one theory reduces to another in the 
limit: f (x1, x2 ) = lim
x3 →a
g(x1 , x2, x3 ) . The limit case is mathematically different from the case 
of a variable held fixed. 
197Cf. Hempel and Oppenheim (1948, p. 266, footnote 26). 
198Popper formalises the idea of degree of universality using relations of material 
implication (instead of counterfactual conditionals as in this chapter): suppose that T is ∀x 
(Fx → Gx), and T’ is ∀x (F’x → Gx) ; then T’ has a higher degree of universality than T if ∀x 
(F’x → Fx) holds. Moreover, T’’ is more precise than T if T’’ is ∀x (Fx → G’x), and ∀x (Gx 
→ G’x) holds. 
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forced by Popperian methodology to formulate theories with greater domain of 
application, approximating genuine unrestricted generalisations in the long run. 
 
The scientist, then, is not allowed to substitute an unrestricted generalisation 
with a generalisation of lower degree. Suppose we are dealing with a disturbing 
factor affecting the system under study, and that our best theories cannot explain 
it. We can distinguish two different strategies to take into account the impact of 
some disturbing factor on the theory’s predictions: a generalising strategy and a 
‘domain’ one.199 If we pursue the former, then we are looking for a new law 
covering the corroborated domain of the older theory (now ‘explained’ as a 
special case) plus the disturbing factor at hand. According to Popper 
(1934/1959) this is the right move: the scientist should look for a new theory 
explaining the incomplete, restricted law and the new factor. If we pursue a 
domain strategy, on the other hand, we simply circumscribe the domain of 
application of the theory by adding further specifications in the antecedent. 
Suppose T is ‘For all x, if Fx then Gx’; a domain strategy will replace T with T’, 
the latter being ‘For all x, if Fx and Mx then Gx’. According to Popper, such a 
move is an ‘ad hoc’ one, because the refuted theory is replaced by a theory with 
a narrower domain of application. The new T’ is a generalisation of lower degree, 
has a more limited domain of application than T, and a narrower class of potential 
falsifiers. It says what happens when an object has the property F and the 
property M, but does not pronounce on what happens when the object has the 
property F in general (with and without M). A new theory should be content-
increasing: it should widen the domain of application of its predecessors.200 
 
 Such a view is still quite popular. Alexander Rosenberg, for instance, 
supports it vigorously in his recent book Economics: Mathematical Politics or 
Science of Diminishing Returns? (1992, ch. 5). Rosenberg proposes a 
methodological requirement of ‘improvability’: a restricted and incomplete 
theory is acceptable only if it is improvable, that is, if it is possible to specify and 
add to it those (so far unspecified) factors that intervene to break the predicted 
                                                 
199The term ‘domain strategy’ is due to Musgrave (1981); cf. also Mongin (1988b). 
200 More about this, with examples, can be found in Popper (1957). Popper’s prescription of 
looking for higher generalisations is the methodological, explicitly normative, counterpart of 
Hempel’s interpretation of incomplete, ceteris paribus, idealised laws as statements 
deducible from more comprehensive and ‘fundamental’ nomic relations. Cf. e.g. Hempel 
(1965, pp. 83, 167, 345, 444 and 447). According to Herbert Feigl, “The aim of scientific 
explanation  throughout the ages has been unification, that is, the comprehending of a 
maximum of facts and regularities in terms of a minimum of theoretical concepts and 
assumptions” (1970, p. 12). The identification of progress with ‘continuous growth’ and 
‘excess of empirical content’ is characteristic also of Lakatos’ ‘Methodology of Scientific 
Research Programmes’ (1970). See also Kitcher (1981) for other quotes and examples. 
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regularities at stake.201 Since neoclassical economic theories do not seem to be 
very promising in terms of improvability, Rosenberg argues, they should be 
deemed unacceptable. Rosenberg’s argument, in simplified form, proceeds in 
three steps. The first is a rejection of the behaviourist interpretation of rational 
choice theory,202 a step which will not be discussed here. From this, Rosenberg 
argues to the necessity of endorsing a psychologistic interpretation of choice 
theory, where ‘preferences’, ‘expectations’, etc. refer to mental states of 
individual human beings. Finally, he presents Alan Nelson’s (1986) 
‘psychoeconomics’ as the best attempt to save microeconomics as an empirical 
and improvable scientific theory. Once the target has been set, he hits it by 
showing that ‘psychoeconomics’ is doomed to failure. 
 
I shall not go into the details of the argument.203 For our purposes, it is 
sufficient to notice that it is clearly built on a growth of content criterion: an 
incomplete law is acceptable only if transformable into a true unrestricted 
generalistion. Most economic practice, as Rosenberg argues, does not stand up 
to such standards. Reasoning of this sort, however, may in contrast lead us to 
think that completion or growth of content standards are inadequate to the special 
sciences, rather than the other way around. We shall see below that persuasive 
arguments can be put forward in support of a much weaker interpretation of such 
standards. The distinction suggested will be similar to Lakatos’ (1970) distinction 
between methodology and heuristics, or to the Popper-Reichenbach distinction 
between the context of discovery and the context of justification. Whereas 
heuristic rules are context-dependent and relative to the problem-situation at 
                                                 
201The requirement of ‘improvability’ is taken from Hausman (1992), but with a twist. 
Hausman’s position on the importance of growth-of-content requirements is ambiguous, 
and I do not have the space to comment on it here. 
202The ‘revealed preferences’ interpretation according to which preferences are to be taken 
as patterns of observed choices. 
203Here is a summary: Nelson’s proposal is based on an analogy between economics and 
linguistics. Rational choice theory would stand to the theory of the ideal speaker as a more 
realistic theory of behaviour would stand to theories of actual linguistic performance. The 
role of the realistic theory is to provide an explanation of how actual behaviour emerges 
from the combination of the agent’s ideal capacities with other factors which impede their 
full instantiation in the real world. Rosenberg sees two major problems in such an approach. 
First, “the list of [interfering] factors is so long, so heterogeneous, and so unsystematizable, 
that the competence/performance distinction is doomed to purely academic interest in the 
case of economics” (1992, p. 140). Secondly, beliefs and desires, as mental states in general, 
are intensional, the human mind being a holistic system. Factors “cannot simply be divided 
up and counted out. What we believe and desire is a whole not uniquely divisible into 
discrete parts. Thus the mind is inaccessible to a simple theory of rational choice 
competence” (1992, p. 147). The conclusions drawn by Rosenberg are not to the falsity of 
the psychological microfoundations of economic theory, but rather to the implausibility that 
an ‘acceptable’ scientific theory can ever be built on those shaky grounds (Rosenberg, 
1992, p. 151). 
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hand, Methodology (capital ‘M’) is supposed to provide universally valid 
principles for appraising scientific practices and results.204 When proposing their 
methodological interpretation of parallelism, I take it, experimentalists are putting 
forward principles of the latter kind. Only such universally valid principles would 
in fact be able to provide laboratory results with a priori validity. My proposal 
will be that parallelism claims be ‘downgraded’ to contingent principles, the 
validity of which is dependent on factual matters and sometimes even on the 
particular problem-situation at hands. 
 
4.5.2 Problems with completion and growth-of-content requirements 
 
Let us now see why the claim that the special sciences must provide complete 
theories with an unlimited domain of application should be rejected. Surely, more 
fundamental, ‘deeper’ laws encompassing earlier ones as special cases and 
extending the domain of application of the theory are better than less fundamental, 
‘shallow’ ones. And surely a complete specification of all the sufficient conditions 
for the occurrence of an event is desirable. The point to be raised here, however, 
is whether we should assign to principles such as unrestrictedness and completion 
the status of methodological rules in the sense specified above. It is reasonable to 
look for increasing generality; but should we take it as a necessary condition for 
the growth of scientific knowledge? 
 
A first reason to be sceptical of this proposal is pragmatic. As far as we know, 
the number of exceptions and background conditions may simply be too great for 
us to take them all into account (argument from the variety of the social world). 
Moreover, there are reasons to doubt that the deeper laws encompassing 
economics’ restricted generalisations are expressible in the language of economics 
(argument from intrinsic linguistic limitations). One may have to shift to a different, 
much more complicated level of analysis in order to find deeper laws. In an often-
quoted passage, Jerry Fodor makes such a feature a distinguishing characteristic 
of the special sciences: 
 
Exceptions to the generalisations of a special science are typically 
inexplicable from the point of view of (that is, in the vocabulary of) that 
science. That’s one of the things that makes it a special science (Fodor, 
1987, p. 6). 
 
                                                 
204For a clear statement of such a distinction, cf. Worrall (1988). 
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Special science laws are unstrict not just de facto, but in principle. 
Specifically, they are characteristically ‘heteronomic’: You can’t convert 
them into strict laws by elaborating their antecedents. One reason why this 
is so is that special science laws typically fail in limiting conditions, or in 
conditions where the idealisations presupposed by the science aren’t 
approximated; and, generally speaking, you have to go outside the 
vocabulary of the science to say what these conditions are (Fodor, 1989, 
p. 78). 
 
To pursue a complete enumeration of the conditions captured by a ceteris 
paribus clause would force scientists to go outside their favoured realm of 
phenomena and level of analysis. The neoclassical economist for example would 
have to abandon his models of rational economic players and engage in a much 
deeper analysis of human psychology. The laws of psychology being ceteris 
paribus in character, in order to extend their domain one would have to move 
one further step down the ladder of microfoundations, to e.g. neurophysiology. 
Eventually, according to the ideal reductionistic picture, all the laws of the special 
sciences would find their justification in the generalisations of physics.  
 
[I]t may [...] be perfectly possible to explain the exceptions [of a special 
science] in the vocabulary of some other science. In the most familiar 
case, you go ‘down’ one or more levels and use the vocabulary of a more 
‘basic’ science [...]. The availability of this strategy is one of the things that 
the hierarchical arrangement of our sciences buys for us (Fodor, 1987, p. 
6).205 
 
The feasibility of a reduction of economics to psychology and of the latter to 
physics cannot be ruled out in principle, but some empirical evidence must be put 
forward before we accept reductionism as the basis for our methodology. Special 
sciences such as economics exist precisely because it would not be practical to 
try explaining right from the start the phenomena falling in their intended domain in 
terms of more fundamental laws such as those of psychology or even physics (if 
they exist at all, of course). But if the criterion for scientificity is growth of content, 
then “the only real science is basic physics. For it simply isn’t true that we can, 
even in principle, specify the conditions under which - say - geological 
                                                 
205See also Kincaid (1990) for arguments of these sort, with particular reference to the social 
sciences. 
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generalisations hold so long as we stick to the vocabulary of geology” (Fodor, 
1987, p. 5).206 
 
To conclude, let me recapitulate what just said. I have not tried to argue that it 
is wrong to look for a more general or deeper version of a theory suffering from 
anomalies - a version able to explain the confirmed consequences of the previous 
theory plus at least some of the anomalies. It would be great if we could do that 
all the time. The correct attitude is surely to look for more content when possible, 
and rely on other criteria in order to assess theories or research programmes that 
score badly in terms of growth. Neither I have claimed that to look for more 
general or deeper accounts is hopeless.207 The position defended in this section is 
a much more pragmatic one: it starts from the recognition that the special sciences 
are concerned with generalisations at a non-fundamental level of analysis, and 
suggests that imposing any requirement (necessary condition) of continuous 
growth is not sensible. That would be equivalent to committing oneself to the 
reducibility of all sciences to a unique fundamental theory. To ask when and 
where a theory can be applied is a very important question, but in order to do this 
we may need help from other sciences. It is even more important if, as in the case 
of economics, the intended domain of the theory is very ambitious indeed: the set 
of all phenomena having to do with the pursue and exchange of goods. 
 
I engaged in such a long argument because experimentalists often rely on 
considerations taken from ‘growth-of-content’ philosophies in order to justify 
                                                 
206Giving up the hope of completion raises automatically the problem of what economic 
generalisations say, after all. According to the standard view, they are ‘promises’ for a true, 
complete explanation of economic phenomena. One alternative solution is to argue, as John 
Stuart Mill and more recently Cartwright (1989) and Hausman (1992) do, that the 
independent variables in economic equations denote factors providing a partial causal 
explanation of how economic phenomena are brought about. Such causal factors act as 
‘tendencies’ or ‘capacities’, providing a constant contribution to the production of the 
phenomenon denoted by the dependent variable across all circumstances - no matter what 
the background conditions are. The fact that in practice we might never be able to give a 
complete account of the ‘other things’ affecting the outcome does not affect the appeal of 
such a metaphysics in principle. Alternatively, one can argue (as Cartwright does in 1983 
and in her more recent writings) that the models accurately describe what happens literally 
only when no other factors intervene. 
207That would be the right conclusion if it was the case that the world was after all not 
governed by a small set of general principles at a very fundamental level. Arguments 
supporting this metaphysical view have been put forward by Patrick Suppes (1984), John 
Dupré (1993) and Nancy Cartwright (1994), who have argued that the universe is much more 
‘disordered’ than scientists tend to assume. According to Cartwright’s ‘metaphysical 
nomological pluralism’, for example, “nature is governed in different domains by different 
systems of laws not necessarily related to each other in any systematic or uniform way: by a 
patchwork of laws” (Cartwright, 1994, pp. 288-289). It is not my purpose here to discuss 
such a position. Pragmatic considerations such as those presented above suffice to reject 
the claims I was concerned with in the first place. 
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their parallelism claims. But if what said above is true, the standards advocated by 
these experimentalists would be not only irrealistic (pushing us to throw 
knowledge of the most useful sort in the bin) but misleading: growth of knowledge 
should not be necessarily equated with growth of theoretical content. The 
falsificationist parallelism standpoint [P3.1], for example, gives advice of the 
following sort: look for generalisations holding outside as well as inside the 
laboratory; test them in the laboratory; reject them if they are falsified there. But 
what if they did hold outside the laboratory (where they were supposed to hold in 
the first place)? 
 
4.6. Empirical versions of parallelism (I) 
 
Economists are surely keen both on seeing their discipline as an ‘inexact and 
separate science’, to use Dan Hausman’s (1992) terminology, and on subscribing 
to growth of content standards. Such commitments, however, pull them in 
opposite directions, and experimentalists do not constitute an exception. We have 
seen, for example, Charles Plott’s ideas on the importance of empirical 
counterexamples to theories, even when they come from laboratory 
experimentation, and how such an idea seems to be based on a generalist 
conception of theories. But Plott (1995) has also recently defended an 
interpretation of microeconomic theory called ‘the discovered preference 
hypothesis’, according to which rational behaviour emerges slowly at different 
stages in the development of an agent’s decision skills.208 According to such an 
interpretation, rational choice models are consistent with data only when applied 
to the behaviour of experienced agents aware of the environment and able to 
anticipate the decisions of other rational choosers. A number of vaguely specified 
conditions must hold in order for the theory to be applicable: even if they have 
had a chance to practice with bargaining for a long time, a group of mentally ill 
people will hardly develop the capacity to anticipate the decisions of other rational 
agents. 
 
Such examples call for an obvious comment: scientists are attached to certain 
specific ideas (something like a Lakatosian ‘hard core’), and often try to defend 
them at the expense of overall logical consistency. Thus, Plott ‘the 
experimentalist’ is ready to appeal to a requirement of theoretical unrestrictedness 
in order to defend the relevance of laboratory experimentation in general; Plott 
                                                 
208This idea can be found in a number of classics including Marshall, Pareto and Joan 
Robinson, and is therefore not particularly new. Ken Binmore (1999) has recently endorsed a 
very similar view. 
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‘the neoclassical economist’ uses every argument (including one involving a 
restricted interpretation of microeconomic theory) in order to save his favourite 
models from refutation. A discussion of such an opportunistic attitude would take 
us too far into the problem of evaluating scientists’ reactions to anomalies, and 
their apparent conservativeness in particular. Such analysis has already been 
attempted by others,209 and I have tackled the issue of the interpretation of 
economic theories only because it is relevant for some prima facie plausible 
arguments for parallelism. On this issue, Plott ‘the neoclassical economist’ (his 
deepest motivations notwithstanding, I should repeat) endorses in my view a more 
reasonable position than Plott ‘the experimentalist’. Notice that the message of 
the ‘discovered preferences’ hypothesis is not a relieving one for the orthodox 
economist. This defensive strategy is very costly: the intended scope of 
economics would be drastically limited were we to take Plott’s proposal 
seriously. Moreover, in the light of what said above about the special sciences, to 
interpret economic theory in a restrictive fashion opens the problem of how to 
explain and define the mechanisms that make the theory applicable in the first 
place. And this might be possible only with help from other neighbouring 
disciplines. 
 
If a ‘restricted’ interpretation of economic relationships is legitimate,210 the 
question shifts from whether human behaviour in general is consistent with, say, 
consumer theory, to how much real economic behaviour is of this sort, and how 
much is not. This leads us eventually to an empirical version of parallelism: 
 
[P4] Parallelism must be checked empirically. 
 
Such a minimal statement has the advantage of being free from problematic 
metaphysical commitments and from methodological standards that do not seem 
to fit economics particularly well. [P4] is applicable to nomic as well as to 
exhibited parallelism - both are, eventually, factual claims. It is thus compatible 
with a metaphysical thesis of high level of abstraction such as [P2.1] (Parallelism 
is exhibited whenever the same causally relevant conditions hold), without being in 
any way dependent on it. It has one great disadvantage, from the experimenters’ 
point of view: it does not vindicate the interest of every experimental result a 
priori. The relevance of an experiment is dependent on its generalisability outside 
                                                 
209Cf. in particular, Hausman (1992) for the case of preference reversals, and Hausman and 
Mongin (1998) for a comparison of that case with another one. 
210As it has been suggested above; but see Woodward (unpublished) for more arguments. 
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the laboratory, and this is a question which may be answered only a posteriori – 
when it can be answered at all.  
 
Nevertheless, such an idea may sound a little paradoxical: did we not 
undertake experimentation in the first place precisely because dissatisfied with 
field evidence? The answer is yes, of course. To appreciate the relative 
advantages of controlled experimentation from the correct point of view, consider 
again the issue of preference reversals. Bisecting the problem (into a problem of 
internal validity and one of parallelism) proved in this case to be very useful. 
Experiments have supported the hypothesis that preference reversals occur (in the 
laboratory) to an extent that would have been impossible with field data. The 
parallelism step is more controversial, but it is surely better to take a firm small 
step plus another shaky small one, rather than one big shaky step at once. 
Moreover, in some cases the parallelism step may be rather uncontroversial, 
because based on commonly accepted assumptions. Indeed, the parallelism step 
is often invisible for this very reason: it is ‘automatically’ taken for granted. But 
(leaving the question of whether it is justifiably taken for granted aside) the fact 
that it cannot be seen does not imply that it is not there. 
 
 Experimenters have indeed put forward claims that can be read as versions of 
[P4], and that are quite incompatible with other, more radical, claims such as 
those reviewed in the previous sections. Vernon Smith for instance points out that 
 
When the theory performs well [in the lab] you [...] think, “Are there 
parallel results in naturally occurring field data?” You look for coherence 
across different data sets because theories are not specific to particular data 
sources. Such extensions are important because theories often make 
specific assumptions about information and institutions which can be 
controlled in the laboratory, but which may not accurately represent field 
data generating situations. Testing theories on the domain of their 
assumptions is sterile unless it is part of a research program concerned with 
extending the domain of application of theory to field environments (Smith, 
1989, p. 152). 
 
On this interpretation, parallelism is an empirical issue, to be settled on a case-
by-case basis. Parallelism is something to be achieved, rather than an 
assumption we can rely upon. In some passages, Charles Plott similarly speaks of 
experiments as just one preliminary step in theory-appraisal: 
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I do not think that experimental methods will replace field research. 
Economies found in the wild can only be understood by studying them in 
the wild. Field research is absolutely critical to such an understanding. 
However, the theories and models used in field research necessarily 
incorporate many judgments about assumptions, parameters and behavioral 
principles. The simple cases that can be studied in the laboratory can 
provide the data against which the importance of such judgments can be 
assessed. Economics is one of the few [sic] sciences that is fortunate to 
have both the field and the laboratory with which to work (Plott, 1991, p. 
918). 
 
The next issue to be discussed, then, is surely how parallelism questions may 
be answered empirically. For example, to what extent can one rely on laboratory 
evidence, and where do field data play a role? And what is the logical structure of 
the arguments put forward in order to justify parallelism claims? Discussing such 
questions will keep us busy for a while: the remaining part of this as well as the 
next chapter are indeed dedicated to different strategies for establishing 
parallelism. I shall now abandon abstract reasoning and turn to concrete 
examples. In the next section I shall start by analysing a real controversy that 
revolved around a parallelism problem - the by now familiar case of preference 
reversals.    
  
4.7. Testing the robustness of preference reversals 
 
Economic relationships are supposed to hold across a certain variety of situations, 
which define the domain of their application. The reasons why they hold, 
however, are not fully specified (and surely not formalised). Economists instead 
put forward a number of informal accounts of why one should be confident that 
some relationship holds where and when it is supposed to. As a typical example, 
take evolutionary and arbitrage ‘stories’: if an economic agent did not behave 
rationally at least most of the time, he would be exposed to exploitation and soon 
kicked out of the market. Or, similarly, whenever a market is not in equilibrium, 
there is the possibility of buying and trading so as to ensure a positive gain at no 
cost. The market’s equilibrium would be restored by repeated arbitrage. To 
define these ‘stories’ as ‘theoretical arguments’ is somehow exaggerated, because 
they seldom take the form of rigorous theories, let alone an axiomatic form. 
(Using the convention adopted in the previous chapters, they are ‘theories’ with a 
small ‘t’, rather than ‘Theories’, capital ‘T’.) Still, they provide arguments for 
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believing in the robustness of a relationship inside a certain domain, by pointing to 
some background circumstances that allow the relationship to hold. 
 
When an experimental phenomenon is particularly indigestible, conservative 
scientists tend to insinuate that it cannot occur in the intended domain of the 
theory, and sometimes give reasons for this. Typically, they will say that there are 
some properties of real-world systems that prevent the anomalies from arising, 
and that such properties are not instantiated in the experimental environment 
where the anomalous phenomenon was generated. Notice that two empirical 
claims are made, and each has to be tested empirically. First, one has to try and 
reproduce in the lab the property at stake, so as to allegedly ‘approximate’ real-
world conditions; this is the strategy followed by experimentalists working on the 
preference reversals phenomenon. If these extra conditions prevent the anomaly 
from occurring, one has to show that such properties are instantiated in the 
intended domain of the theory. 
 
The research on preference reversals (PRs), for example, has broadly 
speaking gone through two main stages. As we saw in chapter three, a few years 
after Lichtenstein and Slovic’s initial findings, economists started to devise 
experiments in order to test the robustness of reversals in the laboratory. They 
tried, in other words, to check whether the anomalous evidence (the observed 
choices) could be interpreted as an ‘artefact’ of the experimental techniques used 
in order to elicit agents’ preferences. We have also seen that economists 
nowadays generally agree that preference reversals are a real laboratory 
phenomenon, rather than a mere illusion of our ‘instruments’ for the observation 
of preferences. Recently - perhaps frustrated by a series of failures to explain the 
anomaly away - some experimentalists have turned their attention to the 
robustness of reversals outside the laboratory. They are investigating whether 
preference reversals can be classified as ‘artefacts2’, to use my previous 
terminology. Or, in other words, experimentalists are now concerned to establish 
or refute parallelism claims. The problem had been posed since the early days. In 
their influential paper, Grether and Plott argued that 
 
The key question is, of course, whether [PRs] should be of interest to 
economists. Specifically it seems necessary to answer the following: 
(1) Does the phenomenon exist in situations where economic theory is 
generally applied? 
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(2) Can the phenomenon be explained by applying standard economic 
theory or some immediate variant thereof? (Grether and Plott, 1979, p. 
624). 
 
Berg, Dickhaut and O’Brien (1985) devised some experiments in order to test 
the robustness of the PR phenomenon to allegedly more ‘realistic’ conditions. The 
fundamental idea guiding their work is the one outlined above: economic 
generalisations should not be taken as exceptionless. They are on the contrary 
relationships that hold only where the ‘right’ conditions are instantiated. Thus, if 
we have a vague idea of what such circumstances may be, we can try to create an 
environment where they hold, and see whether they make any difference to the 
anomalous phenomenon (and, a fortiori, to the theory) in question. 
 
It remains an open question whether any mechanism, particularly one which 
would exist in situations where economic theory is generally applied, can 
substantially reduce or alter [PR] inconsistencies. The mechanism 
considered in our work is an arbitrage procedure. In general, the possibility 
of arbitrage in a market setting leads to the conclusion that there cannot be 
market inconsistencies such as two prices for the same commodity (Berg, 
Dickhaut and O’Brien, 1985, p. 33). 
 
The background mechanism responsible for the relationships of consumer 
theory to hold is therefore illustrated as follows: 
 
If preference reversals exist in an exchange setting, they create an arbitrage 
opportunity. A subject having been arbitraged is expected to realize that 
inconsistencies will be exploited and therefore to reduce both the rate and 
size of reversals (Berg, Dickhaut and O’Brien, 1985, p. 34). 
 
Notice that the background mechanism is not formally modeled nor 
incorporated into the theory of consumer’s behaviour. This is not necessary in 
order to test the theory’s relevance for the PR phenomenon. Experimentalists are 
only interested in checking whether when the arbitrage mechanism is at work, 
learning takes place and reversals tend to disappear. The theory could then be 
applied as it is. Experimenters in this case are not looking for a theoretical 
explanation of the mechanism, which is therefore kept confined in the 
‘background’ of the theory. 
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The design of the Berg-Dickhaut-O’Brien experiment is far from trivial. One 
problem with these experiments is to combine the exchange task needed to 
money-pump ‘inconsistent’ subjects with the already rather complex machinery of 
a standard PR experiment. The BDM procedure, for example, can be used to 
determine the real reservation price in the exchange mechanism only if subjects 
are assumed to be constantly and absolutely risk-averse; otherwise, their buying 
and selling prices will differ (cf. Berg, Dickhaut and O’Brien, 1985, pp. 34-35). 
Another incentive procedure especially invented by O’Brien to solve this problem 
was therefore used in the experiment. After the announced prices were elicited, 
the subjects were required to trade with the experimenter on the basis of their 
announced prices and choices. 
 
The design also controlled for another variable, i.e. repetition. As with Plott’s 
‘discovered preferences’ hypothesis, the central idea is that a period of learning 
may be necessary to acquire the decision skills conjectured by models of rational 
choice such as expected utility theory. By controlling for arbitrage and repetition, 
Berg, Dickhaut and O’Brien discovered that PRs do not disappear under these 
conditions. The frequency of reversals was even slightly higher when subjects 
experienced arbitrage than when they did not, thus replicating a similar effect 
already observed in benchmark experiments such as Grether and Plott’s (1979). 
Their dollar magnitude was, however, substantially decreased (from a mean value 
of 4.10 to 2.52 dollars). Repetition definitely diminished both the frequency and 
the dollar magnitude of reversals - the number of reversals per subject dropping 
from 36% in the first trial to 27% in the second; and the value from a mean dollar 
magnitude of 4.02 to 2.58. Not surprisingly, the two effects combine with each 
other, so that the most significative reductions can be observed in groups subject 
to both repetition and arbitrage. Berg and his collegues eventually recognised that 
the phenomenon was eroded but ‘did not go away’. 
 
The results of this experiment did not discourage the sceptics. Chu and Chu 
(1990) a few years later devised a variant of this experiment that controlled for 
the effects of complexity and of repeated arbitrage. They simplified the 
standard PRs design and exposed their subjects to a longer series of money-
pumps. Whereas simplification alone did not seem to have great impact on the 
phenomenon, repeated arbitrage did. Moreover, the effects of learning were 
observed to be persistent: once exposed to repeated money-pumping, subjects 
acted more consistently with standard economic theory in immediately subsequent 
tasks. 
 
 163 
 
Other experiments were inspired by similar ideas. Knez and Smith (1987) 
tried to design an experiment featuring both the characteristics of typical PR 
experiments and of market experiments known to deliver results consistent with 
standard economic theory. The crucial idea behind PRs is that people adopt 
different ‘response modes’ for different tasks, depending on whether they are 
engaged in pricing or choosing. Knez and Smith assigned to their subjects a fixed 
amount of money and bets to be traded under double-auction rules. Their 
hypothetical valuations and choices for each bet were elicited, and used to plot 
demand-supply curves for the market. Then the subjects were asked to trade 
their bets. Inconsistencies between valuations, choices and trading behaviour 
were observed, but the frequency of reversals was reduced substantially (from 60 
to 40%) by the trading experience.211 
 
All these experiments, to sum up, showed that preference reversals can be 
reduced in certain situations. Two questions, however, arise: the first concerns 
how much arbitrage and repetition (for example) is needed in order to eliminate 
PRs or at least reduce them to negligible proportions; and secondly, are these 
preventatives active in ‘real world’ markets? 
 
4.8. Empirical versions of parallelism (II) 
 
What can the PRs case teach us about the problem of empirical parallelism? 
When some anomalous phenomenon has been produced in the laboratory, 
economists are often in the uncomfortable situation of deciding about its relevance 
without any empirical evidence that suggests that it has some real-world 
counterpart.212 The question then is: Should we take the experimental result 
                                                 
211As Knez and Smith rightly point out (1987, p. 132-133), the results of such experiments 
are not easily interpreted, because the disappearing of inconsistencies and the convergence 
to market prices do not univoquely confirm standard individual choice theory. The theory of 
market efficiency does not require that demand behaviour be consistent with individual 
expected utility theory: there may be convergence to clearing prices even though agents’ 
real preferences are inconsistent. The two theories, in this sense, are quite independent. 
The problem of inferring from ‘market experiments’ to the (non-)robustness of PRs is 
therefore severe, and affects also other more recent research. Cox and Grether (1996) have 
tried to elicit preferences by using three different devices: a standard Becker-DeGroot-
Marschak procedure, a sealed second-price auction, and an English clock auction. The 
sealed-bid auction is a typical pricing procedure, whereas the English clock auction and the 
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism are choice procedures. The effects of repetition were 
particulary strong in the two auctions, where reversals diminished substantially and 
asymmetries disappeared. A correlation between new and old prices generated in the 
markets was also observed. It is not clear, however, whether such ‘anchoring effect’ is due 
to a convergence of agents’ revealed preferences towards their ‘true’ valuations or to simple 
imitation. 
212Assuming, of course, that ‘casual’ observations of, e.g., people’s inconsistencies in 
everyday life do not count as scientifically relevant evidence. 
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seriously, or just shelve it until some evidence of transferrability has been 
presented? The debate between enthusiasts for and sceptics about 
experimentation usually revolves around this question. For example, suppose a 
phenomenon (O) inconsistent with a widely accepted proposition of economic 
theory (T) is observed in the laboratory. The sceptics usually insinuate that O is 
observed only when certain background conditions B are instantiated, that 
conditions B were indeed instantiated in the laboratory, and that in ‘real-world’ 
economic systems circumstances B’  (which are incompatible with B and thus 
prevent O from occurring) are the rule. The theory, then, is saved by adding (in an 
informal way, usually) B’ as an auxiliary assumption. Notice however that the 
overall argument involves not only the (conjectural) prediction that O in fact does 
not occur when both the antecedent in T and the additional B’ are instantiated, but 
also the factual claim that the preventative B’ is indeed instantiated in the real 
economies the theory is supposed to apply to in the first place - two empirical 
claims. 
 
We can now identify two different rules of method. According to the Strong 
Version of Empirical Parallelism, 
 
[P4.1] The burden of proof lies with the economist willing to save T, who 
has to show that 
(i) T obtains for some Bi; 
and  
(ii) Bi is instantiated in the real-world economies whose behaviour the 
theory is supposed to explain. 
 
In contrast, the Weak Version of Empirical Parallelism asserts that 
 
[P4.2] The burden of proof lies with the experimentalist willing to reject T, 
who has to show that 
either  
(i’) T obtains for no Bi; 
or, 
(ii’) none of the Bi for which T obtains is instantiated in the real-world 
economies whose behaviour the theory is supposed to explain. 
 
The auxiliary assumptions Bi are supposed to be borrowed from some stock 
of reasonable or scientifically relevant propositions. Where does the burden of 
proof lie? Let us start with (i) and (i’): to know the exact conditions for the 
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applicability of a theory, its boundaries and limitations, is surely crucial for an 
efficient use of the theory itself. Nobody will deny that it is important to know, for 
example, that a theory previously believed to be of unlimited domain of 
application has rather to be interpreted as a restricted generalisation. (Although, it 
is worth repeating, to require that all the background conditions and mechanisms 
necessary for the theoretical propositions to hold be incorporated in the theory’s 
formalism is unreasonable.) Thus, were a theory supposed to hold 
unconditionally, in case of falsification the burden of proof would lie with the 
defender of the theory to point to some background conditions that would save 
the theory from refutation (case (i) above). It would in fact be impossible for the 
challenger to show that there do not exist any Bi which would save the theory; 
holding [P4.2](i’) would be a too dogmatic and conservative attitude. 
 
The subsequent step consists in testing whether it is really the case that when 
the conditions specified in T plus the appropriately chosen Bi are instantiated, the 
phenomenon O  does not occur. Such a test can sometimes be carried through in 
the laboratory. All the preference reversal experiments seen above test the 
relevance of some background conditions taken to be important by common 
economic wisdom, although not made explicit in the formal theory of consumer’s 
behaviour. Given the incomplete character of economic generalisations, such 
experiments are indispensable in order to infer from the observation of an 
anomaly in the laboratory to the falsification213 of a theory unable to account for 
it. Testing the robustness of a phenomenon to certain background conditions is 
however only half of the job, and needs to be completed by a third step. 
 
Once the appropriate background conditions have been identified (if they have 
been at all), there still remains the question whether  - as implied by (ii) - the 
defender needs to show that these conditions really are instantiated in the real-
world cases of interest, or whether the challenger is required to show that they are 
not (as prescribed by (ii’)). Subscribing to (ii) would amount to claiming that 
Parallelism is supposed to hold until some empirical reason to the contrary 
has been given. Holding (ii’), on the contrary, would imply that Parallelism is 
not supposed to hold until some empirical reason to the contrary has been 
given. Notice that by framing the question this way one is implicitly assuming that 
the empirical test of parallelism advocated in [P4] cannot be exclusively 
                                                 
213Of course I am here and elsewhere in this chapter speaking of methodological 
falsifications (as opposed to logical ones) in the sense of Lakatos (1970): the decision to 
abandon a theory in the light of the available evidence plus some extra-logical 
methodological criterion. 
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experimental in character. Parallelism always involves a correspondence between 
two kinds of phenomena, one in the laboratory and the other in the real world. 
Establishing parallelism requires the collaboration between laboratory and field 
evidence. (In the next chapters I shall show, by means of new examples, how this 
can be done in practice.) 
 
Such an abstract analysis can now be put at work and applied to the case 
study examined in this chapter. The categories above may in fact be used as a 
sort of ideal-typical characterisation of a parallelism problem and how it has to be 
tackled. The first thing to notice is that economists engaged in the preference 
reversals case did not go very far into investigating parallelism. Chu and Chu, for 
example, summarise their results by saying that the PR phenomenon appears to 
be vulnerable to a ‘marketlike’ environment (1990, p. 910), but such a claim is at 
least ambiguous. As Colin Camerer has put it, 
 
These results suggest that in an environment where preference reversal is a 
recognizable, costly mistake that outsiders can spot and exploit, then 
people can learn to switch their expressed preferences (or reduce the size 
of any discrepancy). But there is no evidence of whether subjects who are 
disciplined this way then learn to express preference more consistently in 
the future, or whether reversals actually persist in natural settings (Camerer, 
1995, p. 661). 
 
Chu and Chu seem to suggest that PRs tend not to occur (or occur only very 
occasionally) in real markets, whereas their experiments prove at best only that 
PRs tend not to occur in those markets where repeated arbitrage is possible, and 
where subjects have the possibility of learning to be consistent. They may prove, 
in other words, that the orthodox theory holds where the ‘right’ background 
mechanisms are at work. Whether these are (always? sometimes?) at work in the 
intended domain of the theory, is a different question, which should be settled on 
an empirical basis. Only half an argument against parallelism, then, has been 
carried through. Experimentalists sceptical about the PR phenomenon have tried 
to ‘mimick the real world’, but their conception of what is ‘real’ was shaped by 
their (a priori) views about the structure of market economies. Informal but 
powerful arguments such as ‘if there were inconsistencies in the market, then 
someone would exploit them until they disappear; therefore there cannot be 
inconsistencies in the market’ play a crucial role in justifying the invisible 
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parallelism step from the laboratory to the real world.214 The parallelism step is in 
this case (partly) supported by economists’ preconceptions, rather than by 
empirical proof. One cannot fail to notice, in the debates on controversial 
experimental findings, a tendency to replace empirical statements about factual 
matters - such as required by the principles [P4.1] and [P4.2] discussed above - 
with general statements which lack solid empirical foundations. These arguments 
stand on one leg only, and fall short of the ideal standards I have proposed 
above. A philosophical analysis such as the one attempted above may indeed help 
economists to improve their methodology, to go beyond rhetorical arguments and 
to concentrate on factual matters. 
 
To sum up, in this section two abstract versions of empirical parallelism have 
been proposed and discussed. Both stem from the assumption that parallelism 
claims must be checked empirically, but differ in the weight they assign to 
anomalous evidence. The strong version prescribes taking the theory as falsified 
until it has been shown that the target, ‘real-world’, economies customarily feature 
background mechanisms or conditions preventing the anomaly to occur. The 
weak version of empirical parallelism asserts that the theory should not be 
rejected until it has been shown either that there exist no background mechanisms 
preventing the anomaly from occurring, or that such mechanisms are not at work 
in the target systems at stake. I have suggested that the weak version is too 
dogmatic, and that the ‘aggressive’ attitude implied by the strong version sounds 
more reasonable. In the preference reversals case, this suggests that the discovery 
of the phenomenon has shifted the burden of proof towards those willing to save 
choice theory from refutation. In fact, experimentalists have been looking (and 
partly successfully so) for preventatives of the reversals phenomenon. Finally, I 
have argued that these defensive strategies are not effective until it has been 
shown that background mechanisms such as learning from arbitrage are also at 
work in the ‘real economies’ whose functioning economic theory aims to explain. 
 
4.9. Conclusion 
 
The preference reversals case seems to substantiate my analysis in sections 4.1-
4.6 above. Whether one should revise an economic theory in order to account for 
anomalous experimental evidence is a matter that cannot be settled a priori. No 
                                                 
214Notice, by the way, that such reasoning is based on the assumption that economic 
agents behave as the rational greedy maximisers postulated  by standard economic models. 
But preference reversal experiments are meant to test (and to question) precisely the 
empirical validity of these models! 
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experimental evidence can falsify a theory unless parallelism with real-world 
economic phenomena has been established; but neither can a phenomenon be 
disregarded on the basis of purely a priori reasoning. Whenever it is possible to 
refer to some background conditions that make the relationship robust across the 
range of situations it is supposed to be applied to, such conditions should be 
included in the experimental environment in order to test the anomaly’s relevance. 
It is unreasonable however to require that all the background conditions, 
provisos, and ceteris paribus clauses be made explicit before a theory is deemed 
acceptable. The requirement of completion upon which experimentalists’ 
arguments for parallelism are based should therefore be rejected. How ‘deep’ 
one is supposed to dig into the realm of background conditions is a context-
dependent matter. I have argued that the reasons why parallelism should not hold 
must be made explicit and testable, but not necessarily incorporated into the 
theory’s formalism. Finally, I have shown that the word ‘empirically’ in statement 
[P4] (“Parallelism must be checked empirically”) cannot mean ‘experimentally 
only’. The empirical version of parallelism put forward in the previous section 
must therefore be interpreted in this sense: 
 
[P4*] Parallelism must be checked by collaboration between experimental 
and field data. 
 
The form of such collaboration has to be further investigated, and I shall try to 
say something more precise about it in the following chapters. To conclude and 
summarise this discussion of experimentalists’ arguments: a priori reasoning will 
not convince sceptics of the relevance of laboratory experimentation to 
economics. Such arguments may have played a useful rhetorical role to convince 
editors and referees to accept experimental papers, but stand on slippery 
grounds. Too much should be thrown away were we to interpret them literally. I 
propose, then, to take the issue of parallelism the following way: the results 
achieved in the laboratory are not in principle relevant nor irrelevant to assess 
economic theories - their (ir-) relevance must be somehow justified a 
posteriori.215 Indeed, experimentalists have often done this; given that the 
arguments one finds in their methodological papers are mainly ‘aprioristic’ in 
character, it is necessary to search for genuine parallelism arguments somewhere 
else. In the next chapters I shall look in their scientific papers for the empirical 
procedures they have devised in order to support inferences to parallelism in 
specific cases. 
                                                 
215For a similar conclusion drawn from different considerations, see also Starmer (1999). 
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One final conceptual and terminological distinction. I suggested earlier that the 
issue of ‘parallelism’ in experimental economics is very close to the issue of 
‘external validity’ discussed by other social scientists, in particular by 
psychologists. If the two were identical, it would be wise to simplify and speak of 
external validity all the time. There is, however, one good reason to keep the two 
separate. The problem of external validity is often discussed by scientists as that 
of generalising a certain experimental result outside the specific circumstances of 
the experiment (e.g. to generalise beyond the particular population, the specific 
instruments used, place and time, etc.): from a claim of the form ‘In laboratory Li, 
with subjects Si, selected according to criteria Ci, trained according to method Ti, 
pretested in the way Pi, etc., if X then Y’ to a claim of the form ‘For all subjects in 
all circumstances, if X then Y’. By shifting from the former to the latter statement, 
one is assuming (and this assumption may of course be based on very good 
empirical reasons) that the ‘background experimental conditions’ Bi = {Li, Si, Ci, 
Ti, Pi,...} do not matter for the relationship between X and Y to hold. To put it in 
a different way, when external validity in this sense has been established one is 
entitled to claim that ‘X causes Y unconditionally’.216 
 
One can already see what is wrong with this: linking external validity to 
unconditionality is excessively demanding, and surely goes much beyond what 
economic experimentalists should (and often do) demand.  If ‘if X then Y’ is true 
only in population A or circumstances B, then unconditionality requires that what 
distinguishes A  or B be spelled out and included among the X’s. To endorse this 
principle is equivalent to commit oneself to a complete, explicit specification of all 
the relevant factors, or to make do without ceteris paribus clauses in nomic and 
causal claims. This, as I have argued at length, is an unreasonable requirement. If 
we think that at least some of the generalisations of the special sciences capture 
genuinely causal or nomic relationships, then we better allow for a relative 
invariance of such relationships (relative to the ‘right’ background), as proposed 
for instance by Jim Woodward (1997 and unpublished). Speaking of parallelism 
                                                 
216The idea is that for all X andY, X causes Y iff P(Y|X) > P(Y|~X) for all background 
conditions B. See Humphreys (1989, pp. 72 and following) for a detailed presentation of the 
principle and a philosophical discussion. Humphreys (1989, p. 79, footnote 19) points 
explicitly to the relation between unconditionality requirements and external validity 
referring to Campbell and Stanley’s (1966) classic on quasi-experimental methodologies. 
Unconditionality is more or less closely related to a number of other requirements proposed 
by statisticians and philosophers in order to tell genuine causal claims from spurious 
probabilistic correlations, including: randomness criteria (a number of statisticians since 
Fisher), ‘maximal specificity’ (Hempel), ‘objective homogeneity’ (Salmon), ‘resiliency’ 
(Skyrms), ‘relevance invariance’ (Cartwright) and ‘contextual unanimity’ (Dupré). 
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instead of external validity can help us to mark such a distinction. To achieve 
parallelism is not equivalent to achieve unconditionality: it is perhaps better 
characterised as a weak form of external validity limited to some typical variations 
in the background conditions. It is to establish that a certain experimental result 
can be ‘exported’ from a set of (experimental) systems Li to a set of (‘real-
world’) systems Wi. It is still a local inference, because economists do not have 
to endorse the view that the relationships they subscribe to must hold across all 
kinds of situations. Of course parallelism claims are ampliative, but do not require 
absolute generality. In order to capture this distinction also at the level of 
terminology, it is therefore useful to keep using the word ‘parallelism’. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Experiments as Mediators 
Testing the ‘winner’s curse’ hypothesis 
 
 
 
‘We have seen that there are three sorts of 
bed. The first exists in nature, and we 
would say, I suppose, that it was made by 
god. No one else could have made it, 
could they?’ 
‘I think not.’ 
‘The second is made by the carpenter.’ 
‘Yes.’ 
‘And the third by the painter?’ 
‘Granted.’ 
‘So painter, carpenter and god are each 
responsible for one kind of bed.’ 
‘Yes.’ 
(Plato, The Republic, Part 10, 597b) 
 
 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The case of the last chapter - that parallelism is an empirical hypothesis, rather 
than a claim to be endorsed or dismissed on a priori grounds - of course leaves 
open the question of how can parallelism be established. I have already discussed 
an example in the last chapter, but the case of preference reversals turned out to 
be partially disappointing - experimentalists went only half way to showing that the 
phenomenon could not occur in the real world of untamed economic phenomena. 
In this chapter another example will be presented and discussed, in the attempt to 
lay bare the structure of parallelism arguments.  
 
Taking parallelism seriously will, as I shall try to show, force us to replace the 
standard, rather simplistic view of the logic of experimenting with a more 
complicated account closer to real scientific practice. According to the standard 
hypothetico-deductive model of scientific testing, some prediction about an 
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observable event (O) is deduced from a theory (T), some initial conditions (IC), 
and auxiliary assumptions (AA): (T & IC & AA) ⇒ O. If the predicted event is 
observed, the whole body of theory, initial conditions and auxiliaries is confirmed; 
otherwise, it is falsified and has to be revised. The hypothetico-deductive model 
does not place any requirements on where O comes from: it may be a casual 
observation in a natural setting as well as a highly artificial phenomenon produced 
in a constrained environment. One of the appealing features of the hypothetico-
deductive model is indeed its wide scope of application. By looking deeper at the 
details of testing in different sciences, however, some important differences will 
emerge. 
 
To begin with, we should introduce a distinction based on the kind of empirical 
data typically used in a given discipline, and thus speak of ‘laboratory’ vs. ‘non-
laboratory’ sciences. According to Ian Hacking, 
 
Laboratory sciences are those whose claims to truth answer primarily to 
work done in the laboratory. They study phenomena that seldom or ever 
occur in a pure state before people have brought them under surveillance. 
Exaggerating a little, I say that the phenomena under study are created in 
the laboratory. The laboratory sciences use apparatus in isolation to 
interfere with the course of that aspect of nature that is under study, the end 
in view being an increase in knowledge, understanding, and control of a 
general or generalizable sort (1992, p. 33). 
 
Non-laboratory sciences, then, are those whose claims to truth do not answer 
primarily to work done in the laboratory. More importantly, they cannot answer 
primarily to work done in the laboratory, because the primary aim of such 
sciences is to explain and control non-laboratory phenomena. 
 
I should stress that the laboratory vs. non-laboratory distinction may be more 
a historical and contingent than an essential one. Physics was once a non-
laboratory science, becoming a primarily experimental discipline in the 17th 
Century. But the laboratory revolution was long and gradual. Two centuries later 
physicists were still allowed to worry about the realistic nature of their theories 
and experiments. According to Galison and Assmus (1989), indeed, in the 
Victorian age a ‘morphological’ school challenged the ‘analytical’ approach to 
scientific investigation that has since won the day. Whereas the ‘analysts’ 
searched for fundamental laws by tearing nature apart in their models (by 
abstraction) and in their laboratories (by shielding and manipulating), the 
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morphologists looked with scepticism at such practices and rather tried to 
recreate full natural phenomena in the laboratory by means of ‘mimetic’ 
experiments. The morphologists, in other words, cared about parallelism: what 
can the highly constrained and disciplined environments created in the laboratories 
teach us about the unconstrained, complex outside world? 
 
Nowadays worries of this kind are not very common. Physics has gone 
through two laboratory revolutions: from an Aristotelian science concerned with 
the explanation of spontaneously occurring phenomena by means of unaided 
observations; to a Galilean science investigating natural phenomena in the ‘ideal’ 
conditions of the laboratory; to a science, finally, whose main questions and 
answers are generated in the laboratory.217 Sciences like economics or medicine, 
in contrast, supplement controlled experiments with other methods of enquiry. 
Non-laboratory sciences, then, use experimentation, but in a different way than 
laboratory sciences do. 
 
In this chapter, I shall argue that experiments in non-laboratory sciences are 
just an intermediate step on the ladder leading to scientific knowledge ‘of a 
general or generalisable sort’. I shall rely on some examples of experimental work 
done in economics, and try to show that experiments in sciences like economics 
play the role of ‘epistemic mediators’. They help to bridge the gap between a 
theory and its target domain of application, but not in the straightforward way 
imagined by the proponents of the hypothetico-deductive model. Experiments are 
just one part of a rather complicated engine for testing scientific theories. The role 
of experiments will be explicated by analogy: I shall try to show that experiments 
are used in many respects like models, relying on a specific view of modelling 
recently put forward by R.I.G. Hughes (the DDI account), Margaret Morrison 
and Mary Morgan (models as ‘mediators’). 
 
The problem will be examined from two distinct points of view. First, I shall 
focus on the nature of laboratory experiments in economics. Secondly, I shall turn 
to epistemology and try to show what role experiments play in the process of 
confirming a scientific hypothesis. Despite their being conceptually distinct, the 
two aspects of the problem are clearly connected. What role experiments can 
                                                 
217 One may wonder whether this shift is a progressive one: surely to focus primarily on 
what can be studied in the lab inmplis a drastic restriction in the domain of the discipline. 
But, surely, this shift has payed off in terms of technological applications. I discuss the use 
of experiments for the creation of new economic ‘technology’ in Guala (unpublished). 
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play depends of course on what the experiments are, and conversely, it is mainly 
by looking at how experiments are used that we can tell what they are. 
 
The main case study - Kagel and Levin’s experiments on the winner’s curse 
phenomenon - will be introduced in section 5.2. I shall argue that two separate 
issues arise concerning any laboratory experiment in economics, namely: Can a 
given phenomenon be produced in the laboratory? And: does that phenomenon 
also occur in certain non-laboratory situations of interest? These questions will be 
treated separately in section 5.3. In section 5.4 I shall illustrate in what sense 
models may act as mediators. In section 5.5 the notion of ‘demonstrating’ using 
models and experiments will be introduced. In section 5.6 the case study of 
winner’s curse experiments will be examined again in order to show how an 
inference from the laboratory to the outside world may be rationally formulated. 
Then (section 5.7), I shall try to show that such an inference is based on a 
combination of analogical and inductive reasoning. 
 
5.2. (Re)producing the winner’s curse phenomenon 
 
If you care about the problem of parallelism, you are bound to ask two 
independent questions: Do theories provide adequate explanations of what is 
going on in experiments? And secondly, Do experiments correctly reproduce 
real-world situations, properties, or phenomena? In order to discuss these issues 
with a concrete case in mind, it is useful to select an example of experimentation 
where the two are kept neatly separate. The case of experiments on the ‘winner’s 
curse’ phenomenon is a good example from this respect, and throughout the 
chapter I shall go back and forth from methodological analysis to the case study. 
In this section I shall just introduce the example and show how the first question 
above (‘internal’ validity) was addressed by experimental economists. Then, in 
sections 5.5 and 5.6, I shall come back to the winner’s curse, focusing on 
parallelism. 
 
In 1971 the Atlantic Richfield Company claimed that the constantly low profits 
derived from the exploitation of oil leases in the Gulf of Mexico was the result of 
their being the victims of a ‘winner’s curse’ (Capen, Clapp and Campbell, 
1971).218 Oil leases are auctioned by a federal agency, the Outer Continental 
Shelf (OCS). Auctions of this kind are, technically speaking, ‘common value 
auctions’ - auctions in which the value of the auctioned item is the same for all 
                                                 
218For an introductory survey of the literature on the winner’s curse phenomenon, see 
Thaler (1988). 
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participants, but initially unknown to all. A crucial part of the bidding game, then, 
consists in trying to estimate the true value of the lease. When the participants fail 
in this estimation, the winning bid is likely to turn out overoptimistic and the 
exploitation of the lease not profitable. 
 
The claims of the Atlantic Richfield Company were suspect: they had an 
interest in convincing other companies to be more cautious in their valuations, and 
their move may have been a disguised invitation to act as a cartel by bidding less 
on the licences. On the other hand, a winner’s curse phenomenon may have 
really been hidden below the data. How can we decide? The problem is that field 
data do not help very much to settle the dispute - since they are not able to 
convey information about crucial variables such as agents’ private valuations or 
the real profitability of an oil lease in the long run. 
 
John Kagel and Dan Levin (1986) tried to give an answer by reproducing the 
winner’s curse phenomenon in the laboratory. In their experiment, information 
was provided to the bidders about the possible value of the item to be auctioned 
by communicating to each individual agent a value xi drawn from a uniform 
distribution [x0 - ε, x0 + ε], where x0 is the real value of the item (i.e. the sum 
experimenters will pay the winning bidder) randomly drawn from a uniform 
distribution on an interval [x*, x**]. Experimenters communicated to their 
subjects the range of ε, and computed for them the upper and lower bound for 
the value of x0.219 The format of the experiment was dictated by auction theory, 
which models bidders’ uncertainty as a random draw from a lottery of the above 
kind. 
 
A game-theoretic account of auction mechanisms has been available since the 
sixties thanks to the pioneering work of William Vickrey (1961). Vickrey devised 
a model known as the ‘independent private values model’, where each bidder is 
supposed to be aware exactly of the value of the auctioned item, but does not 
know the value to other bidders. Such an assumption seems to be satisfied in 
auctions of, e.g., antiques, that will be privately enjoyed by buyers who do not 
intend to resell them. Oil leases do not seem to be that kind of good: their value, 
as we have said, is unknown but approximately the same for all bidders. Wilson 
(1977), and then Milgrom and Weber (1982), proposed a generalised theory of 
auctions able to account for the private-value and the common-value models as 
special cases. The auction is modeled as a non-cooperative game played by 
                                                 
219Min {xi + ε, x**} and max {xi - ε, x*}, respectively. 
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expected-utility maximising bidders. The players are assumed to adopt equilibrium 
strategies - in the standard sense of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which, given 
everyone else’s strategy, no agent can do better than he is presently doing by 
changing his strategy. The common value model is based on four basic 
assumptions: (1) That values are common and unknown to all; (2) that the bidders 
are symmetric; (3) that  the pay-off is a function of bids alone; and (4) that 
bidders are risk-neutral. The former three assumptions appear empirically justified 
in the OCS case; risk-neutrality is needed for analytical reasons (assuming, e.g., 
risk-aversion leads to ambiguous results in a number of cases).220 
 
The solution of the standard bidding model is known as ‘non-cooperative 
equilibrium with risk-neutral bidders’ (or RNNE for short), and predicts that the 
agent with the highest private signal (denoted x1)  will generally win the auction. If 
bidders are rational maximisers, as the RNNE models assumes, the one with the 
highest xi is supposed to revise the expected value of the item in the light of the 
fact that his private information signal is the highest. In technical terms, the need 
for this revision is known as the ‘adverse-selection problem’. Denoting the 
expected value conditional on having the highest information signal as E[ x0|Xi = 
x1], a winner’s curse occurs every time the actual estimate of value exceeds the 
latter, i.e. whenever 
 
(WC)     E[x0|xi] > E[ x0|Xi = x1]. 
 
In this case, in fact, the winner fails to take into account the adverse-selection 
problem, and so will experience on average negative profits. The inequality above 
is better characterised as ‘the winner’s curse hypothesis’: unlike the RNNE 
model, it does not provide a full explanation of the bidding process. It is defined 
as a contrast case: it conjectures that real bidders are not fully rational and fail to 
revise their expected values correctly. If the RNNE model is right, and bidders 
really are rational maximisers, the winner’s curse should not occur, and evidence 
such as that presented by the Atlantic Richfield Company should be explained in a 
different way. The aim of the experiment devised by Kagel and Levin was to 
show how the data may result from a particular mechanism by reproducing it in 
the laboratory. The experiment had a very precise, predetermined target. 
 
                                                 
220For an introduction to auction theory, cf. Milgrom (1989); for a more comprehensive 
survey, see McAfee and McMillan (1987). 
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Kagel and Levin (1986) constructed their argument for the existence of the 
winner’s curse by controlling for the number of subjects and public information. 
To begin with, (i) they ran experiments with a ‘large’ number of bidders (6-7) and 
experiments with a ‘small’ number (3-4). When the number of competitors is 
large, a rational maximiser is supposed to take into account two opposite 
considerations: one should bid more aggressively because the signal values are 
more congested, but less aggressively because the adverse selection problem 
becomes more severe. A RNNE bid function taking into account these 
considerations requires the bids to remain constant or to decrease when there is a 
growing number of competitors.221 If the winner’s curse explanation is right, by 
contrast, higher bids should be observed as the number of competitors increases. 
Varying the number of bidders thus provides a means of discriminating between 
the two rival hypotheses. 
 
(ii) Some experiments involved only private information signals, whereas others 
involved public information: bidders were asked to provide a first evaluation 
under knowledge of xi only, and then a second one after having been given some 
additional public information signal xp (the lowest of the private signals formerly 
distributed, xL, is particularly convenient for analytical reasons). The public 
information control is useful to provide insights into the bidding mechanism. In 
RNNE, in fact, public information is supposed to raise the bids of all the subjects 
who have not had the highest private signal; this should put pressure on the x1 
bidder (the winner, according to RNNE) and therefore diminish his profits by 
almost one half.222 
 
Kagel and Levin (1986) observed two results: (i) in ‘small group’ experiments, 
the winners bought the items at a profitable price, but the profits were 
considerably lower than those predicted by the RNNE model (65.1% of the 
latter). In ‘large group’ experiments, the winners experienced losses on average. 
(ii) In auctions with a small number of bidders, the injection of public information 
raises prices; when the number of bidders is large, in contrast, prices fall contrary 
to the RNNE prediction. Both results are consistent with a winner’s curse 
explanation. Winners, ex hypothesis, overestimate values; public information tends 
                                                 
221See Kagel and Levin (1986) for the quantitative analysis behind such a hypothesis. 
222 From E[Π|W] = 2ε / (N + 1) - Y (where N is the number of bidders in the auction and Y is a 
negative exponential becoming rapidly negligible as the value of xi departs from extremely 
low values), to E[Π|W, XL] = ε / (N + 1). See Kagel and Levin (1986) for the details of such a 
prediction. 
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to reduce uncertainty about the true value of the item, so that bidders with the 
highest private information can revise their evaluations. 
 
Kagel and Levin, thus, tried first to run experiments that could teach us 
something about the functioning of laboratory common value auctions. I shall 
return to their experiments later (sections 5.5-5.6), to see how they were also 
designed to support an inference from the ‘internal validity’ of the winner’s curse 
explanation to ‘parallelism’. Before then, some more philosophical weaponry 
must be introduced. 
 
5.3. Parallelism and underdetermination 
 
Kagel and Levin demonstrated that a winner’s curse phenomenon can be created 
in a laboratory economy - but what about the ‘real world’, the target 
phenomenon that originally motivated their investigations? Is a winner’s curse 
interpretation of the OCS data legitimate?  A further step is needed in order to 
claim that the same phenomenon observed in the laboratory lies hidden behind 
real-world empirical data. Two well known and distinct methodological problems 
arise with any laboratory experiment: the Duhem-Quine problem and the problem 
of causal underdetermination. 
 
The Duhem-Quine problem, as we have seen in chapter three, consists in the 
impossibility of logically determining the inadequacy of a given theory on the basis 
of evidence and deductive logic alone. When faced with a falsifying observation, 
there always is the logical possibility of revising a peripheral assumption so as to 
save a given theoretical claim. The scientist, in other words, is never logically 
compelled to blame any particular component of a cluster of theories. This 
problem is also related to the so-called ‘underdetermination of theories by data’ 
thesis: logically speaking, a potentially infinite number of theories can account for 
any body of evidence (no matter how great). Which is just another way of saying 
that positive inferences from data to theory can only be inductive in character. As 
argued in chapter three, these problems cannot be solved, but can at least be 
reduced in the laboratory. In practice, in fact, in any historically given controversy 
only a finite number of competing theories exist, and one can discriminate 
between them by means of ‘quasi-crucial’ tests such as those devised by Safra, 
Segal and Spivak, Starmer and Sugden, and others in the preference reversals 
case, or Kagel and Levin in the case we are presently concerned with. 
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Experimental testing can help to reduce the problem of underdetermination of 
theory by data and thus confirm that a certain explanation is able to account for 
laboratory evidence. But it cannot eliminate nor even reduce the problem of 
causal underdetermination: different causal processes may generate similar 
patterns of data in different situations. In order to generalise a laboratory result, a 
further step has to be made: one has to show that the system constructed in the 
laboratory is the same as the one at work in the real world (the ‘target’, from now 
on), and that the similarity between artificial results and real phenomena is not 
illusory. Economists - as I have shown at length in the last chapter - have named it 
the problem of ‘parallelism’: what does the behaviour of laboratory economic 
systems tell us about phenomena observed in other, sometimes more complicated 
or very different, situations? 
 
My proposed answer will be that experiments act as ‘mediators’. The idea of 
‘mediating entities’ has been already used to characterise the notion and role of 
scientific models.223 I shall build on this idea and speak of ‘epistemic’ mediators: 
experiments, according to my account, constitute an intermediate step in a more 
general procedure aimed at supporting a given theoretical explanation of field 
data. Experiments are just one among many kinds of ‘mediating entities’, as I shall 
try to argue below. In the next section the notion of models as mediators will be 
presented and briefly discussed. Then I shall turn to experiments, and try to show 
that a common denominator of all mediating entities is their being simpler, more 
manageable, and more controllable systems which can be manipulated with the 
aim of understanding the functioning of a complex, little manageable, and partially 
or totally uncontrollable system. 
 
 
5.4. Models 
 
Let us start with the notion of model. There are several kinds of scientific models, 
and different taxonomies have been put forward in order to classify them.224 
Instead of engaging in a review of the literature, however, I shall focus on one 
particular kind of models, which have been called, according to their function, 
‘mediating models’. 
 
                                                 
223Cf. Morgan and Morrison (1999) for an illustration of such a view. 
224Cf. e.g. Giere (1979; 1988) and Redhead (1980). 
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Let me first introduce an example - a famous economic model, put forward by 
Thomas Schelling in his Micromotives and Macrobehavior (1978). Schelling’s 
goal was to give an account of racial segregation in American cities, but this was 
achieved by describing an imaginary checquerboard with a particular tessellation, 
upon which coins of two kinds (dimes and pennies) move according to specified 
rules. He shows that when some specific conditions hold, in particular when 
certain preferences about the occupants of each coin’s neighbour squares hold, 
then certain dispositions of the coins on the checquerboard will follow. Informally 
(but the rules of the game are given by Schelling in game-theoretic form), each 
coin moves in the attempt to escape from areas where an overwhelming majority 
of coins of the other type prevails (say, 2/3 or more). Every time a coin is 
surrounded by a majority of another type, it is moved. Via successive reshuffling, 
it is shown that a complete separation of dimes and pennies may be produced on 
the checquerboard. 
 
Schelling’s paper is an exercise in analysing the dynamics of a toy-model, but 
the story about the model-world is intended to support a hypothetical explanation 
of the evolution of racial segregation in the real world.225 In a recent paper 
devoted to discussing Schelling’s model, Robert Sugden argues that “moving from 
the model to the hypothesis required a step in the argument which most readers 
would be willing to make, but for which no formal justification was available” 
(forthcoming, p. 12). According to Sugden, such a step is an inductive one. 
 
What Schelling has done is to construct a set of imaginary cities, whose 
working we can easily understand. In these cities, racial segregation evolves 
only if people have preferences about the racial mix of their neighbours, but 
strong segregation evolves even if those preferences are quite mild. In these 
imaginary cities, we also find that the spatial boundaries between the races 
tend to move over time, while segregation is preserved. We are invited to 
make the inductive inference that similar causal processes apply in real 
multi-ethnic cities. We now look at such cities. Here too we find strong 
spatial segregation between ethnic groups, and here too we find that the 
boundaries between groups move over time. Since the same effects are 
found in both real and imaginary cities, it is at least credible to suppose that 
                                                 
225The ‘dictionary’ translating the model into a real-world representation is as follows: 
coins = people; dimes and pennies = two races; areas = neighbourhoods; separation = racial 
segregation; rules = people’s preferences; etc. As Dan Hausman pointed out to me, 
Schelling’s contribution can also be read as the exploration of an interesting and 
counterintuitive possibility, rather than as an explanation of real world behaviour. Sugden 
(forthcoming) discusses and dismisses this interpretation in section 3 of his paper. 
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the same causes are responsible. Thus, we have been given some reason to 
think that segregation in real cities is caused by preferences for segregation, 
and that the extent of segregation is invariant to changes in the strength of 
such preferences (Sugden, forthcoming, p. 34). 
 
Let us notice, first of all, that the activity of modelling in economics has to do 
with the construction, and the theoretical description, of ‘model-worlds’. Such 
systems are mostly abstract entities, existing only in the minds of those who 
happen to read, for instance, Schelling’s book. But in principle a real, material 
chequerboard could be manufactured with its dimes and pennies, and a 
‘segregation game’ played for real (Schelling actually invites the readers to do so). 
Schelling’s game-theoretic account of segregation is true of the checquerboard 
described in his book - and trivially so, because the checquerboard system is 
designed so as to satisfy Schelling’s game-theoretic formalism exactly. I have 
chosen Schelling’s theory of segregation because the model there (the 
checquerboard, the dimes and pennies, and the rules of the game) is easily 
visualisable and separable from the theoretical formalism. But the same applies to 
all theories (including, e.g., the theory of auction we have started with): provided 
that their axioms and principles are consistent, an abstract model is identified of 
which the formalism is true. 
 
It should be easy to grasp this idea for those trained in mainstream economics. 
Take for example the Walrasian auctioneer that is central in general equilibrium 
models. It is a typical model in the sense above: it is an abstract entity, because no 
real market uses tâtonnement to determine prices (although a few market 
institutions are similar to the Walrasian auctioneer). And it is an entity of which the 
theory’s equations are true: if such an institution existed, then Walrasian 
equilibrium theory would fit it perfectly. Indeed, Walras in the fourth edition of the 
Elements of Pure Economics seems to suggest that the term ‘tâtonnement’ 
refers to the technique of solving a system of symultaneous equations by 
iteration.226 The ambiguity (tâtonnement as what the auctioneer does, or as what 
the theorist does?) in this case just helps us to understand the nature of models in 
a better way. 
 
We have here a first, clear sense in which models can be said to act as 
‘mediators’: a theory’s formalism (i.e. the set of  ‘axioms’, ‘principles’ or ‘laws’ 
                                                 
226On the Walrasian auctioneer and its various possible interpretations, see De Vroey 
(1998). 
 182 
 
of the theory) is not applied straight to reality, but is first and foremost asserted to 
be true of an ideal model-world, and then is suggested to be somehow relevant 
for the understanding some real-world phenomenon. The path from theory to the 
real world is broken down into at least two steps. Some philosophers of science 
have proposed, indeed, to take the model-worlds of which theoretical principles 
are true as the primary unit of analysis defining what a scientific theory is. Such an 
idea - put forward among others by Patrick Suppes (1969), Wolfgang Stegmüller 
(1979), Ronald Giere (1979/1997; 1988), Bas van Fraassen (1980), Frederick 
Suppe (1989) - is usually referred to as the ‘semantic view’ of theories. 
According to the semantic view, a theory is mainly defined by a family of models, 
rather than by any specific linguistic assertion about them, or about the real 
world.227 
 
Philosophers have learnt from logicians and meta-mathematicians to think of 
models as objects. More precisely, as structures (sets of objects with their 
properties and relations) of which some axiomatic system is true. Scientists, and 
economists in particular, nevertheless often refer to syntactical entities (sometimes 
even to purely syntactical, uninterpreted, ones) as ‘models’.228 But here it is 
useful to stick to a well-defined and rigorous terminology, and speak of models 
the way semantic theorists do. I shall follow Ronald Giere’s (1979/1997; 1988) 
account, and say that a scientific theory is made of two elements: a family of 
models, and a ‘theoretical hypothesis’ asserting that the models stand in some 
particular relationship with the real world. For instance, that segregation in 
American cities evolves in a somehow ‘similar’ way as dimes and pennies move 
on Schelling’s checquerboard. Or that the Walrasian auctioneer provides a good 
caricature of how market forces operate. 
 
The Semantic View was put forward with some precise goals in mind. First of 
all, by focusing on semantic aspects rather than on the syntactical aspects of a 
theory, semantic theorists intended to turn away from problems with language 
which had obsessed the logical positivists. A number of alternative axiomatic 
systems can define the very set of structures for which a theory holds - or in other 
                                                 
227The semantic view of theories is in reality less monolothic than I am pretending it to be 
here. To be precise, one should for instance distinguish between the ‘semantic’, the 
‘structuralist’, and the ‘predicate’ approach; others like to distinguish the ‘set-theoretic’ 
from the ‘state-space’ and the ‘representational’ approach. These distinctions are too fine-
grained for my present purposes, but see Hausman (1992, ch. 5) for a discussion of which 
version fits economic modelling practice better. 
228On the differences and similarities between mathematicians’ and applied scientists’ use 
of the term model, cf. Suppes (1969). 
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words which are semantic models  of that theory. To claim that a theory is a set 
of models (rather than a set of axioms) amounts to say that it is relatively 
unimportant which syntactic formulation of the theory has been chosen. What 
really matters are the models. These will include structures like abstract set-
theoretical entities, systems of dimensionless mass-points and ideal harmonic 
oscillators (for classical mechanics), or checquerboards inhabited by dimes and 
pennies (for Schelling’s theory of segregation). From an empirical point of view, 
the fact that a theory’s equations are true of such structures is not very 
informative, though. Clearly, it is not scientists’ primary goal to describe such 
structures. The latter are useful simply as an intermediate step on the way to 
explain or describe something else. The reason why scientists focus on models 
rather than real systems is pragmatic: models are simpler, more manageable, and 
easier to describe than reality.  
 
A theory’s axiomatics usually includes ‘fictional assumptions’ that do not have 
any real-world counterpart. These can be of various sorts. Some of them, like the 
assumption that economic agents are rational greedy maximisers, are false when 
taken as unrestricted generalisations, but may be true of most situations in the 
intended domain of the theory. Others, like the homogeneity condition in 
consumers’ demand, or the macroeconomic assumption of zero interest rates, are 
almost always false of the real-world situations the theory is supposed to explain, 
but may conceivably hold in some other (unlikely) circumstances. Sometimes they 
are necessary for analytical reasons, sometimes they are just heuristic assumptions 
for the sake of illustrating or developing the model at hand. Finally, there are 
assumptions which cannot possibly be true of any entities in the real world, like 
the assumption that prices may be irrational numbers, or that the economy has an 
infinite number of agents. Some (if not most) systems of axioms or laws, then, 
have semantic counterparts (models) only in some mathematical heaven, or in a 
Platonic world of ideas. The second aspect that makes the semantic view 
appealing, then, has to do with truth: one can concede that scientific laws are true 
of models only, and argue that some other relation holds between the models and 
the real world. (Of course this does not exclude in principle that in some special 
cases there are real systems among the models of the theory.229) Such a 
relationship has been characterised in a number of different ways, from van 
                                                 
229In a similar vein, economists sometimes ask whether a certain economy is, e.g., a 
‘Keynesian economy’. It is better to resist such talk for two reasons: first, because of the 
problems with idealisation discussed in the main text above, suggesting that real-world 
models are rare; secondly, because a distinctive characteristics of models is their being 
simpler and more manageable than real-world systems, and conflating the two does not help 
us in the analysis of the role and nature of models. 
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Fraassen’s (1980) ‘isomorphism’ to Giere’s (1988) ‘similarity’ and Hughes’ 
(1997) ‘denotation’, and there is a lot of discussion about which one is best. I 
shall not be concerned with this problem here, however. Let us just keep in mind 
that theoretical laws (axioms, principles) are true of models, and that a distinct 
hypothesis is often needed to link the latter to the real world. 
 
 To sum up then, and most importantly for our purposes, the Semantic View 
accounts for the fact that the axioms and laws of a theory are usually about some 
intermediate entities. The latter usually have a number of ‘nice’ features, which 
make them preferable to the target systems falling in the intended domain of the 
theory. This not only helps to solve some puzzles (like the highly idealised 
character of most scientific theories) which are not easily dealt with by the 
traditional framework; it also provides us with a powerful idea that may be 
extended beyond the realm of theoretical models to explicate the role of other 
mediating entities like experiments, material models, and simulations. 
 
5.5. Mediators 
 
As anticipated, I shall try to explicate the nature and role of economic 
experiments by analogy, arguing that they are used in many respects like models. 
The idea of ‘mediating models’ has been at the centre of a research project on 
‘Modelling in Physics and Economics’ carried out at the London School of 
Economics, and has generated a number of case studies.230 In this section I shall 
just summarise some of the main tenets of the ‘mediators’ approach and show 
how they can be used for my purposes. 
 
5.5.1 Demonstrations 
 
Mediating entities have three main characteristics: they are partly independent 
both from high theory and from the systems they are supposed to explain; they 
‘stand for’ some real-world systems of interest (which I shall call ‘target 
systems’); and they can be manipulated in order to learn something about the 
real world. I shall start with the latter feature. R.I.G. Hughes (1997) has called it 
the capacity to ‘demonstrate’, and in this section I shall rely on his account - the 
‘Denotation, Demonstration, Interpretation’ (DDI) account of models - in order 
to extend it to experiments in the non-laboratory sciences. 
                                                 
230Cf. Morgan and Morrison (eds. 1999), Morrison (1998b), as well as the symposium on 
mediating models in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 64, Supplement (Proceedings of PSA 1996). 
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Models display the important property of having internal mechanisms, which 
determine their evolution under certain conditions. This is a property of both 
theoretical (mathematical) and material models. 
 
Like an analogical representation, [a mathematical representation] presents 
us with a secondary subject that has, so to speak, a life of its own. In other 
words, the representation has an internal dynamic whose effects we can 
examine. From the behavior of the model we can draw hypothetical 
conclusions about the world over and above the data we started with 
(Hughes, 1997, p. S331). 
 
Hughes calls the process of producing certain consequences by manipulating 
the model, ‘demonstration’.231 The word has a long history and is particularly 
well chosen: it was common practice in the 17th Century to ‘demonstrate’ in 
public with experiments and models, and of course its connotation overlaps also 
with that of mathematical proof.232 The basic idea implicit in demonstrating is that 
of triggering a mechanism and observing what its consequences (e.g. a theorem, 
or a physical effect) are. As an example of a material model, Hughes takes a 
model of light waves as water waves in a ripple tank. One ‘demonstrates’ the 
propagation of light waves by producing a process of propagation of water 
waves. 
 
Whereas in the 17th century geometrical theorems were said to be 
‘demonstrated’, nowadays we demonstrate physical phenomena in the 
laboratory. Mathematical models enable us to demonstrate results in the 
first sense, material models in the second (Hughes, 1997, p. S332). 
 
To sum up: models can be theoretical (abstract) or material (concrete) in 
character. Both have the capacity to ‘demonstrate’. When demonstrating with a 
theoretical model, one usually explores the properties of an abstract structure and 
the consequences of some changes in it. When demonstrating with material 
models, one takes a concrete system that is supposed to display at a certain 
(more or less abstract) level of analysis a behaviour analogous to that of the target 
system one is interested in. The material system can then be used to mimick the 
                                                 
231The idea of manipulability as a crucial characteristic of mediating model is central in 
Morgan and Morrison’s (1999) account. Hughes’ own version should be seen in the context 
of that (i.e. the ‘Models in Physics and Economics’) project. 
232Steve Shapin (1988) analyses the social role of public ‘demonstrations’ in detail. 
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behaviour of the target system. Hughes’ notion of ‘demonstration’ nicely captures 
this activity of ‘playing with’ entities which are not necessarily the set of sentences 
defining the syntactical component of a scientific theory, nor the target systems the 
theory is ultimately supposed to be applied to. Morgan and Morrison (1999) 
have called such entities ‘mediators’. 
 
By moving from theoretical to material models we get ‘closer and closer’ to 
experimental systems (I shall try to make this intuition more precise later, 
especially in chapter six). The latter too may be seen as mediating entities, useful 
for their capacity to demonstrate. Both material models and experimental systems 
feature concrete, material mechanisms which the scientist can use in order to 
understand the functioning of a target system. In the laboratory sciences 
experimenters ‘play’ with the target system itself; in the non-laboratory sciences it 
is sometimes possible to manipulate the target system in a non-laboratory 
environment, but this is more often difficult, costly, dangerous, even impossible, 
and the inferences drawn from uncontrolled experiments are hardly reliable 
anyway. 
 
We can see this also outside economics: one of the principal justifications for 
animal experimentation in medicine is that direct research on humans (the ‘target 
systems’) are not only morally unacceptable, but also methodologically 
problematic. Confounding factors of various sorts make the collection of an 
unbiased sample of data particularly difficult. While investigating the influence of 
electromagnetic fields on cancer rates, for example, North Carolina researchers 
tried to select a sample of subjects by picking up telephone numbers randomly. 
But apparently lower-income people are less likely to be at home during the day. 
The data suggested that brain cancer is highly correlated with exposure to 
electromagnetic fields, but also with traffic density, maternal smoking, and breast-
feeding - which are all correlated with poverty. Animals, as opposed to humans, 
seem to be more controllable, and to provide data free from biases of the above 
kind.233 
 
5.5.2 Representativeness 
 
                                                 
233Arguments of this sort can be found in official documents of the American Medical 
Association. The specific example is taken from LaFollette and Shanks (1996, ch. 2), who 
provide a most interesting discussion of the methodological problems (especially 
‘parallelism’) facing animal experimentation. 
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The word ‘demostration’ is apt also because it evokes the fact that the 
experiment is neither the target system nor a representation of it - it just stands 
for it. In this sense, the experimental auction of our example does a similar job. 
One may say that it ‘represents’ the real OCS auction, but in the sense of being a 
surrogate for it (as a mediating entity, it is a ‘representative’, rather than a 
‘representation’234). Thus, there must be some relations linking the mediating 
object to the target system. More precisely, we need one function taking us from 
the target to the mediator, and another inverse one to take us back from the 
mediator to the target after the latter has been used for investigative purposes. 
 
Hughes (1997) puts it as follows: a theory aims at providing an explanation of 
the behaviour of a certain system; in order to do so, it points to some model 
which will denote the system. Interpretation is the inverse of denotation: it is a 
function taking us from the model to the real system represented by the model. 
Usually, the process of interpretation takes place after some non-trivial 
consequences (predictions) have been drawn from the model. Denotation is the 
first step, interpretation the last one; in between, a demonstration takes place. The 
detour through models, from and back to the target system can, according to 
Hughes, be represented as in figure 1. 
                                                 
234For such a distinction, see Hughes (1999). 
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As I have said, the relationship between models and the systems falling in the 
theory’s intended domain of application has been characterised in a number of 
ways (‘similarity’ and ‘isomorphism’ being two well-known alternatives to 
Hughes’ ‘denotation-interpretation’ account). The debate is philosophically 
sophisticated and it is not the purpose of this chapter to contribute to it. In the 
remaining sections I shall use the DDI account with its terminology for reasons of 
simplicity, but I have to stress that the ‘demonstration’ component is the crucial 
one as far as I am concerned.  
 
Thus, laboratory experiments in the non-laboratory sciences demonstrate 
with experimental systems that ‘stand for’ the target systems of interest. 
Such is my main claim concerning the nature of experiments in economics. Any 
mediating entity is linked either to the real world or to another mediator by means 
of some particular relationship. According to Giere (1988), for example, 
theoretical models are linked to some real-world entity by a ‘theoretical 
hypothesis’, stating what relationship holds between the model and the real world. 
In the case of experiments, similarly, a ‘parallelism hypothesis’ has to be put 
forward saying that the laboratory system stands in some particular relationship to 
the target. Kagel and Levin, for instance, claim that their laboratory auctions are 
common value auctions like the OCS ones. (They are partially isomorphic with 
respect to auction theory, in the sense that they share all the observable properties 
modeled in the theory’s language.) The two steps leading from a given economic 
model to the real-world phenomenon it intends to explain can therefore be 
represented as in figure 2. 
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In the case examined in section 2, there were two competing models, the 
winner’s curse and the RNNE one. I shall devote the next sections to discuss 
how parallelism hypotheses are tested by reviewing the OCS case in detail: What 
kind of data are needed to confirm or refute a parallelism hypothesis? And how 
are they used? Before then, it is worth discussing the third and last crucial feature 
of mediating entities, namely their ‘independence’. 
 
5.5.3 Independence 
 
 The know-how used in building mediating models comes from different sources. 
Scientific models are rarely entirely theoretical or empirical in character. They are 
usually hybrid objects, and for this reason they can function like tools or 
instruments. “It is precisely because models are partially independent of both 
theories and the world, that they have this autonomous component and so can be 
used as instruments of exploration in both domains” (Morgan and Morrison, 
1999, p. 1).235 
 
Experiments too are autonomous from theory and the systems they are 
intended to represent. They are obviously autonomous from theory from an ontic 
point of view, but are also partially autonomous from theory from an epistemic 
viewpoint: a lot more than theoretical knowledge is needed in order to build, run, 
and interpret an experiment correctly. Experiments are designed only in part 
according to theoretical contraints. The path from the target system to models and 
experiments can be represented as in Figure 3. Let us discuss the diagram with 
the example of Kagel and Levin’s winner’s curse experiments in mind. 
                                                 
235Again, for a number of examples supporting this claim, see the case studies in Morgan 
and Morrison (eds. 1999). 
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The target systems to be represented consist of the OCS auctions, and oil 
companies’ low profits is the phenomenon to be explained. The first move is to 
choose a theoretical model providing an explanation of this phenomenon. There 
are in our case two rival candidates, the RNNE model and the winner’s curse 
model. The decision to represent the target system by means of either of the two 
models involves a number of assumptions; some of them are common to both 
models: for instance that the rights to exploit a lease are worth the same for all 
bidders, or in other words that OCS auctions are common value auctions; that 
each bidding firm obtains an estimate from its experts; and that the estimates are 
unbiased, so that their mean corresponds to the common value of the track. Let 
us call these presuppositions common to both models ‘neutral assumptions’. 
Other assumptions, such as the one put forward by the RNNE model that bidders 
are perfectly rational, are specific to either one or the other of the two models. 
 
The role of the experiment is to discriminate between the two representations. 
The theoretical models provide thus the necessary information to design an 
experiment such that, ideally, (a) the neutral assumptions are satisfied, and (b) the 
experimental system can be manipulated so as to obtain a result discriminating 
between the two rivals, i.e. a result that can follow from only one of the two 
models. If so, the experiment will provide a crucial test between the two 
competing explanations. The process of ‘demonstration’ is therefore carried on in 
parallel, by manipulating and letting the three machines (the two theoretical models 
and the experimental system) run. A first process of interpretation is needed to 
link the theoretical models’ predictions to the outcome of the experiment. But this 
is not the end of the story: the experimental system is not the target system, and 
thus one needs a further step, from the experimental auction to the real OCS 
auction. We shall see (sections 5.6-5.7) that this parallelism step is far from trivial. 
 
Margaret Morrison has argued that mediating models sometimes “even 
supplant the physical system they were designed to represent and become the 
primary object of inquiry” (1998b, p. 8). This fits very well with my analogy: 
experimental systems too ‘take on a life of their own’, although their properties 
are investigated under the hypothesis that they can teach us something about the 
real economic world. But (both in the case of models and of experiments, one 
supposes), this applies only to the first phase of investigation. Experiments take on 
a life of their own, but only for a while. Because experiments in economics are 
separate from the target systems they intend to represent, the parallelism problem 
arises. Thus, good experiments must be autonomous from their target domain 
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only in part, if they want to teach us something about it. In the next section I shall 
show how one can deal with parallelism by turning back to the OCS case. 
 
5.6. Tightening the bridge 
 
Demonstrating with models and experiments is an activity with a clear epistemic 
goal. The main question one has to face when dealing with a conjectural 
(theoretical or experimental) ‘demonstration’ of a certain phenomenon is: What is 
the relationship between the model or the experiment and the target system? How 
can one argue that the model or experiment is a satisfactory representative of the 
target system? Here lies the epistemic gap to be filled by parallelism 
arguments.236 
 
It should be stressed that the problem of generalising laboratory results is not 
peculiar to economics. In Laboratory Life (1979/1986), Bruno Latour and 
Steve Woolgar give a detailed account of the research on the thyrotropin 
releasing hormone (TRH) that led to the award of the Nobel prize for medicine to 
Roger Guillemin in 1977. TRH is a product of the mammalian hypothalamus 
which allows the secretion of a hormone called thyrotropin. The hypothalamus 
secretes only a tiny amount of TRH, which is therefore very difficult to obtain. 
Guillemin in Houston (and, independently, Andrew Schally in New Orleans) 
solved the problem by synthesising a tri-peptide whose behaviour resembles 
very closely that of the TRH. The focus of Latour and Woolgar as 
microsociologists of science was on the (alleged) strategies of negotiation that led 
to identifying the synthesised protein with the real TRH in mammals’ 
hypothalamus. The remarkable aspect of Laboratory Life’s case study, as 
noticed by Hacking (1988), is that the artificial peptide became quickly - and 
without much scrutiny, a fact suggesting that sociological factors may have played 
a role in such a decision - the benchmark for deciding what should count as TRH 
and what should not. Its structure became ‘the’ structure of TRH. The success of 
Guillemin’s and Schally’s work was probably due to their ability to provide an 
‘off-the-shelf’ substance potentially to be used for a number of tasks 
(independently of its being ‘the’ original TRH or not). But how can one prove 
                                                 
236Of course not all ‘demonstrations’ are put forward for epistemic purposes. When Phillips 
built his famous analogic model of a Keynesian macroeconomy made of pipes, water and 
valves, he also aimed at clarifying macroeconomic theories for didactic purposes (cf. 
Morgan and Boumans, 1998). His aim was pedagogic, whereas an experimental 
demonstration like Kagel and Levin’s, in contrast, clearly has a more ambitious goal. 
Economic experiments are also used to convince laymen of the correctness of certain 
policies. 
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that an ‘artificial’ result in the laboratory is actually a faithful representative of a 
real-world phenomenon or entity? 
 
Let us go back to the winner’s curse experiments presented in section 5.2 
above, and see how the issue was tackled in that case. Kagel and Levin claim 
they have produced the winner’s curse phenomenon in the laboratory, and their 
claim is clearly intended to bear on the real-world issue at hand: was the 
winner’s curse the cause of average low profits in the OCS auctions? We 
had two possible explanations of the data, and the experiment was designed so as 
to increase the plausibility of the winner’s curse explanation. That is, the 
experiment was performed in order to confirm either the standard RNNE model, 
or the alternative winner’s curse model (or possibly neither one nor the other) as 
explanations of the target phenomenon at stake.  
 
As we have seen in the last chapter, the parallelism step must eventually be 
empirical in character. We have also seen that some experimentalists seem to be 
aware of this. According to Vernon Smith, for example, “which kinds of 
behaviour exhibit parallelism and which not can only be determined empirically by 
comparison studies” (1982, p. 267, but see last chapter for more quotes). In the 
preference reversals case, one last step was missing: having shown that certain 
circumstances considerably reduced the relevance of the phenomenon in the 
laboratory, economists did not go on to trying to answer the (crucial) question 
whether such conditions are instantiated in real world economies always or at 
least for the most part. They never, in other words, stepped out of their 
laboratories to collect field evidence for parallelism. 
 
The case of the OCS auctions similarly required one step beyond the 
reproduction of the winner’s curse in the laboratory. Real-world evidence did not 
play any role in the arguments presented in section 5.2 (except of course as a 
motivation for the experiments). Thus, the strength of the winner’s curse 
explanation had to be somehow increased; Kagel and Levin focused on an 
interesting parallelism between laboratory results and a real-world phenomenon. 
Mead, Moseidjord and Sorensen (1983) had provided data about different 
profits achieved by oil companies on so-called ‘wildcat’ as opposed to ‘drainage’ 
leases. The former are on tracts for which no evidence about past productivity is 
available, whereas the latter are on tracts lying adjacent to some hydrocarbon 
reservoir. The developers of the adjacent tract (the ‘neighbours’) have higher 
private information on the profitability of the drainage tract, but all bidders (‘non-
neighbours’) know that something is likely to be found. 
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Mead, Moseidjord and Sorensen (1983) noticed that in the Gulf of Mexico 
from 1954 to 1969 both neighbours and non-neighbours have had on average 
higher rates of returns on drainage than on wildcat leases, a fact that is not 
compatible with the RNNE explanation. Why? Because in RNNE, depending on 
whether the information available is (a) purely public, (b) purely private, or (c) 
both private and public, we should expect rates of return: (a) lower for all; (b-c) 
higher for neighbours than non-neighbours, with the latter earning less than they 
would in absence of insider information. If a winner’s curse effect is present, in 
contrast, the data can be easily explained: the increase in insiders’ information 
helps to reduce the winners’ overestimation of wildcat tracts, and thus raises the 
returns of both neighbours and non-neighbours. Kagel and Levin (1986) show 
that a phenomenon of the above sort can be replicated in the laboratory, where 
one can control for public information at will (the strategy has been outlined in 
section 5.2 above). 
 
From a methodological point of view, the logic of the procedure can be 
analysed as follows. Let us call the evidence in need of explanation, i.e. the fact 
that oil companies in the Gulf of Mexico experience on average low returns from 
their leases, e. The goal of the experiment is to discriminate between two 
alternative theoretical hypotheses H1 and H2 - the RNNE explanation and the 
winner’s curse explanation respectively. The construction of an artificial common 
value auction system enables us to test (new) predictions from H1 and H2. Kagel 
and Levin, by varying initial conditions such as public/private information and the 
number of bidders, construct an independent test which is moreover a quasi-
crucial experiment relative to H1 and H2, i.e. such that H2 ⇒ e’ but H1 ⇒ ∼e’. 
The new evidence e’ collected in the laboratory confirms that a winner’s curse 
phenomenon is likely to be hidden behind experimental bidding. Indeed, Kagel 
and Levin produced two quasi-crucial experiments (‘quasi’ because their 
conclusion depends on the decision to limit the analysis to H1 and H2, and on a 
number of auxiliary hypotheses about the experimental techniques, etc.), by 
varying the number of bidders and the nature of the information provided. The 
results of both tests were consistent with the winner’s curse hypothesis, which 
was therefore highly confirmed. 
 
The experimenters were aware that such evidence (e’) could not settle the 
dispute about the target system. Therefore, they showed that in the real world 
there are cases of variation of public/private information theoretically analogous to 
those reproduced in the laboratory. In the OCS case, such evidence was 
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provided by Mead, Moseidjord and Sorensen’s study. The crucial argument for 
parallelism consists in showing that (i) in some cases the initial conditions of the 
real systems under study are (qualitatively) similar to those of the laboratory 
systems; and thus (ii) some data in the real world, e*, can really play the same 
role as e’, so that H2 ⇒ e* and H1 ⇒ ∼e*. 
 
It must be noticed that in this case the data (e*) used to argue for parallelism 
constitute a sub-sample of the data (e) that originally motivated the experimental 
investigation. They are all, in fact, productivity data ranging over the same period. 
They are supposed to provide novel information nonetheless, because, although 
the same mechanism (either that described by the RNNE or the winner’s curse 
mechanism) is supposed to be at work in all auctions, slightly different effects 
follow from different initial conditions (e.g. the kind of information available to 
bidders). Theoretical reasoning plays an important role in selecting the ‘right’ sub-
set of data. This ‘nesting’ of e and e* at any rate does not have to hold in general: 
the field data used for parallelism might be totally independent of the field data 
that motivated the experiments. When the data-set changes, other problems with 
generalising, inferring, inducing from one case to another necessarily arise. The 
inferences, once again, can only be supported by other assumptions: that the data 
generating process stays fixed, for example. Such assumptions may be based on 
empirical evidence on their own; or simply be considered reasonable in the 
absence of any proof to the contrary; or supported by theoretical reasoning. 
Background knowledge of this sort, is indispensable in the game of science.237 
 
It is really e* that provides confirmation for H2 as an explanans of e. It can do 
so because a final process of ‘interpretation’ (to use Hughes’ terminology) has 
taken place: economic theory suggests that wildcat and drainage leases provide 
information of a different quality (public vs. private), so that both the results 
‘demonstrated’ from the theoretical models and those ‘demonstrated’ from the 
                                                 
237Moreover, the correspondence between experimental and field evidence is strictly 
speaking of the ‘phenomena-to phenomena’ kind (to take Bogen and Woodward’s, 1988, 
terminology). To calculate profits is rather straightforward in the experiment: it is the 
difference between the value of the auctioned item (x0) and the price paid for it (b1) (this is 
why one does experiments in the first place!). In the field things are more complicated; 
Mead, Moseidjord and Sorensen (1983) use the so-called ‘internal rate of return’ (IRR) 
measure: the rate of discount which makes the present value of the stream of net revenue 
(i.e. gross revenue minus costs minus taxes) equal to zero. The IRR can only be estimated, 
because there do not exist direct data for a number of costs (exploration costs, post-sale 
exploration, drilling, development, production, interests, and abandonment costs, for 
example) which must be derived from other indicators, and the taxes attributable to each 
lease can only be calculated on the basis of estimated costs and revenues. Quite a number 
of assumptions carry the weight of the parallelism argument. 
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experiment can denote a phenomenon in the target system. It is crucial that such a 
process of interpretation, like the initial one of denotation, be ‘neutral’ with 
respect to the two theories at stake, so that the parallelism inference can be 
accepted by both parties. No assumption incompatible with any one of the two 
hypotheses can be used in order to identify e* with e’.238 
 
The moral is that experiments can help just at an intermediate stage of 
confirmation. They cannot completely fill the gap between the target phenomenon 
and the theoretical model. Experimentalists are aware of this: 
 
Our objective here is not to definitively test between competing 
explanations using field data. If we thought the field had this kind of 
potential, there would be no need to resort to laboratory experiments in the 
first place [...]. Rather, our objective is to show that a reasonable analysis 
of the available data does not falsify the hypothesis that similar economic 
processes are at work in both settings. If this can be done, the burden of 
proof rests on those who would argue that the results don’t generalize to 
demonstrate that their arguments are correct (Kagel and Levin, 1986, p. 
914). 
 
Notice that no claims about having shifted the burden of proof are put forward 
before this last section of the paper. The need for an argument for parallelism is 
clear: experiments cannot, on their own, prove much about the real world. They 
can increase the plausibility of an explanation, but only up to a certain point. The 
reason is not only that a pattern of data can be explained by different theories, but 
that it may also be the result of different causal processes. A Duhem-Quine 
problem can be reduced in the laboratory by controlled testing, but establishing 
that a certain explanation is the right one in the (artificial) domain X does not 
prove that the same process lies at the origins of a similar pattern of data in the 
target domain Y. In order to establish this, one needs some further independent 
evidence from the target domain of application of the theory at stake. By 
presenting such evidence, Kagel and Levin made the first move and sent the ball 
into the opponents’ camp. It was their turn, then, to discredit Kagel and Levin’s 
results by challenging the parallelism argument. 
 
5.7. Parallelism as analogy 
 
                                                 
238Cf. what said in section 5.5. In this sense, parallelism arguments are theory-dependent. 
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With the OCS example in mind, we can now try to put forward a more abstract 
characterisation of the relationship between models, experiments, and target 
systems. We can also try to define more precisely what kind of reasoning is 
involved in making the parallelism step from experimental systems to the real 
world of phenomena the theory aims at explaining. I have argued earlier that the 
demonstrative capacity common to models and experiments is due to their having 
some internal mechanism which can be ‘triggered’ and let run. The procedure of 
experimental confirmation in the non-laboratory sciences can therefore be thought 
of as a demonstration carried on in parallel, on three systems at the same time: a 
real-world system, a theoretical model, and an experimental system. 
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On the far left of figure 4, we have a (theoretical) model which, when certain 
initial conditions are assigned to it, leads to a prediction. On the far right, there is 
the real-world system, producing certain observed ‘field’ data out of naturally 
evolved initial conditions. In the middle, we have a laboratory system, producing 
an experimental result out of tightly controlled initial conditions. In order to argue 
for parallelism, a number of moves have to be made. The first one consists in 
associating the initial conditions stated by the theoretical model with both the initial 
conditions of the experimental system and those of the target system. The first 
step, as I have already suggested, is automatically fulfilled by designing the 
experiment so as to mirror (some of) the model’s assumptions. The second step is 
more problematic, as it amounts to finding some features of the real-world 
systems that correspond to the model’s and the experiment’s initial conditions. 
The same operation must then be carried on at the level of the outcomes of the 
demonstrations: the model’s predictions must be associated with the experimental 
outcome and with some real-world observed data. 
 
The next (big) step consists in arguing that since a correspondence has been 
established both at the level of the initial conditions and at the level of the 
outcomes, then there also exists a correspondence at the level of the internal 
processes. Imagine two sets X and X* such that each one element of the first set 
can be associated to one (and only one) element of the other by means of a 
function f (a bijection). Nothing guarantees that all the relations holding between 
the elements of the first set will also hold between the corresponding elements of 
the second set. In order for a relation R on the first set to translate into a relation 
R* on the second set, we must impose the further requirement on the function f 
(taking us from the set X to the set X*) that x*R*y* if and only if xRy (where x, y 
and x*, y* are elements of X and X* respectively). 
 
By associating some systems in such a way - claiming that the stated initial 
conditions of a theoretical model denote the initial conditions of an experimental 
system, and that both denote the initial conditions of a real-world system - we are 
thus drawing a function from the properties of one kind of entity to the properties 
of the other. The relationships exploited in parallelism arguments can be seen as 
functions from models to experiments to target-systems. The parallelism step is 
however complete only after a correspondence has been established at the level 
of the internal processes - the relations between a system’s initial conditions and 
its successive states. These relations are syntactical rules in the case of a 
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syntactical entity, abstract relations in the case of a theoretical model, causal 
processes239 in the case of an experimental and a real-world system. 
 
To take another example: arguing from a correspondence between initial 
conditions and outcomes to a correspondence between mechanisms is like 
arguing from the observation that six points form a grid of the kind represented in 
figure 5 (see next page), to the claim that there exists an infinite number of other, 
unobservable, points forming two parallel lines. What kind of argument is this? As 
we have seen, Robert Sugden (fothcoming) claims that the step from a model to 
the real world is inductive in character. More precisely, it seems to be an 
analogical argument, both in the vague sense of the word ‘analogy’ in everyday 
language, and in the technical sense of the Greek word analogìa (‘according to a 
ratio’). In general, an analogy is a similarity relationship between two entities or 
sets of entities. In the Pythagorean tradition, more precisely, an analogy was an 
identity of ratios. This meaning survived in the mathematical sense of analogy as 
proportion: a : b = c : d. Whereas an analogy in the everyday sense involves two 
entities, an analogy in the original, rigorous sense always involves at least four 
terms taken in couples: “As A is to B, so C is to D”, according to Aristotle 
(Topics, i, 17). In the case we are concerned with, the parallelism argument 
amounts to an analogy of the following sort: given (a) some controlled initial 
conditions in the laboratory and (b) some observed experimental result on the one 
hand; and given (c) some observed properties of the target system and (d) some 
observed field data on the other, then (by analogy) c stands in the same (causal) 
relation to d as a stands to b. 
                                                 
239Of course, I do not (and cannot) go into the problem of causation here; the above claim 
is supposed to be neutral regarding which theory of causation one subscribes to. 
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Analogies have a well-known heuristic value: by postulating an analogy 
between two sets of properties, we can infer the existence of a hidden property in 
one set by observing the existence of other properties in the other set. Analogical 
models sometimes work precisely this way: by observing the properties of a 
model we are induced to think that similar properties are to be found in the real 
entity modelled. To say it once again with Aristotle, “A is in B like C is in D”. 
More rigorously, in mathematics knowledge of three terms of a postulated 
proportion like 1 : 3 = x : 6 allows to obtain the value of x = 2. In our case, 
however, the parallelism analogy cannot be simply postulated. It is a hypothesis, 
one has to justify it, and the argument takes the form of a generalisation from a 
number of correspondences between the entities in the two sets to an analogy 
between the relations holding inside the sets themselves. 
 
Induction is part of the process: it intervenes because, of course, the more 
initial conditions and outcomes are found to correspond to each other by 
denotation and interpretation, the more one is led to think that the systems’ 
internal mechanisms correspond to one another. This is nothing new: it is one of 
the confirmation processes inductivists have taught us about since a long time 
ago.240 The relationship between models, experiments and real systems is one of 
analogy; the analogy is established (or just weakly confirmed) by inductive 
reasoning. 
 
The inference, once again, is always affected by underdetermination. 
Analogical reasoning may turn out to be wrong, but there is nothing special with 
economics, from this respect. The mechanism of propagation of poliomelytis, for 
example, was unknown to virologists until quite recently. In order to investigate it, 
Flexner and Lewis studied the process of infection in rhesus monkeys. 
Apparently, monkeys are easily infected via the nose, from which the virus travels 
to the olfactory nerves and finally to the spinal cords. Nasal sprays based on 
alum, zinc sulfate and picric acid seemed to be able to kill the virus, and were 
therefore tested in experiments on humans. But the human nervous system is less 
susceptible to poliomelytis than that of lower primates; on the contrary, our 
intestinal tract is weaker and is attacked easily by the polio virus, whereas 
                                                 
240On the problem of confirming analogies, cf. Mary Hesse’s (1963) classic on models and 
analogies. What is said about models there can be easily translated in terms of experimental 
systems. 
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monkeys are more resistant to this kind of infection.241 Two different causal 
mechanisms in this case led to the same effects, and experimental analogy proved 
to be misleading. 
 
A characteristic feature of the parallelism step from experiments to target 
systems is that it is sometimes supported by very few established 
correspondences at the level of initial conditions and outcomes. In the OCS case, 
as we have seen, the analogy is based on just one correspondence - the one 
between private vs. public information and wildcat vs. drainage leases on the one 
hand, and the one between high vs. low returns of neighbour vs. non-neighbour 
tracts on the other. In contrast, the analogical step from the model to the 
experimental system can be supported by more evidence, and is thus more tightly 
established thanks to the manipulations and controls allowed by the laboratory. In 
the laboratory one can control the initial conditions so as to derive 
(‘demonstrate’) new phenomena, ideally ones that can discriminate between two 
alternative explanations. In the field, this is not always possible. For example, in 
the OCS case, field data provided a variation of public and private information 
but no control on the number of bidders was possible. 
 
Are experiments needed at all, then? After all, the whole investigation started 
with field data and finished with field data. And, as I have argued at length, field 
evidence is needed in order to argue for parallelism. So why not go back to 
econometrics and recognise that that is all we have got (although it may not be 
very much)?242 This would be too quick: there are good reasons to do laboratory 
experiments - even though these may not be conclusive ones in the context of a 
scientific controversy. 
 
Capen, Clapp and Campbell’s (1971) claim that oil companies’ poor profits 
originated from a winner’s curse phenomenon challenged the only existing theory 
of auctions available at the time. It also challenged a core hypothesis of 
mainstream economics - that economic agents are perfectly rational. According to 
orthodox economic theory, a winner’s curse should simply not occur. Showing 
that it occurred in the laboratory, then, proved that it was possible. Of course the 
laboratory is not the real world, but in absence of a reason why the same should 
not occur in the target system Kagel and Levin surely proved a point - something 
like proving an existence theorem in mathematics. Secondly, it is true that 
                                                 
241Cf. LaFollette and Shanks (1996, pp. 126-128); for a more detailed account of this episode, 
see Paul (1971). 
242I must thank in particular Julian Reiss and Peter Lipton who have raised this question.  
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experiments take one only half way towards the target, but they can support a 
point much better than most field data can. To repeat what I said in the last 
chapter: it is better to take one small firm step and another small shaky one, rather 
than one big shaky step at once. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Conclusion 
Simulating experiments, experimental 
simulations 
 
 
 
‘Isn’t the same thing always true?’ 
‘Your meaning?’ 
‘You always have the three techniques - 
use, manufacture, and representation.’ 
‘Yes.’ 
‘And isn’t the quality, beauty and fitness 
of any implement or creature or action 
judged by reference to the use for which 
man or nature produced it?’ 
(Plato, The Republic, Part 10, 601c-d) 
 
 
 
 
7.1. Summary 
 
Let me now summarise the main arguments of this dissertation. To begin with, I 
have tried to show how experiments can be used to assess normative theories. 
That was the central theme of chapter two: that economics is a complex 
discipline, concerned with matters of fact as well as normative issues such as 
rational decision making. To falsify an economic theory, therefore, may require an 
attack on both the descriptive and the normative fronts. Chapter three was 
devoted to provide more detail concerning the intricacies of laboratory testing. 
Focusing on the preference reversal experiments, I have tried to show how the 
interpretation of laboratory observations always requires some inference from 
‘data’ to ‘phenomena’. These inferences can be and often are indeed questioned, 
but they can in principle be resolved by means of ingenious testing. I then turned 
to the problem of parallelism and attempted a conceptual analysis of its main 
features in the fourth chapter. Parallelism concerns the relationship between 
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laboratory and real world systems, and - in the light of my analysis - should be 
resolved on empirical grounds. In chapter five I have tried to illustrate by means 
of an example how parallelism can be achieved in practice. The notion of 
‘mediating experiments’ has been also introduced in that chapter, and put at work 
on the winner’s curse example. In some circumstances, it has been suggested, 
parallelism can be established on firm grounds, provided enough information is 
available about the laboratory and the target systems in question. 
 
This journey through economic experimentation has been motivated mainly by 
methodological concerns. How are experiments used? Is there any difference 
between the use of experiments in economics and in the natural sciences? What 
kind of knowledge can be gained in the laboratory? And what makes a good 
economic experiment? What knowledge is needed in order to apply experimental 
results outside the laboratory? I have tried to show that economic experiments do 
not differ sharply from those performed in the natural sciences. The same 
methods, in particular, are applied in order to detect a phenomenon of interest on 
the background of unreliable, ‘noisy’, or uncertain data. I have also tentatively 
suggested that the problem of parallelism is not specific to economics or the 
human sciences, but that it may hold in other contexts as well. The truth is that 
parallelism is often taken for granted (and sometimes for good reasons) in some 
disciplines, whereas, in others, experimentalists are constantly required to prove 
that what they are doing is relevant to understanding the ‘target phenomena’ of 
their discipline. 
 
In this last chapter, finally, I would like to take a different perspective on 
experimental economics. We have seen what one can do with laboratory 
experiments, but what is an experiment in economics? 
 
7.2. Experiments and simulations 
 
Vernon Smith’s “An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior”, 
published in 1962 in the Journal of Political Economy, is one of the pioneering 
and most influential articles in experimental economics. Throughout the paper, 
Smith refers to his laboratory tests as ‘experiments’, ‘experimental games’, or 
similar locutions. Yet, we can read in the first page that “most of these 
experiments have been designed to simulate, on a modest scale, the multilateral 
auction-trading process characteristic of [...] organised markets”, and Smith is 
keen to emphasise that “[the experiments] are intended as simulations of certain 
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key features of the organised markets and of competitive markets generally” 
(1962, p. 111, my italics). 
 
Smith’s caution may appear outdated: surely economists nowadays are not 
afraid of speaking of experiments, and put their work on the same level as that of 
experimental physicists. But the issue is not merely terminological, and bears on 
an interesting conceptual distinction. Simulations, after all, are somehow supposed 
to be somehow less reliable than ‘genuine’ experiments as tools to produce 
scientific knowledge. They are usually taken as a second best when 
experimentation is unfeasible, and their results are often qualified as ‘mere’ 
simulations not to be mistaken for the ‘real thing’. But economic experimental 
systems are not the ‘real thing’. They are mediators, independent systems the 
study of which is supposed to teach us something about some other target 
systems of interest. And this sounds like the definition of a simulating device: some 
system (e.g., a computer-based model) that once put at work can help us 
understand the functioning of another system (a biological one, for example). 
 
Of course there is little prospect for progress unless we define what 
experiments and what simulations are in a more precise way. Simulations have 
attracted the interest of philosophers of science only recently,243 and we still lack 
an analysis of the distinction at stake. To my knowledge, the best solution can be 
found in Herbert Simon’s work on the ‘sciences of the artificial’, but I shall come 
to that later. Let us begin with the opinion of someone who has taken the question 
of the nature of economic experiments at face value. 
 
Harry Collins is one of the few students of experiment who have written about 
economic experimentation. In a short comment to a paper by Vernon Smith, 
Kevin McCabe and Stephen Rassenti (1991), he has argued that economic 
experiments are not ‘genuine’ experiments, of the same sort, say, as those 
performed by physicists. They should rather be seen as simulations. 
“Simulations”, according to Collins, “have a lot in common with experiments”, and 
certainly “involve a lot of experimentation and manipulation”; but “not all 
experimental manipulations and complex observations are experiments” (1991, 
pp. 227-228). Those taking place in economists’ laboratories, in particular, are 
not. 
                                                 
243Cf. the symposium in PSA 1990 (papers by Humphreys, Laymon and Rorlich), and more 
recently Hartmann (1996). Some history of the rise of simulation techniques in physics can 
be found in Galison (1997). As far as I know, the only historico-philosophical discussion of 
simulation techniques in economics is in Boumans (1998). 
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Collins points to some of the features common to mediators (to use the earlier 
terminology), such as that of being easily manipulable and carefully observable. 
The difference between experiments and simulations is supposed to lie elsewhere: 
in a genuine experiment, according to Collins, the scientist interacts with his 
objects of interest in a direct manner. Or perhaps we should say ‘almost direct’: 
the physicist Robert Millikan during his famous experiments to measure the charge 
of the electron “did not look directly at electric charges”, but rather at “the 
positions of the knobs that controlled the charge on the electrostatic plates”, and 
the long journey from there to the electron “goes via oil drops, gravitational pulls, 
microscopes, and so on” (Collins, 1991, p. 228). Where is the difference, then? 
 
I think that if there is a difference it must be to do with causal chains. One 
can tell a plausible story about the causal relationship between charge and 
the position of the knobs in the case of Millikan, whereas there is no causal 
relationship between the world and the results of a simulation except via the 
imagination of the simulator. [...] 
There does not seem to be a causal connection between economies and 
Smith, McCabe and Rassenti’s  observations. If you want to tell a causal 
story about the relationship between the things that happen in economies 
and the outcome of laboratory experiments it still has to be via the 
experimenter’s imagination. The experimenter has to imagine the 
relationship between economies and what happens in the lab. The economy 
is not to be found in the lab in the way the charge is to be found in 
Millikan’s apparatus. The direct causal story starts with people in labs 
playing a game (Collins, 1991, pp. 228-229, my emphasis). 
 
I have italicised Collins’ repeated use of the term ‘imagination’, for it clearly 
has to do with the notion of parallelism. In the jargon used so far, Collins is 
pointing out that a parallelism hypothesis or assumption bears the weight of the 
inferences from the laboratory to the real economic world. Collins, however, uses 
a misleading analogy when illustrating the difference between experiments in 
physics and in economics. In the physics case, he focuses on the causal chain 
linking laboratory (unobservable) entities with observable data, rather than 
laboratory entities with non-laboratory ones. But the latter question can in 
principle be raised also in the Millikan case: what is the relationship between 
Millikan’s laboratory electrons and real-world electrons? The relationship 
between the charges measured in his tightly controlled artificial environment and 
those of the electrons, say, in my chair? Millikan’s experiment was a good one if it 
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isolated (or we better say reproduced, given the complex preparation of 
materials required by such experiments) in the laboratory electrons with the same 
properties (among those of interest, like charge) as those to be found elsewhere, 
in the real world of unconstrained microparticles. But the same applies to 
economics: the fact that the step from the laboratory to the outside world is 
usually taken for granted by physicists does not mean that such a step is not 
taken. Parallelism may be invisible, but is always there. 
 
The distinction between simulations and experiments does not have to do with 
the observable vs. unobservable distinction, nor with the ‘internal’ vs. ‘external’ 
validity problem. Both hold (at different degrees, perhaps) in all sciences. Collins 
has the right intuition when pointing to causal chains as the key to this puzzle, but 
frames the question in the wrong fashion. Let us try a different approach, then. 
 
Herbert Simon once noticed that simulations rely on a process of abstraction 
from the fundamental principles governing the behaviour of the simulating and the 
target systems (1969, pp. 15-18). One starts from the hypothesis that the same 
‘organisational properties’ arise at a certain non-fundamental level from different 
substrata. If the hypothesis holds, it is legitimate to abstract from the latter and 
simulate the behaviour of a system A by observing the behaviour of another 
system B which happens to (or which is purposely built so as to) display these 
non-fundamental properties. 
 
Working on this idea, we can now propose a criterion to demarcate genuine 
experiments from ‘mere’ simulations. The difference lies in the kind of similarity 
relationship existing between, on the one hand, an experimental and its target 
system, and, on the other, a simulating and its target system. In the former case, 
the similarity is supposed to hold at a ‘deep’ and ‘material’ level, whereas in the 
latter case the similarity is admittedly only ‘abstract’ and ‘formal’. 
 
A common feature of all mediating entities is their greater manageability, 
simplicity, and controllability than that of the target systems they are supposed to 
help understand. A mediating entity may be used to study the functioning of some 
object that is too complex or can hardly be manipulated, but only if it resembles 
the target system in some relevant respect. At a very general level, two systems 
may be similar in the sense that some abstract relationship holds in both of them.  
For example, take the equation 
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m
d2x
dt2
+ β
dx
dt
+ kx = F(t). 
 
It describes the motion of an ideal mechanical system with one degree of 
freedom (like for instance a sphere attached to a spring): F(t) is the acting force, 
x is the motion of the mass m, k the elastic constant of the spring, and β  a friction 
coefficient. A formally identical equation is used to describe an electric charge 
moving in a section of electric circuit made of an autoinduction in series with a 
resistor and a condenser. In this case we have in fact 
 
L
d2Q
dt 2
+ R
Qx
dt
+
1
C
Q = V (t), 
 
where L is the autoinduction, R the resistance, Q the charge of the condenser 
at time t, and V(t) the voltage in the circuit. The abstract electric circuit can be 
taken as an analogical model of the abstract mechanical system constituted by a 
little sphere attached to a spring - because both are legitimate interpretations of 
the above equations (or rather: equation, singular). Tension is the analogical 
counterpart of force, electric current is the counterpart of velocity, charge is the 
counterpart of displacement, autoinduction is the counterpart of mass, and so on. 
We are here dealing with two theoretical models which are analogous at the 
formal level. The interpretation of the terms in the equations is different, depending 
on which model is chosen to interpret the mathematical relationship. 
 
As already pointed out in chapter five, theoretical models usually do not exist 
physically. They are mostly abstract entities ‘picked up’ by implicit definition by 
some set of sentences (the syntax of the theory). Theoretical models can however 
sometimes be used to construct concrete, material ones. Engineers, for example, 
often build scale models of cars, ships, and airplanes for testing purposes. 
Sometimes economists do it too: the famous ‘Phillips machine’ is a concrete 
model of a Keynesian economy made of pipes, valves, and coloured liquid, built 
for pedagogical purposes in order to show in a pictorial way the flow of income in 
a macroeconomy.244 This is however a peculiar case, and I shall here illustrate 
my point by relying on a physics example. 
 
A material model of the propagation of light, according to the wave theory, 
can be built with the aid of water waves in a ripple tank. At a rather general level 
                                                 
244See Morgan and Boumans (1998) for some history and methodology of the Phillips 
machine. 
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of analysis, in fact, any kind of wave can be modeled as a perturbation in a 
medium determined by two forces: the external force producing the perturbation, 
and the reacting force trying to restore the medium at rest. General relationships 
such as Hooke’s law or D’Alembert’s equation may hold for all kind of waves. 
More fundamental relationships, such as Maxwell’s equations, describe the 
properties of the electric and the magnetic field only. The values given by 
Maxwell’s equations can be used in D’Alembert’s wave equation in order to 
obtain, for instance, the velocity of propagation of an electromagnetic wave, 
because electricity behaves like a wave, although the fundamental principles at 
work are different from those at work in case of, e.g., water waves. The terms 
appearing in the equation describing the target and the model-systems are to be 
interpreted differently in the two cases: the forces at work are different in nature, 
and so are the two media in which waves propagate. The similarity between the 
theoretical model of light waves and the ripple-tank model holds at a very 
abstract level only. The two systems are made of different ‘stuff’: water waves are 
not light waves. 
 
Because of this formal similarity, though, the behaviour of light waves can be 
simulated in a ripple tank. Both light waves and water waves seem to obey the 
same non-structural law, despite their being made of different ‘stuff’. This is due 
to different reasons in each case: different underlying processes produce similar 
behaviour at a more abstract level of analysis.245 Similarly, human behaviour can 
to some extent be simulated with computerised models, but the former arise from 
‘machines’ made of flesh, blood, neurons, etc. rather than silicion chips. The 
Aristotelian distinction between ‘material’ and ‘formal’ causes seems to provide 
an appropriate framework for the present discussion:246 according to Aristotle 
one can ‘explain’ a given statue by means of its form, but also in terms of its 
material constituents, e.g. its being made of marble. This latter explanation is 
different from the ‘formal’ one in that marble itself may in principle be explained in 
terms of its own formal causes. Yet, for the task at hand (explaining the statue) 
one does not have to go as deep as that in the formal structure of the object under 
study. The material can be abstracted from for pragmatic reasons. The same with 
simulations: they are particularly valuable when one cannot manipulate nor 
                                                 
245Of course, if one believes in the reductionist story according to which everything 
physical is made of the same fundamental sub-atomic particles, then both light and water 
waves are ‘made of the same stuff’. But the reductionistic story is controversial (photons for 
example seem to have different properties from other particles), and at any rate the fact that 
everything is made of the same stuff does not play any relevant role in explaining why both 
systems display certain non-fundamental relations. 
246For an extended discussion of the Aristotelian point of view, cf. McMullin (1977). 
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perform controlled experiments on A, and thus looks for an analogous system B 
similar only up to a certain degree, in order to investigate or simply illustrate 
certain specific properties of A. 
 
7.3. Experimental simulations 
 
Let us now return to economics. The crucial presumption behind mediating 
experiments is that some relevant components of the laboratory system are made 
of the same ‘stuff’ as those of the target system. The experiment should feature 
the same causal processes that are at work in the real world, rather than display 
some abstract relationships by means of a different device. If the causal principles 
at work are different in the laboratory and in the target system, then the 
experiment is simply a bad one. It is a failed experiment, not a good simulation. 
 
This distinction helps to account for the advantages of laboratory 
experimentation, its use, and its being complementary to simulating techniques. 
Experiments are particularly useful when one has an imperfect understanding of 
the basic causal mechanisms of the system under study. They can be used in these 
contexts because the laboratory ‘stuff’ is assumed to be the same as the non-
laboratory ‘stuff’. For example, one can do experiments on market behaviour 
even without a proper understanding of the mechanisms of individual choice and 
belief formation. Experimental subjects may trade at a certain equilibrium price 
because they are acting in a fully rational way, or perhaps because they are 
following some rule of thumb, or even by sheer imitation. Whatever the real causal 
process, we can use laboratory tests to study the functioning of specific real world 
economies as long as we are confident that the same (unknown) basic principles 
of behaviour apply in both cases. 
 
An experiment can give us more confidence in a model, only if the model 
makes some contestable assumption about some component of the target system, 
and if the experiment includes the real component (for example, real human 
behaviour, las in Kagel and Levin’s experiments). An experiment that merely 
reproduces the assumptions of the model, for example paying subjects to act 
according to the behavioural theory of the model, does not test anything at all – 
except perhaps the incentive system. 
 
 Considerations of this kind have often been proposed by experimentalists to 
defend their methodology. Vernon Smith, for example, puts forward a double 
argument in support of his faith in the relevance of laboratory experimentation. 
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“The laboratory becomes a place where real people earn real money for making 
real decisions about abstract claims that are just as ‘real’ as a share of General 
Motors”. For this reason, “Laboratory experience suggests that all the 
characteristics of ‘real world’ behavior that we consider to be of primitive 
importance [...] arise naturally, indeed inevitably, in experimental settings” (1976, 
pp. 100-101). This reasoning supports experimentalists’ confidence in their 
results. To them, the ‘real’ character of experimental markets helps to bridge the 
gap between a theory and its intended target. “Laboratory microeconomies are 
real live economic systems, which are certainly richer, behaviorally, than the 
systems parametrized in our theories” (Smith, 1982, p. 923). Experimental 
economies are indeed supposed to work according to the same principles as the 
target systems in the intended domain of economic theory, because they are made 
of the same ‘material’. 
 
Simulations and experiments are therefore the appropriate research tools in 
different contexts. Roughly, simulations can be used in two different ways: (1) 
either to bootstrap from the fact that a given effect (which we have first observed 
in system A) has been produced by means of simulation B, to the fact that the 
relations governing the behaviour of B also govern the behaviour of A; (2) or to 
argue that a certain effect observed by simulating with B will also be observed in 
the case of A because the two are governed by similar relations.247 Both 
procedures are knowledge-producing ones. The point to be stressed, however, is 
that in both cases the governing relationships have to be fully specified for the 
simulations to be carried on. Simulations of this kind are ‘transparent boxes’, to 
which the old dictum applies: ‘the results of a simulation are only as good as the 
assumptions that you feed into it’. 
 
Geologists working in stratigraphy, for instance, study the structure of rock 
strata below the earth’s surface. They also investigate the process of formation of 
strata, but usually have to face very serious obstacles, such as the impossibility of 
doing controlled experiments (processes of sedimentation last for millenia and of 
course the target systems are too large to be manageable), the difficulty to gather 
data even about the present geography of the strata, the strong theory 
dependence of the interpreted data, and the complex interdependencies within 
geological systems. In order to solve at least some of these problems, 
stratigraphists have devised simulation techniques such as STRATAGEM, a 
                                                 
247One may be unable to experiment with A, or the equations describing A may be so 
complicated that they can be solved only by means of some ‘brute-force’ solution in B, etc. 
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computer-based modeling package used also by large companies such as Shell 
Oil.248 These simulation techniques work on the basis of a number of structural 
equations taken from the theory of ‘sequence stratigraphy’. The equations model 
the system’s outcome (the actual sedimentation) as a function of a number of 
variables such as the hydrodynamics of sediment deposition, the subsidence 
patterns, the global sea level, the amount of sediment supplied to the basin, etc. 
The point is that the outcome of the simulation is dependent on the approximate 
validity of the theory endorsed, and also on the correct specification of the initial 
conditions and of the values assigned to the free parameters in the equations (and 
these are all problematic assumptions to make in the specific case). 
 
Contrary to Collins, it is not necessarily true that “simulations do not have the 
epistemological priority that we accord to experiments” (1991, p. 229). Rather, 
the knowledge needed to run a good simulation is not the same as the one 
needed to run a good experiment. As noticed by Hughes, “computer 
experimentation [i.e. simulation] is in a crucial respect on a par with all other kinds 
of theoretical speculation” (1999, p. 63), in that it requires empirical 
confirmations. When reproducing a real-world system in the laboratory, similarly, 
the relationships which describe the behaviour of both systems are not well-
known in advance. But one does not have to specify the full set of structural 
equations governing the target system. The trick is to make sure that the target 
and the experimental system are similar in most relevant respects, so as to 
generalise the observed results from the laboratory to the outside world. 
Experimenters make sure that this is the case by using materials that resemble as 
closely as possible those of which the parts of the target system are made. They 
also make sure that the different components of the mimetic device are put 
together just like those of the target, and that nothing else is interfering. Of course, 
quite a lot of knowledge is required in order to do so, but no fundamental theory 
of how the target system works is needed. The laboratory system can be partly 
used as a ‘black box’ device. 
 
As we have seen in chapter five, Kagel and Levin claimed they had shifted the 
burden of proof by showing that a winner’s curse phenomenon can be observed 
in a laboratory ‘common value auction’ which is analytically analogous to (that is, 
it shares all the characteristics that auction theory deems relevant, with) the real 
OCS auctions that had originally attracted economists’ attention. The burden of 
                                                 
248I have learned about simulation techniques in geology from Francis Longworth - see his 
unpublished paper on the methodology of STRATAGEM. 
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proof was actually shifted because there was no reason to believe that the 
experimental system was different from the target system of interest. The 
same processes, the same causal principles were supposed to be at work in both 
cases - until proof to the contrary. Experimental systems thus are close to real 
world economies, because (when correctly designed) they are made of the same 
‘stuff’ as real world economies. No process of abstraction from the material 
forces at work is needed in order to draw the analogy from the laboratory to the 
outside world. One may abstract from ‘negligible’ causal factors, but not from the 
basic processes at work. The similarity is not merely formal, but holds at the 
material level as well. 
 
The difference between experiments and simulations can be best appreciated if 
one turns to ‘hybrid’ experiments. I call them ‘hybrids’ because they share 
characteristics of both ‘pure experiments’ and ‘pure simulations’ at the same 
time. Game theorists, for example, often impose for analytical reasons very tight 
restrictions on their models, by assuming for instance absolutely risk averse 
players. When experimenters try to test the predictions of such models, they have 
to make sure that such conditions are satisfied. In the particular case of risk 
aversion, they have two possible strategies: they can pre-test subjects and use for 
the purpose of the experiment only those who happen to display risk averse 
behaviour. Or they can use an ingenious experimental device invented by Roth 
and Malouf (1979): in order to ‘produce’ risk-averse behaviour, the 
experimenters use a ‘reward medium’ consisting of entry-tickets for lotteries. The 
lotteries can then be set so that the subjects are indeed maximising some ‘risk-
averse’ (i.e. concave from above) ‘medium function’ rather than their own, real 
utility function. The index of preferences is in this case simulated by means of the 
medium function. 
 
Or, to take a more familiar example, let us go back to Kagel and Levin’s 
experiments on the winner’s curse phenomenon: Kagel and Levin (1986) did not 
experiment on subjects who were uncertain about the value of the items to be 
auctioned in exactly the same way as an oil company manager is uncertain about 
the value of an auctioned tract. They rather provided each subject with a ‘private 
signal’ of the real value of the item, drawn from a lottery. They thus simulated 
uncertainty by means of a random draw, because auction theory models agents’ 
uncertainty as a probability distribution of this sort. The uncertainty arose from the 
interaction of experimental subjects with a random lottery device, rather than with 
an oil tract of unknown value. In order to do so, one needs to be very confident 
that such a way of modeling this particular aspect of the target system under study 
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is legitimate. One has to be reasonably sure, in other words, that that part of the 
theory is right.249 
 
That feature of the experiments was, so to speak, ‘hyper-realistic’: in the target 
economy, beliefs are formed by subjects facing an information set which is 
definitely less neat and ready-to-use than the one provided by the experimenters. 
Kagel and Levin’s subjects also received very quick feedback about the real 
value of the auctioned item, whereas in the real OCS auctions the real value of an 
oil tract is revealed only after many years and the process of belief revision may 
work differently. These experiments, then, shared some features of simulations, 
suggesting that there really is a continuum of cases rather than a sharp distinction. 
They are hybrid objects - ‘simulating experiments’, or if you prefer ‘experimental 
simulations’.250 
 
7.4. Mediating entities, mimetic devices 
 
If we take the above reasoning seriously, we must conclude that there exists a 
continuum of mediating entities - with different but somehow related properties, 
used in different but not entirely unrelated ways. They are, to borrow Galison and 
Assmus’ (1989) terminology, ‘mimetic devices’ used to reproduce the behaviour 
of some other system. On one extreme of this ideal taxonomy, there are abstract 
theoretical models; in the middle, we find a sequence of concrete models, 
simulating devices, and experimental systems. At the opposite end, the target 
systems that lucky scientists have a chance to manipulate, dissect and reassemble 
- in other words, to experiment upon without any mediation.  
                                                 
249One can object (as Robert Sugden has done in private correspondence) that laboratory 
and real world economies have to be seen as tokens of a same kind (‘the economy’). Thus, 
to ask whether uncertainty has been produced correctly in the laboratory would be like 
asking whether in an experiment to investigate the properties of steam, the boiler has been 
heated by burning coil rather than by a Bunsen burner: the heat is heat however it is 
produced, and obeys to the laws of thermodynamics. As I have argued in chapter four, 
however, this kind of reasoning does not seem to be warranted in economics, where 
universal covering laws are hard to find. If economic relationships hold on the ‘right’ 
background circumstances only, then experimental inferences have to be local in character. 
Of course there may be mechanisms general enough to support a wide range of inferences, 
but that is an empirical matter.  
250Hartmann (1996) uses the second label. 
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